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Trading and market forces have been an integral part of the development of the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), transforming the country from its early days primarily 
reliant on the pearling industry to the modern nation that it now is. Market forces 
have also impacted the development of the higher education sector in the UAE, 
shifting from a funding model that was primarily based on a centralized, input-based 
approach towards a more decentralized supply driven approach,  funding the public 
institutions on a per student basis, together with supplemental funding, based on 
purpose-specific criteria. During this shift towards a more decentralized funding 
model the federal government undertook some initial discussions on progressing 
funding from this supply driven approach (providing funds directly to institutions) to a 
demand driven approach (providing funds indirectly to institutions via vouchers 
supplied to students). The claim that vouchers promote improved quality and 
efficiency through competition was seen as a primary reason why the UAE 
government considered applying market forces to fund higher education. Increased 
awareness of both students and their parents of the cost of high education along 
with increased student choice to facilitate greater education diversity to support a 
pathway to a knowledge economy were additional considerations. Hypothesizing 
the problem, or problems, the UAE government was attempting to address by  
implementing voucher funding for higher education was alike to poising a solution in 
search of a problem, hence the title of this thesis: “Higher education vouchers: a 
solution in search of a problem.  A case study of the United Arab Emirates”.   
 
This study examines whether voucher funding within the UAE is possible (or not) 
and in what form and under what conditions. The study also seeks out the wider 
considerations on prerequisites for market-based funding models and potential 
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1. Chapter One: The Research Problem  
1.1. Background and Rationale for the Study 
Trading and the market economy have always been an integral part of the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), even before the British-Trucial Sheikhdoms treaty expired on 
1 December 1971 and the country gained its independence. During the 19th and 
early 20th century the pearling industry thrived, providing income and employment 
for the local people. The discovery of oil in the 1950’s, and the corresponding oil 
revenues, saw the beginning of a massive investment in infrastructure such as 
roads, housing, hospitals, schools, water and electricity services, airports and ports 
and many other projects to support the progress of the UAE (UAE Interact.com, 
2013). In the short time after gaining its independence the UAE has garnered a 
2012 GDP of $US 358.9 billion (The World Fact Book, 2013) and ranks 23 out of 
189 economies in the world for ease of doing business based on its economy and 
regulatory environment, ranked by the Doing Business 2013 Report published by 
the World Bank Group (World Bank Group, 2013).  
 
Market forces have also impacted the development of the higher education sector in 
the UAE, progressing from three federal higher education institutions to now the 
largest higher education hub of international branch campuses globally (Wilkins, 
2010). The first higher education institution in the UAE was the United Arab 
Emirates University, established in 1977 in Al Ain. This was followed in 1988 with 
the opening of the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT), which originally offered 
mainly vocational and technical programmes, but now also offers undergraduate 
and postgraduate degrees through a network of 16 campuses across the country. A 
third institution, Zayed University, was established by the federal government in 
1988 and has campuses in Dubai and Abu Dhabi (Wilkins, 2010). In addition to 
these three public, or federal institutions, there are now 74 private institutions (CAA, 
2014) in the UAE, with 37 of these being international branch campuses (Wilkins, 
2012). While no evidence is claimed for this significant rise in private institutions in 
the UAE one could argue that the three propositions listed by Gareth Williams for 
the case for market approaches to higher education funding could also be 
applicable to the UAE:  
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“One is the belief that the private sector can relieve governments of some of the 
cost burden. The second is that many of the benefits of higher education accrue to 
private individuals and they should be prepared to pay for them. However, private 
finance is not necessary for market mechanisms to operate and the third premise is 
that both external and internal efficiency improve if government agencies buy 
services from universities rather than make grants to them. More efficient 
institutions offering better value for money flourish while those that are less efficient 
lose out. Markets put the power in the hands of purchasers of higher education 
services, so the system has to be responsive to their demands. Advocates of 
markets define efficiency as the satisfaction of consumer wants at minimum costs” 
(Willliams, G., 1992, p. 138). 
 
Market forces have not only impacted the establishment of these private institutions 
within the UAE but also the changes in higher education financing. Gareth Williams, 
in his 1995 essay noted: 
 “A marked shift is occurring from input-based budgeting whereby the state supplies 
educational services, either directly or indirectly, and the main criterion determining 
what is provided is knowledge and expertise, towards output and performance-
based budgeting, in which suppliers receive resources to the extent that they 
provide services that satisfy consumers” (Willliams, G., 1995, p.174). 
 
A similar trend has occurred with the funding of public higher education institutions 
within the UAE. The past funding model that was primarily based on a centralized, 
input-based approach moved towards a more decentralized supply driven approach 
when the UAE Cabinet in 2010 approved  funding the public institutions on a per 
student basis, together with supplemental funding, based on purpose-specific 
criteria. This new per student funding method was developed through the Office of 
Presidential Affairs.  During this shift towards a more decentralized funding model 
the Office of Presidential Affairs undertook some initial discussions with outside 
consultants on progressing funding from this supply driven approach (providing 
funds directly to institutions) to a demand driven approach (providing funds indirectly 
to institutions via vouchers supplied to students). For the purpose of this study this 
raises the question as to the reasons why voucher funding was being considered by 
the federal government and how it saw its higher education system supporting 
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certain social, economic and political objectives. As the brief provided to the 
consultants was not made available, and given that during the course of this study it 
became apparent there was a lack of governance within the federal government in 
exercising oversight of the higher education system and how this would support the 
nation’s strategic priorities, the implication was that consideration of voucher funding 
for the federal institutions was primarily one of market forces increasing competition, 
including greater competition from private institutions, which would increase the 
efficiencies and quality at the federal institutions. One could argue that the market 
forces that have driven the rapid development of the UAE economy were also being 
considered to drive competition and efficiencies within higher education. Putting 
funding in the hands of students would require higher education institutions to 
compete for students and to realign their priority from responding to government 
departments to meeting the needs of students.  
 
Increased awareness for both students and their parents of the cost of high 
education was another potential consideration of the UAE government for 
implementing voucher funding. While the UAE prides itself on providing for the 
needs of its citizens, which includes free education at the primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels, there is also the realization that this type of ‘welfare state’ will not be 
sustainable in the long run and that citizens should become more aware of the costs 
of services made available to them and should hold some accountability for them. 
While the funding received by institutions under a voucher funding scheme will be 
determined by the students that actually enrol in that institution, one can argue that 
there is fundamentally little difference between a voucher funding system and a 
formulaic funding system based on student enrolment. The difference, proponents 
argue, is the psychological effect that voucher funding may have on students; it 
shows the investment the government is making on behalf of the students, money 
that could be ‘left on the table’ if not utilized, thereby encouraging the aspect of 
student choice and advancing the government policy of  increasing participation. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, there is a dominant view today that we have 
entered a knowledge economy with a shift from an industrial society into a so-called 
network society, characterized by a large degree of individualism, sometimes 
referred to as mass-individualization. The implication for higher education 
institutions is that they will be faced with increasing student demands for diversity in 
educational services, not just for the years after high school, but increasingly for 
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lifelong learning.  Proponents see vouchers as the mechanism to facilitate student 
choice for education diversity; that vouchers could ultimately enable students to 
tailor their individual learning programmes through a combination of different 
faculties and institutions. The UAE, as discussed in Chapter 5, wants to transform 
its economy into a model where growth is driven by knowledge and innovation. As 
such, voucher funding could be seen by the UAE government as the mechanism to 
facilitate increased education diversity to support its pathway to a knowledge 
economy. 
 
Hypothesizing the problem, or problems, the UAE government was attempting to 
address by  implementing voucher funding for higher education was alike to poising 
a solution in search of a problem, hence the title of this thesis: “Higher education 
vouchers: a solution in search of a problem.  A case study of the United Arab 
Emirates”.  The approach taken in this study was to examine the policy issues and 
implications for implementing voucher funding for higher education within the UAE. 
Key issues for consideration included funding structures, levels and sources; 
operational and capital expenditures; student choice and accessibility; protection of 
subjects; quality assurance; and administrative requirements. As such the main 
research question was stated as: 
What are the consequences, intended and unintended, of implementing a 
voucher system for funding higher education within the United Arab 
Emirates? 
 
While the research question would seek out whether voucher funding within the 
UAE is possible (or not) and in what form and under what conditions, it would also 
seek out the wider considerations on prerequisites for market-based funding models 
and potential recommendations for a regulatory framework. 
 
By putting purchasing power directly into the hands of students, voucher funding 
can be seen as a powerful means of applying market forces within higher education 
funding. However the application of market forces to higher education funding also 
raises the issue of market failure. The conditions that Jongbloed (2003, p.114) 
identifies for a market (for providers: freedom of entry, freedom to specify the 
product, freedom to use available resources, freedom to determine prices; for 
consumers: freedom to choose provider, freedom to choose product, adequate 
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information on prices and quality, direct and cost-covering prices paid)  could be 
summarized as autonomy, open markets and well-informed decentralized decision 
making for both providers and consumers of higher education (Teixeira, 2004, p. 4). 
Deficiencies in these market conditions would ultimately lead to market failure. In 
considering voucher funding of higher education policy makers therefore need to 
consider the constraints of markets. Jongbloed (2000, p. 18) when presenting Barr’s 
argument that “vouchers should be thought of as a continuum, from zero per cent 
constrained (‘law of the jungle’) to 100 per cent constrained (‘pure central planning’) 
or anywhere in between” (Barr 1998, p. 352)  states “policy makers should consider 
a variety of constraints in choosing their position on this continuum: 
1. Protecting subjects. Some courses (e.g. classics) need special protection, 
others need less protection. This can be arranged by tying some vouchers to 
specific subjects. 
2. Protecting institutions. For reasons of regional balance it could be necessary 
to tie vouchers to universities in particular parts of the country. 
3. Protecting individuals. There are good reasons to offer larger vouchers to 
students from low income families. 
4. Protecting quality. One of the best arguments in favour of competition is that 
competition creates a strong incentive for higher education institutions to 
offer quality to their students. Nevertheless, at the same time it is important 
to protect standards, for example, by monitoring quality and publishing the 
results.” 
 
It can be argued therefore that market forces need to be accompanied by 
government regulation to ensure the constraints posed by voucher funding are 
contained. This study therefore examines the implications for a voucher system 
within the UAE along with the wider considerations on prerequisites for market-
based funding models and potential recommendations for a regulatory framework. 
 
1.2. Significance of the Study and Research Approach 
A primary goal of any study can be stated as that of advancing knowledge in a 
chosen field. While there are numerous examples of voucher funding for primary 
and secondary education, there are few examples of voucher funding for higher 
education. A number of countries have considered implementing vouchers for 
funding higher education, as is discussed in the literature review, but few have 
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actually proceeded and the benefits claimed have been for the most part theoretical 
rather than empirical. In the case of the UAE, limited research has been conducted 
into the study of implementing voucher funding for higher education. For this project 
a case study was utilized to develop generalizations and pathways to assess 
whether a voucher funding scheme would deliver the results expected of the UAE 
government, and to ascertain whether these generalizations may also be applicable 
to others considering implementing vouchers for funding higher education, taking 
into consideration the unique characteristics of the UAE. The findings derived from 
this case study are spelled out in the Conclusions and Recommendations chapter 
and are offered as advancing knowledge in an area where there has been limited 
experience. 
  
1.3. Organization of the Study 
The thesis is composed of six chapters. 
Chapter One introduces the research problem and provides the background, 
rationale and significance of the study, along with the research methodology 
applied. 
 
Chapter Two presents an overview of the literature on vouchers, encompassing 
discussion on the description of vouchers, their historical origins and various 
voucher models implemented for primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
Arguments for and against vouchers are presented along with discussion on 
countries that have considered implementing vouchers for higher education and the 
rationale for why, and why not, this has materialized and whether there are market 
based alternatives to vouchers for higher education. 
 
Chapter Three provides an account of the history of funding higher education in the 
UAE. Jongbloed’s (2004) funding model analysis is applied to the UAE experience 
to illustrate how the funding scheme is progressing from a centralized, input-based 
approach to a more decentralized approach where the supply driven model 
(providing funding to institutions on a per student basis) is currently being 
implemented and a demand driven approach (funding provided indirectly to 
institutions via vouchers supplied to students) has been considered. The 
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advantages and limitations of the funding schemes identified are discussed in this 
chapter and provide the background for the analysis of a implementing a voucher 
funding scheme in the UAE. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the research methodology for the project and identifies the 
rationale for using a case study as the method of data collection. The research 
question and sub-questions are identified, along with the data analysis approach 
and discussion on the limitations of validity and reliability. 
 
Chapter Five presents the empirical findings and implications of adopting a voucher 
funding scheme for higher education within the UAE and discusses the 
generalizations and pathways that would need to be considered for such 
implementation. 
 
Chapter Six presents the conclusions and recommendations to the research 
















2. Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1. Literature Review Approach 
Rudestam and Newton (1992, p. 47) state that the literature review “is the exact 
study that needs to be done at this time to move knowledge in this field a little 
further along”. As the UAE federal government has given consideration to voucher 
funding for higher education, and given the limited examples of such funding in 
practice for higher education, the literature review is essential in addressing the 
following questions as adapted by Silverman (2005, p.295): 
 ”What do we already know about the topic? 
 What do you have to say critically about what is already known? 
 Has anyone else ever done anything exactly the same? 
 Has anyone else done anything that is related? 
 Where does your work fit in with what has gone before? 
 Why is your research worth doing in light of what has already been done?” 
 
Creswell (2003) identifies three approaches to consider for the literature review, as 













Table 1 : Using Literature in a Qualitative Study 
Use of the Literature Criteria Examples of Suitable 
Types of Studies 
The literature is used to 
“Frame” the problem in 
the introduction of the 
study. 
There must be some 
literature available 
Typically used in all 
qualitative studies, 
regardless of type. 
The literature is presented 
in a separate section as a 
“review of the literature” 
An approach often 
acceptable to an audience 
most familiar with the 
traditional, positivist 
approach to literature 
review 
This approach is used with 
those studies employing a 
strong theory and 
literature background at 
the beginning of a study, 
such as ethnographies 
and critical theory studies. 
The literature is presented 
in the study at the end; it 
becomes a basis for 
comparing and 
contrasting findings of the 
qualitative study. 
This approach is most 
suitable for the “inductive” 
process of qualitative 
research; the literature 
does not guide and direct 
the study but becomes an 
aid once patterns or 
categories have been 
identified. 
This approach is used in 
all types of qualitative 
designs, but it is most 
popular with grounded 
theory, where one 
contrasts and compares 
his or her theory with other 
theories found in the 
literature. 
Source: Creswell (2003, p.31) 
 
While the analyses of many different voucher models are present in the literature, 
these have related primarily to the funding of primary and secondary education with 
limited review of funding higher education. As such the literature review was used to 
“frame” the problem in the introduction of the study rather than a basis for 
contrasting findings of a qualitative study. In addition a further review was done in 
and around the data collection and analysis (as advocated by Silverman (2005)) to 
confirm that the most relevant and current literature was reviewed based on the 
findings and analysis of the data. The literature examined included books and 
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academic journal articles, along with newspaper and magazine articles which 
focused on voucher funding of higher education.  
 
2.2. Background to Literature Review 
The dominant view today is that we have entered a global knowledge economy 
driven by the application of new technologies and reduced barriers to international 
trade and investment (Brown & Lauder, 2006). According to the World Bank (2000) 
human capital in the United States is now estimated to be at least three times more 
important than physical capital. In this ‘age of human capital’ Becker (2002) states 
that the “prosperity of individuals and nations will rest on the skills, knowledge and 
enterprise of all rather than the elite few that drove industrial capitalism in the 
twentieth century.”  As Castells (1998) states, society is evolving from an industrial 
society into a so-called network society, characterized by a large degree of 
individualism, sometimes referred to as mass-individualization. The implication for 
higher education institutions is that they will be faced with increasing student 
demands for diversity in educational services, not just for the years after high 
school, but increasingly for lifelong learning. Jongbloed (2004 p. 105) argues these 
developments towards mass-individualization, the knowledge society and lifelong 
learning have consequences for the way higher education is managed, funded and 
regulated by public authorities. He further states public authorities will no longer be 
able to centrally plan the higher education sector due to the variations and 
unpredictability of markets. Instead he argues the choices made by students and 
the resulting competition amongst higher education institutions will be the leading 
principle. From a funding perspective this self-regulation by students and higher 
education institutions would imply “demand-side” financing, where financing is 
wholly determined by the “customer”, in this case students. This is in contrast to the 
conventional form of “supply-side” funding whereby grants are provided by the 
funding authority directly to institutions that “supply” the provision, that is, the 
universities in higher education. Demand-side funding, as argued by Vossensteyn & 
Jongbloed (2007), gives students a greater say in what happens in higher education 
institutions. They can ‘vote with their feet’ (money follows students) which will force 
higher education institutions to focus more on the demands of students and on the 
quality of programmes and services being offered. This increased focus on quality 
and the resulting competition amongst institutions for students, it is argued, should 
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result in greater efficiencies and greater value for the funds provided by the 
government. The most far-reaching version of demand-side funding may be 
vouchers, which aligns with the wider argument about the dominance of neo-liberal 
thinking in many areas of life. 
 
Within the following sections vouchers will be discussed as to their definition, 
historical origins, different types, advantages, disadvantages, current practices in 
higher education and finally potential alternatives to vouchers. Following this the 
discussion turns to a review of the funding of higher education within the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and the recent consideration within the federal government of 
implementing a voucher scheme for funding the public higher education institutions.  
 
2.3. Description of vouchers 
From the literature (e.g. Levin 1983) vouchers are identified as a powerful means of 
demand-side financing. The voucher itself is a kind of “coupon with a prescribed 
purchasing power, over a specified service” (Blaug, 1967). The value of the voucher 
reflects the average per capita costs of a specific amount, and type, of education. In 
a voucher system, students (or prospective students) would receive vouchers (or 
entitlements) to buy the educational services from higher educational institutions 
and the institutions in turn would present the vouchers received from the enrolled 
students to the government in exchange for their funding value. The higher 
educational institutions, therefore, would no longer receive direct funding from the 
government, in the form of an object subsidy, but rather would receive indirect 
funding through the redemption of the voucher. The vouchers themselves can be 
considered as object subsidies, which are now provided to the students rather than 
the institutions, because the students can spend these subsidies only on education; 
students do not realize an increase in their free disposable income. 
 
The indirect funding of institutions and student choice as a means of distributing 
funds are key factors of a voucher system. In addition there are a number of other 
considerations inherent with vouchers including (Bekhradnia & Massy, 2009): 
 Whether vouchers can be used in private universities as well as public. A 
crucial aspect of the voucher scheme is freedom to choose and according to 
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Barr (1988) would require the inclusion of private institutions in the provision 
of higher education. Students would need to be allowed to cash in their 
vouchers at private institutions provided they comply with the minimum 
quality standards of the public ones. 
 Whether vouchers can be used only at the undergraduate level or if they 
would be extended to cover postgraduate studies. As well, the length of 
study. Whether vouchers would be limited to the standard three or four years 
for undergraduate degrees and two years for postgraduate degrees, or 
longer. 
 Whether voucher values would be differentiated depending on which 
institution they were used at and for which subjects. Institutions would be 
reluctant to offer expensive programmes such as medicine or engineering if 
voucher values were not greater than for less expensive programmes. 
 Whether universities can charge a fee to top up the value of a voucher, and 
the extent of the fee, along with the total number of students that could be 
recruited.  
While vouchers are generally associated with market driven economics, the 
considerations discussed above demonstrate that as with any market-based 
initiatives, there are given constraints that will affect the total amount of funding 
available and the distribution of such funds. 
 
2.4. Voucher Models 
The idea of an education voucher is not a recent innovation. West (1967) traces its 
origin back to Tom Paine’s Right of Man (1790) however the economist Milton 
Friedman (1962) is usually credited with development of the idea in modern times. 
Within the literature several different voucher proposals for compulsory education 
have been described, of which three well known models will be discussed below. 
The liberal market approach, represented by Friedman, has the dominant objective 
of improving educational quality and efficiency through competition amongst higher 
education institutions. A second model, the income-linked market model of Peacock 
and Wiseman is an amendment of Friedman’s voucher scheme and proposes that 
vouchers be considered as a part of taxable income to promote fairer access to 
education. A third model, the social policy approach, represented by Jencks, views 
vouchers as having the capability of increasing the equality of educational 
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opportunity as a policy objective. These three models deal primarily with compulsory 
education. For higher education, voucher schemes are rare. The model proposed 
by Levin (1983) appears to be the most elaborate and consistent and will be 
presented after the discussion on the voucher plans for compulsory education. 
 
Liberal Market Model – Milton Friedman 
Friedman was the first economist credited with the idea of educational vouchers 
providing market competition in education while still having financial support from 
government (Jongbloed, Koelman 2000). Friedman (1962) distinguishes between 
three kinds of education: compulsory education, higher education and vocational 
education. Compulsory education, he argues, has to be funded by “giving parents 
vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on 
‘approved’ educational services”. Friedman presents a similar proposal for higher 
education whereby the value of a voucher is the same for each child and can be 
spent at any institution, both public and private. Institutions would be able to charge 
top-up fees above the value of the voucher and would be free to choose their 
students. The advantage of the voucher scheme in higher education, according to 
Friedman, is that it would encourage competition amongst the institutions for 
students thereby increasing efficiencies and putting greater controls on government 
spending for higher education.  
 
Vocational education, Friedman argues, is an investment in human capital, similar 
to investment in physical capital. As such it would not have the same external 
effects that should be supported by government funding. Instead Friedman 
advocates the establishment of a loan facility, or individual learning accounts that 
students would draw on. Students would repay these loans based on a schedule 
related to the additional income earned as a result of the vocational education 
received. 
 
In summary Friedman’s concept of vouchers places a greater emphasis of efficiency 
issues and less so on equity issues, such as access to higher education. Allowing 
institutions to charge additional top-up fees could result in lower income families not 
being able to enrol their children in institutions charging high tuition fees. This 
drawback in Friedman’s voucher scheme has led to alternative models. 
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Income-Linked Model – Peacock and Wiseman 
Peacock and Wiseman (1964) provide an amendment to Friedman’s voucher model 
whereby the voucher is considered to be part of the taxable income “so that under a 
progressive income tax system the rich would not retain its full money.” They argue 
that the value of the voucher would therefore be higher for children from lower-
income families thereby reducing the unfair effect of access to education for higher 
tuition institutions. In reality it is unlikely that the purchasing power between low and 
high income families would be represented by the value of the voucher adjusted for 
income tax, or if low income families would perceive this adjustment in purchasing 
power. Jencks (1970) acknowledges that “legislatures may provide poor parents 
with slightly larger vouchers than rich parents, but (…) the difference is not likely to 
compensate the poor for their inability to spend private funds on education”. 
 
Compensatory Market Model – Jencks 
Equal access to education is the main emphasis of Jencks’ model. His model has 
three main characteristics (Jongbloed, Koelman 2007, p. 10): 
“It favours the market and competition among suppliers, but market 
competition ought to be regulated to become effective. 
It introduces a compensatory element in order to avoid economic, religious 
and racial barriers and to promote social mobility between classes. 
Schools where demand exceeds supply must allocate at least half of their 
places by ballot”. 
 
Under the compensatory model schools would not be able to charge tuition beyond 
the value of the voucher. Poorer families would receive a second, compensatory 
voucher inversely related to their income. Students from low-income families would 
therefore receive additional funding and as such should have access to education 
equal to those students from higher income families. Even if parents were willing to 
supplement, or top-up, the voucher value, this would not be allowed. Jencks’ model 
aims to support the prevention of social and economic segregation – children would 




The three voucher models discussed above have shown the trade-off between 
individual freedom of choice (efficiency) and equality of educational opportunity 
(equity). From the previous discussion on the pros and cons of vouchers, it was 
argued that in the view of its proponents, vouchers will increase efficiency and 
consumer sovereignty. Opponents to voucher schemes question the efficiency 
advantages stating it is strongly related to whether parents are sufficiently well 
informed to make decisions regarding the standards of their child’s school. In regard 
to equity, opponents of voucher schemes argue inequality to education access will 
increase, both in terms of quantity and quality, by social class, though less so under 
Jencks’ social policy model than under a liberal market approach such as the 
Friedman model. 
 
The discussion thus far on voucher schemes has focused primarily on compulsory 
education as most of the academic literature has addressed this. Voucher schemes 
for higher education are rare. The voucher model proposed by Levin (1983) appears 
to be the most elaborated and consistent plan. The Levin model contains five key 
elements (Oosterbeek, 1998, p. 219): 
“Students receive vouchers (entitlements). Through their enrolment pattern 
they directly determine the amount of funding those higher education 
institutions (HEIs) will receive. If a student spends a voucher to attend a 
specific programme at a HEI of his/her choice, the government is obliged to 
pay a pre-determined amount of money to the institution that offers the 
programme. 
A prerequisite for a HEI to be eligible for governmental funding is that it must 
be accredited. Not only regular institutions, however, are considered for 
accreditation. In principle, every supplier of higher education courses that 
meets specific quality standards can qualify for accreditation. This means 
that new suppliers get a possibility to enter the market. Furthermore, by not 
restricting accreditation and governmental funding to the traditional suppliers 
of higher education, Levin’s voucher scheme can also include on-the-job 
training programme. 
The voucher is not necessarily a grant, but may also contain a mixture of 
grant and loan. The composition of the voucher, in this respect, may vary 
with the type of programme and student characteristics. For example, for 
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studies that generate relative large externalities, the vouchers contain a 
large grant component. Moreover, based on equity considerations, it could 
be considered to give vouchers with a larger grant-component to students 
from low-income families. Another policy option could be to endow students 
with lower initial ability with more vouchers than the other students. Finally, it 
is important to note that the possibility of a loans component in the voucher 
scheme creates the option to combine a voucher scheme with a loan 
scheme (e.g. where repayments on loans are based on the income earned 
by the borrower). 
Vouchers retain their real value during the entire lifetime of the owner. This 
makes it possible to combine a voucher scheme with the policy goal of 
lifelong learning, which is becoming more and more important in a 
knowledge-based economy. 
 
Information plays an important role in the market system, such as a voucher 
scheme. Therefore, Levin is aware of the need to provide accurate 
information to demanders and providers of higher education and proposes to 
establish a special agency to collect and disseminate information about 
institutions and courses in the higher education system. Potential students 
should have quick access to relevant and accurate information about 
programme, course content, costs, quality of teachers, labour-market 
position of graduates, et cetera. At the same time, suppliers of higher 
education programme should be well-informed about enrolment patterns and 
new labour-market requirements. The same agency could play the role of 
administrator, bookkeeper, controller and collector of the vouchers.”  
 
2.5. Arguments for vouchers 
The arguments for vouchers are generally aligned with market driven economic 
models. The benefits espoused however are for the most part theoretical rather than 
empirical, since there is no experience of the successful use of vouchers in higher 
education. The effect of a voucher scheme, it is argued, is that providers of higher 
education are forced to be more responsive to the needs and preferences of their 
customers (i.e. students, business). (Jongbloed, Koelman 2000). Student choice, it 
is argued, will be strengthened. Putting funds in the hands of students will empower 
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them as they will choose which institution at which to cash in their voucher. This 
entitlement may also have the psychological effect of making students aware of the 
value of higher education and the benefit of utilizing this resource rather than 
wasting it.  
 
Another argument for increasing the power of the consumer (students and parents) 
and reducing that of the supplier (government funding agency) is that it will increase 
competition. Institutions faced with this increased competition will need to become 
more responsive to student needs in terms of delivery methods of instruction, 
flexibility in learning routes, and programmes offered. Increased competition will 
require institutions to become more efficient while at the same time increasing the 
quality of services delivered. Proponents argue that the efficiency gains to be 
realized through increased competition, together with efficiencies that could be 
realized within the government funding agencies as bureaucratic controls are 
reduced in line with indirect funding, should translate into a reduction in the cost of 
education per student. Governments, it is argued, should be able to educate more 
students for the funds they are providing. 
 
Vouchers, argued by some proponents, will also facilitate widening participation and 
increasing demand. Greater opportunities will be provided for lower income families 
and minorities as vouchers will provide them the same access to higher education 
institutions as higher income families. Open-administration policies would make 
institutions more responsive to the educational needs of minority groups (Davis, 
1983). 
 
Finally, proponents of vouchers argue that the amount of private funding in higher 
education will increase as individuals top-up the voucher to match the fees charged 
by universities – assuming universities will be allowed to charge higher fees than 
the value of the voucher. It is believed many parents would be prepared to 
supplement vouchers from their own income, thereby increasing the total money 




2.6. Arguments against vouchers 
Opponents of education vouchers have numerous arguments against their use to 
fund higher education. A number of higher education researchers have focused on 
the underlying principles that define and distinguish the market and the academy 
(e.g. Dill and Soo, 2004; Geiger, 2004; Massy, 2004; Newman et al., 2004). Dill and 
Soo (2004) contend that market assumptions may not directly apply to higher 
education institutions, citing the example that efficient markets require transparent 
transactions where consumers and producers have perfect or complete information 
about the commodity. Massy (2004) doubts whether students and institutions 
possess or can acquire the information needed to understand the long-term 
economic, political, and social value of a college education. Market analysis 
therefore does not tell the full story. Students may decide to enrol at higher 
institutions based on marketing initiatives or a host of other reasons.  Likewise the 
decisions made by academic leaders to offer or expand new programmes, or to 
close other programmes, relate to many reasons, are not fully explained through 
market analysis. 
 
Given the competition amongst universities to attract students, opponents to 
vouchers express a concern that universities may feel pressure to admit more 
students and lower standards. Staff as well may feel pressured to award more 
favourable results in order to remain an attractive student choice. 
 
Student choice is also limited by geographical factors. Most voucher proponents 
reference their models to urban settings where a greater diversity of institutions is 
available and public transportation facilitates access. The same diversity and 
accessibility is not available in rural areas within a reasonable travel distance and is 
a constraint that would hamper access for this segment of the population. 
 
Student choice is also constrained by the capacity of physical facilities and 
infrastructure. Hough (1987) argues that that the implementation of education 
vouchers have the long term effect of popular institutions needing to expand, 
contract more buildings and appoint more staff while unpopular institutions would 
decline in numbers or even have to close. The result would be a mismatch and 
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waste of physical spaces in the unpopular institutions. Even the popular institutions 
could face the possibility of wasted infrastructure investment if enrolments do not 
materialize as planned. Institutions faced with the uncertainty and instability of 
funding if based solely on student demand would likely exercise extreme caution in 
investing heavily in facilities and infrastructure which in turn may result in less 
recruitment of students. This could have the opposite effect on participation from 
that originally sought. 
 
The implementation of a voucher system involves substantial administrative support 
and cost. Individual training careers will need to be maintained along with the 
individual funding allocated by subject and year. Even proponents of a voucher 
scheme like Levin conclude that “the shift from the existing system to a voucher 
system with a well-functioning school market place in which adequate transportation 
and information is provided will demand considerable additional resources for 
education beyond those allocated for educational vouchers and instructional 
services” (Levin, 1998, p. 373). 
 
From a government funding perspective, arguments against the use of vouchers 
relate primarily to controlling government expenditure and a loss in steering the 
higher education system. While the argument for vouchers is that they will reduce 
the cost of education per student given the efficiency gains realized through 
competition, unless a limit is put on the total number of students that can attend 
institutions, a government would face an open-ended financial commitment which it 
would not be able to afford. Governments would need to limit the number of 
students it would fund which would defeat the key aims of a voucher of widening 
and increasing competition along with increasing student choice. An alternative to 
limiting the number of students a government would fund would be to adjust the 
value of the voucher depending on the total students to be funded – the result being 
that students from one year of a course could receive less funding than those from 
another year and would need to supplement the shortfall themselves. 
 
Opponents to a voucher system argue that the public interest extends beyond 
producing the maximum number of students as cheaply as possible – that 
universities are a resource and service to their communities, they conduct research 
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and they should support the strategic interests of the nation. Left simply to student 
choice enrolments in subjects such as physics or engineering may fall below the 
levels required to support the strategic and economic objectives of a nation. 
Likewise with programmes with high cultural value but small enrolments. These 
programmes could be in danger of being closed as they may not be economically 
viable to operate in a market environment. Universities usually are a primary 
depository of the history and understanding of a country’s culture. The on-going 
stewardship of this function could be put at risk if simply left to market forces. 
Governments as such will need to look at certain constraints or regulations to 
protect subjects that are in the interest of the country, be they economic or cultural. 
 
Barr (1998) argues that vouchers allow the intervention of the government to foster 
educational and distributional objectives. He concludes that vouchers should not be 
viewed as the only approach to competition but rather that “vouchers should be 
thought of as a continuum, from 0 per cent constrained (‘law of the jungle’) to 100 
per cent constrained (‘pure central planning’) or anywhere in between”. In choosing 
their position on this continuum, governments should consider a number of 
constraints, as identified by Jongbloed, Koelman (2000, p.18), such as the 
protection of subjects, where specific vouchers could be tied to certain courses, for 
example classics, to ensure their continuation; protecting institutions, where 
vouchers could be tied to particular regions of the country to ensure regional 
balance and accessibility; protecting individuals, where vouchers could be offered to 
low-income families to facilitate equality of access; and protecting quality, to ensure 
that standards are maintained through quality assurance regimes as higher 
education institutions compete for more students. 
 
Barr’s conclusion that vouchers are not the only approach to competition brings up 
the issue of market-based alternatives to vouchers. This will be reviewed in a 





2.7. Examples of Vouchers in Higher Education 
While one can reference the analysis of many different voucher models in the 
literature, there has been very little empirical testing of ideas (Jongbloed, Koelman 
2000). Although the theoretical advantages or disadvantages of vouchers can be 
documented, good theory does not always translate into good policy. In theory, 
vouchers are identified as an effective means of providing greater choice to 
students in selecting a higher education institution. In reality it is unclear whether 
this opportunity is simply preference or forced choice as family resources, 
geography and admission requirements can ultimately determine which institution a 
student will enrol at. Likewise, vouchers are credited with facilitating institutional 
competitiveness and efficiency (Jongbloed, Koelman 2000). Again there is a lack of 
relevant research that demonstrates that a voucher system could enable weaker 
universities to compete with universities that are dominant as a result of their 
superior buildings, strong academic programmes and positive reputation. 
 
Predicting the outcomes from any voucher programme is uncertain because 
outcomes are contingent on the demand for postsecondary students, the availability 
of student places, tuition stability and the terms and conditions of specific 
programmes (Mason, 1975). In short, the literature on voucher schemes poses a 
number of intriguing issues that need further examination. 
 
While examples of effective voucher systems have been identified around the world 
to fund school-level education there is only very limited experience of vouchers in 
higher education. The Higher Education Policy Institute, in the paper Vouchers as a 
Mechanism for Funding Higher Education (Bekhradnia, Massy 2009) identifies the 
state of Colorado, USA as the only example in the developed world where vouchers 
have been introduced and have effectively and comprehensively funded higher 
education. The paper also identifies the Republic of Kazakhstan as having 
introduced vouchers, although these have been limited to a relatively small number 
of the highest achieving students. As the majority of students and universities did 
not receive any government funding at all, there was little learnt from the voucher 




The Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) in a study for the 
University Grants Committee Hong Kong (Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 2007) identified 
recent developments in Australia, Colorado, Germany and the Netherlands as the 
most relevant and recent experiences with voucher-type practices in higher 




The state of Colorado put into law the College Opportunity Fund (COF) on May 10, 
2004. Through the adoption of this legislation Colorado set out to address three 
pressing policy issues (Lewis 2006). First, under the voucher system the revenues 
collected by institutions would no longer be subject to the state’s revenue limits 
under the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR).  TABOR required voter approval on 
local and state tax increases and limited growth in expenditures to increases in 
inflation and population growth. Second, the voucher scheme was seen as a new 
market-based accountability framework to replace a previously failed accountability 
system set out to measure institutional performance against state-wide performance 
standards. Third, the voucher scheme was seen as a means of providing greater 
participation in higher education, especially for students from underrepresented 
racial/ethnic or low-income backgrounds and male students. This increased access 
was to be facilitated through lower costs to student education as a result of market 
competition amongst institutions and by increasing the awareness of students of the 
funding allocated directly to them versus the previous invisible subsidizations 
provided to the institutions. Vossensteyn and Jongbloed (2007) also identify an 
increase in the quality of higher education as an intended outcome of the 
introduction of vouchers in Colorado. Institutions spending more time on attracting 
students rather than lobbying government for additional funding would place a 
stronger focus on students which should increase the quality and relevance of 
higher education. 
 
By adopting the new funding system higher education institutions in Colorado no 
longer receive direct lump-sum funding from the state. Instead their funding comes 
in two forms: 1) resident undergraduate students, with few exceptions, receive a 
state stipend to offset their tuition costs. (In 2005-06, the initial year, the stipend was 
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$2400 or $80 per credit hour) and 2) additional funding is provided through new fee-
for-service contracts designed to provided funding for specific programmes, such as 
graduate education, basic skills courses and rural education. These fee-for- service 
contracts recognize that some institutions have higher costs than others and that a 
single voucher would not recognize this- which in effect undermines the efficiency 
argument for vouchers. The Colorado scheme also includes a performance contract 
through which the state would identify its priorities and reward universities for 
meeting them, although these have yet to be implemented. 
 
According to an evaluation of the Colorado College Opportunity Fund (Longanecker, 
Prescott 2009) the voucher scheme succeeded in exempting higher education 
institutions from TABOR but it failed to foster more consciously market-oriented 
behaviour among institutions and it failed to lead to improvements in access. In 
assessing what went wrong the evaluation states that enrolment growth was not 
funded and that the fee-for-service funding was never well defined, nor change 
oriented. In addition funds were shifted between the stipend and the fee-for-service 
contracts which essentially gutted both policies of any chance of driving institutional 
behaviours. Finally performance contracts were not accompanied with rewards or 
penalties based on performance. At present Colorado is reviewing its policy options 
regarding the voucher scheme. 
 
Australia 
On March 13th, 2008 the Australian Minister of Higher Education initiated a review of 
Australian higher education to examine and report on the future direction of the 
higher education sector, its fitness for purpose in meeting the needs of the 
Australian community and economy and the options for reform (Bradley, 2008). The 
review was conducted by a panel of experts lead by emeritus professor Denise 
Bradley and is commonly referred to as the “Bradley Review Report”. In the report 
the panel strongly supports a demand-driven, student entitlement model (this 
terminology is used instead of the word “voucher”) in order for Australia to achieve 
better attainment of higher education qualifications. Such a funding system, the 
panel states, would provide greater incentives for students to participate and would 
provide institutions the flexibility as to which courses to offer and the number of 
students to enrol. In turn, this choice for both students and institutions, supported by 
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good information and stronger quality assurance, would provide for a higher quality 
student experience. 
 
The report acknowledges however that there are also concerns about a totally 
market and student demand-driven system for funding higher education, such as: 
the financial capacity for the government to fund the scheme should student 
demand rapidly increase; the potential for sudden changes at institutions resulting 
from large student enrolments at one institution at the expense of another institution; 
the quality of students admitted at some institutions if funding was to be demand-
driven; and the potential mismatch between the courses taken by students and the 
requirements of the workforce (Bradley, 2008). 
 
To address these shortfalls the report recommended refinements to the funding 
scheme. These include implementing a cap on the tuition fees universities could 
charge for any domestic undergraduate or coursework graduate students; 
continuing the direct funding of certain courses that are in the country’s interest but 
which may not be supported by the market due to high costs and low demand; and 
allocating a certain portion of funds (the proposed amount being 2.5 per cent of the 
total funding for teaching and learning provided to each higher education provider) 
be provided to universities  based on negotiated performance targets, reflecting 
national priorities which a purely voucher-based system would be unlikely to deliver. 
The Bradley report, while clearly seeing the benefits of vouchers, is pragmatic and 
in the end does not endorse a true voucher system given the shortfalls identified. 
 
Germany 
Vossensteyn and Jongbloed (2007) in their discussion of the voucher experience in 
Germany state the main objectives of voucher models in Germany were to bring 
more competition and efficiency. Many German higher education institutions 
experienced problems with students taking a relatively long time to complete five-
year degrees; drop-out rates were high; and there was a lack of student orientation 
in the system. Vouchers were seen as a means of providing the incentive for greater 
efficiencies and for making students more aware of the cost of their education and 
to stimulate institutions to be more transparent towards their students.  
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Within Germany the individual states or Lander have the autonomy over their own 
funding mechanisms for higher education. The Lander of Northrhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) introduced a voucher model in the 2004-2005 academic year for all public 
higher education institutions and which was available to students pursuing diploma, 
bachelor and master degrees. Students pursuing a PhD degree fell outside of the 
model and were able to study and do research without having to pay tuition fees. 
Every student starting out in their first undergraduate or master programme was 
allocated a number of credits that would need to be utilized over the stated term of 
the programme. These credits would be reduced for every semester a student was 
enrolled within a programme at a university or college. If a student did not complete 
the programme within the stated timeline, then the student would have to pay a 
tuition fee per semester to stay enrolled and to complete the programme. 
 
Based on the number of credits that were allocated to students every faculty was 
allocated a particular amount of funding. In addition the higher education institutions 
received tuition revenues from students who used all their credits. Certain 
performance indicators, like the number of graduates and the average duration of 
study, were incorporated in the revenue allocation process to reward institutions 
with the shortest duration of courses to receive the most public funds (Vossensteyn, 
Jongbloed 2007). 
 
This voucher system based on the number of credits was replaced by a regular 
funding model in 2007. Two main problems were identified as to its failure. One was 
that the model proved to have high administrative costs, due to the need to track the 
credits allocated and utilized for each student based on their programme of study. 
The other problem was that the voucher model was politically introduced as an 
alternative to the imposition of tuition fees (Ziegele, 2006). A change of government 
in NRW and a political decision to introduce general tuition fees in NRW at the 
beginning of the summer term 2007 saw the return to a regular funding model. 
Regardless of the return to the regular funding model the political debate on the 







The implementation of vouchers has been considered by the Netherlands on three 
different occasions: the late 1980’s, the late 1990’s and the most recent from 2004 
onwards (Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 2007). In the late 1980’s a working group 
proposed a voucher-like funding model for upper secondary and higher education 
that would provide a set number of study credits for students depending on 
programme type and duration. The credits would be valid for a given number of 
years with an incentive of additional credits being granted for post-initial training if 
students graduated quickly. This model was not implemented as it was felt that the 
technical and administrative demands of introducing the model were too great and 
that the unpredictability of the voucher amounts to be funded from one year to the 
next could be a serious financial burden to both the government providing the funds 
and to the higher education institutions attempting to plan their resource 
requirements. 
 
The voucher debate of the late 1990’s lead to a first attempt to implement a real 
voucher experiment in 2001 with a cooperative effort of 10 institutions of higher 
professional education (HBO) and six medium and small-scale business 
organizations (MKB) and 1000 students in the final two years of their programme 
(Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 2007). Two key elements of the experiment were the 
personal education plan (POP) for each student and the strong relationship with 
business sector (MKB-Nederland/HBO-raad, 2001). The personal education plan 
called for students together with the HBO-institution and the employer to establish a 
tailor-made individual study plan that would provide the qualifications required for a 
degree. Students in the final two years of their programme were given 84 vouchers, 
representing two years of full time study, which could be traded in at either of the 
working environments or at courses to be taken at the 10 participating HBO-
institutions. This flexibility provided for greater student choice and also increased 
competition amongst the HBO-institutions.  
 
A final evaluation of the voucher experiment was published in 2004 (De Weerd en 
Van der Velde, 2004). The evaluation concluded, on the one hand, that students 
believed they had become owners of their own education process which resulted in 
them being more motivated and better prepared for the professional market. On the 
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other hand, both students and teachers questioned the impact of vouchers on 
demand driven education, primarily because students do not know exactly what job 
they will end up with and what experience, programmes or courses they will need. 
The evaluation concluded that the personal learning path (POP) was the most 
important element in demand led education. However, having more individualized 
course structures for students would also require processes for individual 
assessment, which had not been fully thought through. In summary the experiment 
did not gain much attention and was not followed up by any further initiative 
(Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 2007). 
 
In 2004 the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture proposed a demand driven 
funding mechanism for higher education, with vouchers (or learning entitlements as 
they were now referred to) at the centre of the model. Amongst other objectives the 
rationale for the model was to make higher education more efficient and to have 
students complete their degrees within a shorter period (Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 
2007). Under the proposed learning entitlement system students would get a limited 
amount of learning entitlements which they could use to attend higher education 
institutions for half year periods, equating to the nominal duration of the programme 
plus on additional year. For three year programmes this would equate to 8 learning 
entitlements (6 for the nominal duration of the programme plus 2 for the additional 
year). For four year bachelor programmes 10 learning entitlements would be 
provided. The learning entitlements were touted as providing students with greater 
flexibility and choice as to the courses and programmes best suited to their own 
profile. Another benefit put forward was that by informing students of the high cost 
of education and of the funds made available specifically for them, that students 
would be urged to make better and more critical study choices (Jongbloed 2005). 
 
In the debate that followed the launch of the learning entitlements proposal, 
concerns over the administrative impact such a system would have were again 
raised. The administrative tasks associated with tracking study credits for individual 
students and aligning these with programmes and degrees was seen as an 
enormous challenge for higher education institutions. There were also doubts raised 
about the coherence of study programmes, with the possibility that students for a 3-
year bachelor programme could combine up to six different half-year units from six 
different faculties and institutions, leaving the question as to which faculty or 
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institution would confer the degree and what would it stand for? As well, how would 
these different opportunities and potential combinations be explained to students 
(Jongbloed 2006)? As of the formation of a new government in 2006/07 the plans 
for learning entitlements were partially withdrawn and put aside for an undecided 
period (Vossensteyn, Jongbloed 2007). 
In looking at the four examples of vouchers in higher education it is questionable 
whether the benefits claimed such as increased competition and responsiveness to 
student demand are fully realized. Likewise the benefits claimed would need to be 
weighed against the negative effects of vouchers, such as an increased 
administrative workload, the need for government regulation as it applies to income 
distribution and the potential risk of increased demands on the government treasury 
if student demand is not capped.  
 
2.8. Market Based Alternatives to Vouchers 
Bekhradnia and Massy (2009) contend that the benefits sought from a voucher 
system, primarily increased competition amongst providers and student choice 
driving the funding system, are attainable in a market orientated system without 
resorting to vouchers. They list England as example where universities receive two 
streams of money for teaching students: the fee paid by each student (which in 
effect is paid by the Government on the student’s behalf and then recovered 
through the taxation system) and the Government grant paid by the Higher 
Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE). This grant is dependent on the 
number of students recruited, with the value of the grant based on the subject 
studied. If universities fail to recruit the number of students stipulated to receive the 
grants (within a permitted margin of five per cent) then part of the grant has to be 
repaid. Under this system universities are funded only to the extent that they 
succeed in recruiting students. And while there are limits in place for the total 
students that can be recruited, which one could argue goes against student 
accessibility, the limits provide a safeguard on the total draw on the government 
treasury. 
 
Bekhradnia and Massy (2009) also contend that this present arrangement offers 
students as much choice as any realistic voucher system. They contend that even 
within a voucher system popular universities are unlikely to expand at the expense 
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of less popular universities. The biggest constraint on student choice, they contend, 
is likely to be an institution’s assessment of a student’s suitability for admission to a 
particular university, and not any external constraint on recruiting students. 
 
Having now gone through this initial discussion of vouchers as to their definition, 
historical origins, different types, advantages, disadvantages, current practices in 
higher education and potential alternatives to vouchers, the study now turns its 
attention to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Recently there has been discussion 
within the federal government of the UAE of implementing a voucher scheme for 
funding the public higher education institutions. This raises the question as to what 
are the implications, the advantages and limitations, of vouchers as a means of 
funding higher education within the UAE. Further questions are also raised as to 
whether the objective of this form of funding is based on the liberal market 
approach, improved quality and efficiency through competition, or whether it is 
based on a social policy approach to increase the equality of educational 
opportunity, or whether the objective is a combination of these two or other possible 
objectives.  Before proceeding to identify the research approach to address these 
issues it is prudent to first understand the history and background of the UAE and its 














3. Chapter Three: The Progression Towards 
Voucher Funding of Higher Education in the UAE 
3.1. Background on the UAE and the Funding of 
Higher Education  
The UAE has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with real GDP 
growth estimated at 4.5 per cent for 2013 and 2014. (IMF, 2014). Successful efforts 
at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP based on oil and gas 
output to 25% (CIA Handbook, 2013). This substantial diversification of the 
economy over the short 42 year history of the UAE is apparent in the additional 
flows of investment capital into the country and the increase of knowledge 
production, primarily through privatization. Prior to the mid-1990’s the number of 
private higher education institutions was limited; there are now 74 private institutions 
(CAA, 2014) in the UAE, in addition to the three federally funded institutions. Of the 
total 46,615 UAE national students attending higher education institutions, 12,959 
attend private institutions, with the remaining 33,656 students attending the three 
federally funded institutions (MOHESR, CAA, 2013). An increasing number of the 
private institutions are overseas institutions that are setting up satellite campuses 
within the different emirates of the country, this number currently standing at 37 
(Wilkins, 2012).  The University of Wollongong (Australia), Strathclyde (UK), 
Imperial College London (UK), Sorbonne (France), and New York University (USA) 
are a few examples. The growth of private institutions will likely increase as 
projections from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research indicate 
that total student population could increase to 50,000 by 2020. In addition the 
number of potential adult learners could add another 13,000 new students to this 
number resulting in a potential 40 percent increase in enrolments over the next 12 
years. 
 
The traditional view of higher education saw universities and colleges shielded from 
the pressures of market and political forces; higher education institutions were seen 
as public resources and education was viewed as a public good (Massy, 1996). 
According to Massy (1996) this view has been challenged over the years through a 
combination of reduced government resources and a corresponding questioning of 
government’s ability to assure quality and efficiency to the satisfaction of public 
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officials and their constituents. The result has been an increasing “privatization” of 
higher education, with a greater reliance on market forces over public 
appropriations.  
 
Growth within the publicly funded higher education institutions on the other hand 
has remained relatively static given budget constraints. Over the past several years, 
funding has failed to keep pace with inflation, operational costs and rising 
enrolments. In real terms, per student financial support at the federal higher 
education institutions has declined by at least 20% since 1999 (MOHESR, 2013). 
This decrease of public funding and the increasing “privatization” of higher 
education are similar to what is occurring in western countries but for different 
reasons. An interesting anomaly of the federal government of the UAE is that it does 
not enjoy financial independence and it does not have its own source of funds. 
While there are substantial resources within the country these reside with the local 
emirates (state governments) that finance the federal government and its 
programmes along with their own local programmes. Over the years federal 
programmes have increased, adding more burden to local government sources. 
Local governments have been reluctant to increase their level of contribution to the 
federal government, instead exercising their local autonomy and directing funds to 
local priorities, including the establishment of private institutions within their emirate. 
 
3.2. Resource Allocation Funding Mechanisms Utilized 
in the UAE 
The introduction of more market-type mechanisms for coordinating higher education 
is being considered by many countries throughout the world (Jongbloed, 2004). This 
consideration is also occurring within the United Arab Emirates. These 
developments have a particular effect on the financing of higher education, where 
new models of resource allocation, institutional steering and control, and 
privatization are being explored (Weiller, 2000). In the following sections each of 
these aspects will be reviewed in greater detail, starting with resource allocation. 
 
Jongbloed (2004) in his discussion on models and arrangements for the public 
funding of higher education proposes that funding arrangements can be classified 
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according to the two questions: (1) what is funded by the government and (2) how is 
it funded? These two questions were used as a framework for analyzing the funding 
pattern within the UAE.  Question 1 concerns the basis of government allocations to 
higher education institutions: are funds tied to educational outputs and performance 
or rather to inputs? When funds are provided to cover on-going costs such as staff 
salaries and supplies and materials this refers to input funding. Likewise if budgets 
are driven by activities such as enrolled students this also refers to input funding 
since student enrolments will significantly determine the amount of inputs spent for 
instruction and operations. Output funding, on the other hand, entails funding 
arrangements whereby allocations are tied to specific institutional teaching and 
research outcomes, such as successful graduation rates, job placements or 
research contracts awarded.  
 
Question 2 addresses the degree of market orientation in the funding arrangements. 
What are the decisions that drive the government funding allocations? What is the 
degree of competition implied by the funding decisions?  Is funding regulated by 
central authorities or is the funding driven by decisions of the clients (students, 
private firms, research councils/foundations) themselves? (Jongbloed, 2004) 
 
Displaying Question 1 and Question 2 in graph form Jongbloed identifies four 
quadrants to classify funding arrangements (See Figure 1). The vertical axis depicts 
the degree of (de-) centralization and the horizontal axis depicts the degree to which 
governments are paying for the results (outcomes) instead of the efforts (inputs). 
Quadrant one, top left, represents planned, input-based funding through providers. 
A centralized system of funding exists, where allocations are negotiated between 
the institution and the ministry or funding council, usually using the previous year 
allocation as a basis. Budgeting is by line item or by budget category such as 
salaries, service and supply requirements, and building operating and maintenance 
costs. Budget allocations for these line items or categories are usually based on unit 






Figure 1 : Jongbloed’s (2004) funding model analysis applied to the UAE 
Progression of Funding Schemes within the UAE 
 
                   Centralized 
                 (Regulated) Approaches 
  Q1                  Q2 
 
  Planned, input‐based        Performance based funding of 
  Funding through providers      providers 
 
 






     Input Orientation              Outcome  Orientation
                                  
 
  Student oriented        Supply driven 
  Demand‐driven, input based       Purpose‐specific purchasing from   
  Funding through clients (students)    providers. 
  (Voucher system)        (Funding provided to institutions on a   
per student formula basis) 
 
  Q4                  Q3  
                    Decentralized 




Quadrant two, top right, represents performance-based funding of providers. This is 
also a centralized system however funding is now allocated on the basis of outputs 
rather than inputs. Budget allocations, for example, could be tied to the number of 
successful credits (students passing exams) obtained by an institution within given 
subject areas. Job placements and research contracts awarded are other examples 
of outputs that could be tied to budget allocations. 
 
Quadrant three, lower right, represents purpose-specific purchasing from providers. 
The funding approach has now shifted from a centralized (regulated) approach to a 
decentralized (market) approach. An example of this type of funding would be 
institutions being invited to submit tenders for a given supply of graduates or for a 
particular research project. Through the tendering process educational institutions, 
both public and private, would compete with one another to provide education, 
training and research as required to meet national needs. Funding contracts would 
be established between the government (or funding agency) and the institution 
identifying the criteria to be fulfilled. Such criteria could include the types and 
qualifications of students admitted to the higher education institution, the level of 
tuition fees (if any) levied by the institution, and the commitment made by the higher 
education institution towards its students in the instruction and teaching processes  
(Jongbloed, 2004). 
 
Finally, quadrant four represents demand-driven, input-based funding through 
clients. Here funding is primarily through the use of vouchers. Governments make 
funds available to students in the form of vouchers which they exchange for 
educational services at the institution of their choice. The institution in turn cashes in 
the voucher with the government to obtain its funds. This type of funding system is 
demand driven in that it is the consumer that drives the system; the consumer 
(student) decides which institution to attend and which programmes to enrol in. The 
higher education institution, in order to ensure their programmes remain attractive, 
will need to monitor the quality of teaching and the offering of programmes. 
 
Jongbloed (2004) in surveying the funding mechanisms in place across OECD 
states found that there has been a move away from negotiated line item funding 
(Quadrant 1) towards more transparent, formula performance based funding 
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(Quadrant 2) and in the case of research funding, a move towards more competitive 
funding mechanisms (Quadrant 3).  Whether further movement towards more 
demand-driven systems of funding (Quadrant 4) will materialize remains to be seen. 
 
The transformation of government funding of higher education within the United 
Arab Emirates has followed a similar pattern to that documented by Jongbloed. 
Shortly after the formation of the country in 1971, the first federally funded 
university, United Arab Emirates University, opened. A centralized system of 
funding was put in place where allocations were based on budget requests 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance and Industry (MOFI). The budget proposal 
contained detailed information on the inputs required such as staff salaries, supply 
requests and facility costs. Funding was negotiated between the institution and the 
MOFI on the basis of inputs required and the unit costs of these inputs. Negotiations 
for subsequent years were on an incremental basis, with the base budget at the 
same level of support as the previous year and only the items that were proposed 
as additions or deletion scrutinized. Monitoring and control focused on maintaining 
expenditures within budget allocations; control was on the cost of the inputs rather 
than on the purpose of the inputs. The same system of funding was applied to the 
Higher Colleges of Technology when it opened in 1988 and to Zayed University 
when it opened in 1998.  
 
In late 2003 the federal government initiated plans to introduce performance based 
budgeting. The introduction of performance based budgeting in western institutions 
in the 1980’s was in response to government demand for more accountability. The 
same rationale was given by the UAE Federal Government as stated in the 
following selected excerpts from its 2004 Guidelines for the Development and 
Implementation of Performance Based Budgeting (UAE, 2003):  
 
“The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Federal Government has decided to 
introduce a performance-based budgeting framework. Performance-based 
budgeting represents a significant change to management culture in that it 
requires a change in focus from inputs to outputs… (incremental) budgeting 
does not provide decision makers with the information necessary to make 
informed decisions about expenditure priorities and to use the budget as a 
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tool for getting value for money. Programme budgeting reform is designed to 
improve decision-making by providing better information on how well 
Government services meet the community’s needs. An emphasis is put on 
the “3 E’s”, that is Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness…(p)erformance-
based budgeting reinforces public sector financial management principles 
having the objective of improving resource allocation and management, 
service delivery performance and accountability.” 
 
As part of the implementation of performance based budgeting the three federally 
funded institutions were required to prepare three-year programme agreements 
outlining the outputs they intend to achieve. Within the agreements the institutions 
identified their respective key performance indicators and output measures. While 
the federal institutions were required to provide the required performance indicators 
and output measures the actual funding was not tied to these metrics. Rather the 
government continued to allocate funds on a negotiated, incremental basis thereby 
not implementing performance based budgeting in the true sense.  
 
In mapping the history of the funding arrangements for higher education institutions 
within the UAE on Figure 1, the starting point would be the top left hand quadrant 
(Q1), depicting the past history of the federal government funding on an input basis 
and in a traditional incremental fashion reflective of a centralized, regulated 
approach. In 2003 the UAE federal government introduced performance based 
budgeting with the intention of changing funding from an input to an output basis, 
depicted as Quadrant 2 in Figure 1, however actual funding continued to be 
provided on a negotiated, incremental basis. In 2007 the Ministry of Presidential 
Affairs commissioned a report for the implementation of a per student funding 
scheme. The consultants engaged provided a report on funding public higher 
education institutions based on students enrolled in specific subject areas (supply 
driven funding – Quadrant 3 in Figure 1). The consultants further elaborated on how 
funds could be provided directly to students in terms of vouchers which in turn 
would fund the higher education institutions (demand driven funding – Quadrant 4 in 
Figure 1). In June 2008 the Cabinet of the UAE approved funding the public higher 
education institutions on a per student funding scheme based on students enrolled 
in specific subject areas (supply driven funding – Quadrant 3 in Figure 1). This 
45 
 
funding scheme as proposed was comprised of the following components and is 
detailed in Appendix 4: 
 Per Student Funding Values: Differential values are calculated for four 
classes of programmes (medicine, laboratory-based, non laboratory-based, 
preparatory/foundation). The values are calculated based on full time 
equivalent students enrolled in the programmes multiplied by programme 
costs weighted by degree level. Programme costs are comprised of 
academic salaries and benefits, derived through benchmark compensation 
and faculty: student ratio values, together with all other expenditures 
calculated as a ratio of academic compensation. Added to this resultant 
funding is additional funding to address unique costs incurred such as 
medical doctor salaries, Emiratization training, and size and scope costs 
relating to the operation of small classes in geographically dispersed and 
gender separated campuses and the offering of multiple programmes. 
 Fee-for-Service Contracts: Additional funding provided to universities to 
recognize their specific characteristics, such as the education of doctors, the 
provision of postgraduate education, the conduct of research and the 
provision of expensive programmes. This funding is to be based on a 
contract that states explicitly what the university will provide in exchange for 
this funding. 
 Performance Contracts and Incentives: Funding for this element entails 
agreement between the government and the universities about performance 
indicators and participation in quality assurance and improvement 
programmes. Each agreement would contain a core set of performance 
indicators, along with indicators relevant to the particular institution as well 
as outcome measures identified in the fee-for-service contracts. The funding 
proposed for this element is 2.5 per cent of the total funding providing to the 
university, an amount that is believed to be sufficient to get the attention and 
motivation of the universities. 
 
While the Cabinet had approved the per student funding scheme not all of the 
elements have been implemented to date, namely the fee-for-service contracts and 
the performance contracts and incentives. As well there has been no regular and 
systematic updating of academic salaries and benefits to ensure current 
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benchmarking as called for in establishing the per student funding values. According 
to officials within the federal Department of Finance the funding levels for 
universities, and all other public expenditure, will not be altered until the fall of 2014, 
at which time new funding levels are to be established for a set number of years. As 
such it is not expected that any further adjustments will be made to the per student 
funding scheme until the new funding levels are approved. This freeze in funding 
levels has raised concerns by the federal higher education institutions as to level of 
quality education that could be delivered, with arguments being made that 
competing for students is not a substitute for adequate levels of funding. 
 
3.3. Resource Allocation Funding Mechanisms – 
Strengths & Weaknesses 
From the previous discussion on the different resource allocation funding 
mechanisms utilized by the UAE one can look at the strengths and weaknesses of 
each model and identify the common trends that have occurred globally. 
Government funding of higher education within North America, the U.K. and a 
number of European countries has seen a shift to a greater focus on accountability 
(Orr, 2005; Duderstadt, 2000; Massy 1996). The traditional resource allocation and 
regulatory systems are no longer seen to influence, let alone control, the strategic 
directions of higher education institutions (Orr, 2005; Massy 1996). Governments 
are moving away from the common incremental budgeting approach and are 
looking at new approaches to improve accountability while still allowing operating 
units to maintain autonomy over their internal affairs (Massy 1996).  The following 
sections examine the different resource allocation models employed by 
governments over time, and the strengths and weaknesses of each, starting with 
the incremental budgeting approach. 
 
3.3.1. Incremental Budgeting 
Historically resource allocation processes were centralized, tightly controlled from 
the center and usually referred to as line-item budgeting or incremental budgeting 
(Duderstadt, 2000). Under this system a unit began the year with the same level of 
support it had the previous year and only the items that were proposed as additions 
or deletions were scrutinized. Adjustments to the base would be subject to factors 
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such as inflation, the unit’s perceived needs and the financial capacity of the 
institution. Control over expenditures was primary, ensuring that expenditures were 
within budget and within approved categories rather than the accountability of the 
purpose and the results of the expenditures. Massy (1996) has identified additional 
assumptions also implicit in the traditional incremental budgeting system such as 
‘property rights’, academic time constraints, and central administration 
responsibility. Property rights are in reference to programmes once approved having 
the right to on-going continuance, barring drastic circumstances. Academic 
programmes and faculty contracts are seen as being constrained by short-term 
financial fluctuations and central administration is viewed as having the 
responsibility for the financial health of all the academic units. Under these 
assumptions traditional line item budgeting can be viewed more as a matter of 
coping and conflict management rather than putting scarce resources to the best 
possible use (Massy, 1996). If a university is unable to have the capacity to set 
priorities and allocate resources to these priorities it raises the question of the 
institution being able to preserve its core values, mission and character.  
 
3.3.2. Performance Funding and Performance Budgeting 
As the accountability movement gathered momentum during the 1980’s 
governments began questioning what institutions should be doing for the state, 
rather than what the state should be doing for public colleges and universities 
(Lasher, 2004). Performance based budgeting approaches were seen as the reform 
to efficiently manage the resources at the institution level. 
 
In performance funding, specified state funding is tied ‘directly and tightly to the 
performance of public campuses on individual indicators … In performance funding, 
the relationship between funding and performance is tight, automatic and formulaic. 
If a campus achieves a prescribed target or an improvement level on defined 
indicators, it receives a designated amount or per cent of state funding.’ (Burke & 
Minassians, 2001).  Performance budgeting, on the other hand, is more flexible. ‘(It) 
allows governors, legislators and coordinating or systems boards to consider 
campus achievement on performance indicators as one factor in determining 
campus allocations … In performance budgeting, the possibility of additional funding 
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due to good or improved performance depends solely on the discretion of state, 
coordinating or system officials.’ (Burke & Minassians, 2001). 
 
While performance based budgeting and funding focuses on accomplishments and 
results rather than on inputs and processes, it also has its weaknesses, as 
referenced by Lasher (2004, p. 222) to include “difficulty in defining performance 
criteria and appropriate measure; a tendency to measure only that which is most 
easily measured along with outright manipulation of results; long time gaps for 
institutions between measuring an accomplishment, achieving a goal and receiving 
the associated funding; and having performance measures developed at the state 
level and imposed on institutions.” 
 
Massy (1996) also states that performance based budgeting and funding does not 
address the issue of externalities which arise when the costs or benefits accruing 
from one unit’s performance affect that of another. While funds should be withheld 
from an operating unit that pursues its goals at the expense of the institution this is 
rarely done. Units therefore tend to see most of their costs as fixed, thereby 
inhibiting them from responding to market forces. In response to this shortfall, some 
institutions have turned to Responsibility Center Budgeting which responds to 
market forces and encourages entrepreneurialism. 
 
3.3.3. Responsibility Center Budgeting / Cost Center Budgeting 
Harvard’s President James Conant is credited with originating responsibility centre 
budgeting with his statement “Every tub stands on its own bottom; each dean 
balances his own budget” (Lasher, 2004, pp. 223-224). Under this approach units 
are seen as being self-supporting, with each unit needing to raise sufficient 
revenues to support projected expenditures. The fundamental premise  “being the 
completion of the authority responsibility circle within affinity groups of disciplines: 
giving the faculty of schools or departments specific, measurable incentives to 
exercise their considerable authority responsibly for the benefit of themselves, their 
students, their organizational units, and the institution as a whole. With the right 
incentives, faculty become advocates for change and actions they might normally 
resist strongly, if advocated by others, especially central administrators” (Strauss & 
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Curry, 2002, pp. 1-2 ). Responsibility centre budgeting is on the opposite end of 
decentralization from performance budgeting. While performance budgeting focuses 
on intrinsic values with funds provided in blocks to operating units according to 
recent performance and future plans and are assessed in relation to the vision, 
mission and goals of the institution, responsibility centre budgeting focuses revenue 
responsibility on the operating units and virtually all the revenues are devolved to 
them (Massy, 1996). 
 
While responsibility centre budgeting encourages entrepreneurship by giving 
operating units greater responsibility for budget development and control it also 
contains weaknesses which include (Lasher, 2004, p. 225) “academic programmes 
becoming more budget-driven at the risk of sacrificing academic performance and 
priorities, and likewise, professional units may thrive while core academic units are 
pressured to generate sufficient revenue.” 
 
3.4. Devolution of Spending Authority 
The discussion in the previous section has identified different resource allocation 
models for institutions to consider as they attempt to align their missions and values 
with the resources available. One could say that choosing the right resource 
allocation method is as simple as ‘putting the money where it will make the most 
good’ (Massy, 1996). It is likely more than this. ‘Process – the way decisions are 
made and communicated –powerfully affects outcomes’ (Hoenack, 1994). Massy 
(1996) states that this process needs to take into account three keys for effective 
resource allocation: understanding the incentives that guide spending in colleges 
and universities; recognizing and managing the diversity of intrinsic values within 
higher education institutions and managing complexity. Resource allocation 
methods therefore need to address the question of how to decentralize budget-
making authority without abandoning institutional-level values and priorities; how to 
make use of the expertise and motivation residing within institutions without losing 
the funding agent’s ability to influence outcomes (Massy, 1996).  Putting this 
process into practice requires strong institutional leadership as well as plans and 
initiatives based on good information and rational decision processes (Lasher, 
2004). As stated by Thomas (2001, p. 89) “whatever style and methodology are 
applied for allocating resources and whatever the institution’s policy on the degree 
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of devolution adopted, the ultimate responsibility for financial management lies with 
the institution centrally, and in particular with the chief executive and senior officers.” 
This raises the question of how senior management actually develops the 
methodology for allocating resources and the degree of devolution. What are the 
factors that influence these decisions? These will be considered in the next section. 
 
3.5. Determining Factors for Distribution of Resources 
While much of the literature on devolution of resources addresses the approaches 
and rationale for such a decision the literature on the various factors that influence 
the internal methodology applied is more limited. Massy (1996) touches on this in 
general terms and has identified three keys to effective resource allocation, the first 
being the system of incentives that guides spending in colleges and universities. A 
good resource allocation system he states will ensure that an institution will be able 
to have the proper balance between its intrinsic values and those of the 
marketplace.  Intrinsic values need to be considered when a programme has low 
financial potential but is key to the institution’s academic vision; in this case cross-
subsidization is necessary. Market forces however cannot be ignored as this can 
place the institution at financial risk.   A second key is the recognition and 
management of the diversity of intrinsic values within any higher education 
institution. Different staff, be they faculty, administrators or government funding 
officials, have different views on what is intrinsically important. Effective resource 
allocation will require the alignment of these competing individual values with that of 
the institution. Finally Massy identifies the management of complexity as a third key 
to effective resource allocation. Higher education institutions are professional 
organizations with a host of experts involved in various contexts; the complexity 
arises as each of these individuals in their different roles interacts within the 
resource allocation process. 
 
Thomas (2001, p. 93) delves more deeply into the various factors that influence the 
internal methodology applied and suggests that there is a range of issues affecting 
the extent to which financial management is centralized or devolved, starting with 
“prerequisites” such as senior staff appointments, staff training, support 
mechanisms and effective information systems and monitoring procedures. In 
addition there are “determinant” factors such as “the history and culture of the 
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institution, its size, subject mix and organizational structure, financial health of the 
institution and its component parts, activities of powerful interest groups, the 
preferences and priorities of key staff and strategic priorities.” 
 
The sections below provide a summary of Thomas’ discussion on these factors. 
3.5.1. Prerequisites 
3.5.1.1. Suitable Senior Staff Appointments 
The appointment of senior staff to manage the budgets arising through the 
introduction of devolved, formula-based systems of resource allocation can give rise 
to a tension between managerial and academic imperatives. Traditional heads of 
academic departments may not be seen as managerial heads. Likewise an over 
emphasis on managerial experience may short change the necessary academic 
requirements. Central authorities therefore need to take a more proactive role in the 
appointment of senior staff positions to ensure a proper balance between 
managerial and academic competencies. 
 
3.5.1.2. Staff Training and Development 
Training and development for academic and administrative staff needs to become 
part of a wider organizational learning process. Ideally they should be used to 
prepare staff in advance rather than following a change process. Training should 
encompass not only in-house activities which would likely focus on local procedures 
and practices but should also encompass regional programmes where department 
heads can exchange experiences and discuss problems with colleagues from other 
institutions. 
 
3.5.1.3. Support Mechanisms 
Staff training and development needs to be supplemented by adequate institutional 
support for academic managers. This support includes adequate information 
systems (discussed next) as well as the administrative staff support and the 
structuring of management teams to alleviate academic managers of detailed tasks. 
Good communication between the central administration and the academic 
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managers is also essential to ensure operations are in alignment with the strategic 
plans of the institution. 
 
3.5.1.4. Adequate Information Systems 
A danger of the introduction of a devolved formula-based system of resource 
allocation is the growth of multiple management information systems. Systems 
integration needs to become an overriding principle to ensure that information is 
consistent and can be delivered in a timely fashion and in a manner that is easily 
understood and meets the requirements of academic departments and central 
administration. It may be prudent to delay the introduction of a devolved, formula-
based system until such time as an integrated system has been implemented. Care 
also needs to be taken to ensure that the principles underlying reporting 
methodologies are capable of being put into practice. Allocation of indirect costs and 
calculations of student load are given examples. 
 
3.5.1.5. Effective Monitoring Procedures 
While devolution in essence empowers operating units to respond more closely to 
the market, the central administration still has the responsibility for ensuring 
adequate budgetary control mechanisms and the monitoring of performance. Issues 
such as approval for commitments and the carrying forward of surpluses or deficits 
need to have clear rules and procedures. In effect there needs to be a balance 
between encouraging entrepreneurial activity at a budget center level and ensuring 
effective central control. 
 
3.5.2. Determinants 
3.5.2.1. Organizational Structure 
The extent to which financial management is centralized or devolved is further 
impacted by the relationship between organizational units and central institutional 
authorities, that is, whether managerial authority lies at the center or at a 
departmental level or at an intermediary level such as a faculty or school.  In either 
case there needs to be an alignment of budgetary responsibility with managerial 
responsibility. Creating budgetary units that superimpose an existing level of 
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managerial responsibility will result in a new unit being created as a secondary 
distribution to the level already in operation. This ultimately results in increased 
administrative tasks and perhaps increased micro political activity focused around 
existing centers of power. 
 
3.5.2.2. Organizational Culture 
The culture of an organization can be viewed through its degree of policy definition 
and its control of policy implementation. This is illustrated in McNay’s quadrant 
model (Thomas 2001) identifying institutions as collegial, bureaucratic, corporate or 
entrepreneurial. Senior managers need to determine whether they wish to build on 
the institution’s existing culture or whether to use the methods of managing financial 
resources to shift the culture of the organization. Increased devolution will enhance 
the managerial role of department heads while central administration will need to 
engage in more “interactive, interpersonal and facilitating functions”. 
 
3.5.2.3. Size 
The size of a budget unit can affect its ability to respond to financial pressure. If, for 
example, salaries are devolved to a small budget unit this will likely comprise the 
majority of the unit’s total expenditures. This leaves the unit with little flexibility to 
improve its financial position as most of its costs are fixed. Decisions of an optimal 
budget unit size therefore need to be made, and amalgamation of smaller units may 
be necessary. In such cases attention needs to focus on the disciplines and 
backgrounds of the units to make the amalgamation as seamless as possible. 
 
3.5.2.4. Subject Mix 
Thomas suggests that the subject orientation of department heads may affect their 
reception to devolution. Science oriented heads, through their professional 
backgrounds and experience in managing large research contracts, are seen as 
more adept to devolution than their arts-based colleagues. Senior managers need 
to be aware of how subject mix may affect the internal management of departments 




3.5.2.5. Financial Health of the Institution and its Component 
Parts 
The introduction of a devolved system of resource allocation is optimal when the 
institution and individual budget centers are in a surplus position. In reality it is more 
likely that some budget centers will be surplus position while others will be in a 
deficit. Senior management will therefore need to have policies in place regarding 
cross-subsidization between surplus and deficit departments and will need to 
determine whether over time  all departments must operate on a self-sustaining 
basis. 
 
3.5.2.6. Priorities and Preferences of Key Individuals 
A few key individuals, namely the vice-chancellor or chief executive, through their 
priorities and preferences can influence the system of resource allocation adopted. 
Chief executives can impose their style of management, be it centrally setting 
direction and maintaining control, or devolving control to lower levels. The 
preferences for allocating resources can also favor formulaic approaches or 
retaining the flexibility to exercise discretion and power subjectively. 
 
3.5.2.7. Activities of Powerful Interest Groups 
In the developmental stages of a resource allocation model, micro political activity 
can influence the items to be devolved and the factors used in the model, 
consequently affecting the long-term financial health of departments. Within the 
budgeting cycle greater influence would now occur at the formulation stage of the 
resource allocation model. The involvement of deans and department heads , while 
necessary for wide ownership of the process, also opens up the door to powerful 
interest groups influencing the decision making process. 
 
3.6. Institutional Steering and Control 
Resource allocation models are but one part of a national government’s approach to 
the control and steering of a higher education institution. Quality assurance 
instruments are complimentary factors. Dominic Orr, in his paper on Funding 
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Allocation and Quality Assurance in Higher Education (Orr, 2005) states that the 
instruments of funding allocation along with instruments  of quality assurance have 
become the preferred levers  of change in steering and coordinating higher 
education reforms during the past 10 years. New funding models, as illustrated 
through Jongbloed’s analysis, have shifted from centralized input-based funding 
schemes to performance based funding with further movement to market driven 
funding schemes. Orr (2005, p. 34) states “models of external quality assurance are 
utilized to ‘illuminate’ the performance of universities. Their function is that of 
mapping university activity, for transparency and accountability.” While resource 
allocation instruments concern the operation of higher education processes, 
evaluative instruments are concerned with norms, which determine the boundaries 
of the operation (Becher & Kogan, 1992). Together the two factors provide a 
framework of national government steering and control of higher education 
institutions. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between these two policy 
instruments and puts forth the argument from Orr (2005) that due to the 
interdependence of the policy instruments “a funding method with a degree of state 
control is likely to be matched with a quality assurance method involving a similar 
degree of state control to provide an adequate coordination framework. Conversely, 
a method of quality assurance based on the market principle only comes to fruition 
in a system where it is used in conjunction with a method of funding that has a 


















































































































In many countries across the world there is a growing tendency for governments to 
introduce more market-type mechanisms for coordinating their national higher 
education sectors (Williams, 1995; Dill, 1997; Brown, 2013). The progression of 
higher education funding within the UAE has also shown a move towards market-
based policies. Historically the government funding of higher education followed an 
incremental budgeting approach, with funding levels largely based on inputs such 
as the approved number of faculty, staff and students. A later funding model 
attempted to introduce a performance based funding approach which the 
government believed would improve accountability while allowing the higher 
education institutions to maintain autonomy over their internal affairs. An initial shift 
towards a market approach to funding higher education occurred in 2008 when the 
UAE government introduced the current per-student funding mechanism for the 
federal institutions, with funding values differentiated based on programme and 
subject levels and tied to the number of students enrolled. It was during this time 
that the UAE government also considered the introduction of voucher funding for 
higher education.  
 
Greater efficiency and greater responsiveness are usually the main benefits 
identified for market-based policies. The market forces that have driven the rapid 
development of the UAE economy could also be seen as the government’s attempt 
to drive competition and efficiencies within its higher education system. Putting 
funding in the hands of students would require the federal higher education 
institutions to be more responsive to student choices and thereby require the 
institutions to offer programmes and services of a higher quality than their 
competitors in order to attract more students. 
 
While voucher funding, as a market model, strives to deliver efficiency in the 
economic sense, it is also subject to market failures, with quality often the main 
casualty. Information problems that contribute to market failure, often described as 
‘information asymmetries’ (Dill, 2004, p. 61) can occur where information on quality 
can vary significantly between suppliers and consumers. Brown (2013, pp. 124-125) 
however argues that in higher education the problem is not so much about the 
unequal distribution of information but rather that “ no one has or can have the 
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information to make the same judgements about quality and suitability that they 
might make about a physical product or a less complex service.” Brown further 
argues that competition may damage quality by commodifying knowledge and 
lowering standards through grade inflation as well as diverting resources away “from 
learning and teaching to activities like marketing, enrolment, student aid and 
administration.” 
 
The effective monitoring and regulation of quality is required to ensure competition 
does not erode quality standards. The UAE government therefore in considering 
voucher funding needs to have necessary oversight and applicable regulations in 
place to ensure that its higher education institutions not only deliver the educational 
programmes required to meet its national priorities but also to ensure international 
quality standards are maintained. The concept of ‘efficiency’ as it relates to voucher 
funding and its relationship to ‘quality’ is further discussed in subsequent chapters. 


















4. Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
Moving forward from the discussion on the background to the research question the 
next stage in the research project was to establish the research methodology for 
conducting the study. Silverman (2005, p. 303) states that in writing up qualitative 
research one needs to recognize, amongst other considerations, “the reasons why 
the research progressed the way it did, taking into consideration both analytical and 
chance factors, and the theory supporting the chosen research methodology”. In 
essence Silverman (2005. p. 303) asserts that in writing the research methodology 
chapter one should simply “spell out your theoretical assumptions”. Silverman 
further elaborated on this call for transparency about research methodology on “how 
one went about their research, the overall strategy adopted and why, the design and 
techniques used and why these were chosen and not others” (Silverman 2005, p. 
305). These questions, in practical terms, served as a guide for defining the 
research methodology for this project. 
 
4.2. Research Approach 
 As a starting point for developing the research framework, and following 
Silverman’s (2005, p. 303) assertion that the research methodology should 
recognize “the (contested) theoretical underpinnings of methodologies”, the 
research approaches of Creswell (2003) and Punch (2006) were considered, as 
these offered two “contested” views. Figure 3 depicts Creswell’s view. He believes 
that before a research framework can be established one has to consider the 
elements of inquiry, that is, the knowledge claim, the strategies of inquiry and the 
data collection and analysis methodologies. Creswell combines epistemology and 
theoretical perspectives and contends that a researcher in stating a knowledge 
claim starts out with certain assumptions about how, and what, would be learnt 
during the inquiry. Creswell follows what Punch (2006, p. 20) defines as 
“methodolatry …putting method before content. It is first learning the research 




Figure 3: Knowledge Claims, Strategies of Inquiry, and Methods Leading to 




Conversely Punch (2006) contends that rather than finding research questions that 
can fit into a particular method (adapting questions to the design and method) 
research is better undertaken when one identifies the research area, the questions 
that need answers and then fitting the methods and techniques to the questions 
(adapting design and methods to questions).   Figure 4 depicts his view. Punch 
(2006) contends that adopting a particular perspective could possibly influence the 
methods of research and the research questions.  
 
In reviewing the two approaches the conclusion was that Punch’s approach was the 
best fit for this research. It lays out a logical framework and one that could easily be 
adapted to this project. The research area for this project has been identified as 
vouchers as a funding scheme for higher education institutions, and the associated 
implications thereof. Through the literature review and in the context of funding 
alternatives considered by the federal government of the United Arab Emirates the 
research question and interview questions were determined. From this point onward 
it was a matter of choosing the appropriate research method and proceeding with 
the data collection and analysis. Punch therefore provided what was considered a 
more natural and easily adaptable approach for this research. 




















Elements of Inquiry 
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Figure 4 : Punch Simplified Model of Research (Without Hypotheses) 
Source: Punch (2006:40) 
 
While Punch’s model shows a linear progression of the tasks to be undertaken in 
the research project it is proposed that there needs to be a feedback loop to 
illustrate the likely need for a further literature review and further refining of the 
research question and interview questions arising out of the data analysis. As such 
Figure 5 restates Punch’s simplified model of research to include this feedback loop 
to both the research question and to the literature review, in keeping with 
Silverman’s (2005) contention that the most relevant and current literature be 
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4.3. Research Question 
Punch (2006:37) stipulates that the research question guides the project and is what 
the research is designed to answer. As discussed, the UAE federal government has 
given consideration to implementing a voucher system for funding higher education 
institutions. While a number of countries have considered voucher funding for higher 
education, as discussed in the literature review, there are few examples of actual 
implementation. This raises various questions as to the advantages and limitations 
of such a funding scheme for the UAE, the objectives of the federal government, 
and the potential impact on students and the higher education institutions. As such 
the main research question has been formulated as: 
 
What are the consequences, intended and unintended, of implementing a 
voucher system for funding higher education within the United Arab 
Emirates? 
 
In formulating the main research question three primary actors have been identified: 
the UAE federal government, as the main provider of funds, higher education 
institutions, as providers of higher education, and students, as the recipients of 
higher education. With the main research question established, and the three 
primary actors for the project identified, the literature review was then referenced to 
identify the common themes associated with voucher funding of higher education. 
For the themes identified an overarching question was then established that 
questioned whether voucher funding would deliver the results purported in the 
theme, or how, as the case may be. 
 
Two main government policy objectives were identified in the literature review for 
considering implementing vouchers as a funding scheme. The liberal market 
approach, advocated by Friedman, sees vouchers providing public funding indirectly 
through the consumers (students) rather than directly to the providers (higher 
education institutions). It is argued this approach will improve quality and efficiency 
through competition. For institutions to attract more students they will need to make 
provision that is of higher quality than their competitors. This led to the overarching 
question: ‘Will increased competition result in institutions raising their quality 
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standards to attract more students?’ From this overarching question relevant 
interview questions were established, such as “How will voucher funding provide 
incentives to institutions to improve quality and make better use of public funds?’ 
and ‘How will institutions ensure quality standards are maintained or increased?’ 
 
The social policy approach, as advocated by Jencks, sees vouchers increasing the 
equality of educational opportunities as students with a voucher would have equal 
access to higher education institutions. The corresponding overarching question 
was established as ‘Does voucher funding achieve equal access to higher 
education?’  followed by relevant interview questions such as ‘Should all Emirati 
citizens, regardless of age, be eligible for vouchers?’, ‘Or should vouchers be limited 
to young UAE Nationals leaving school?’, ‘Should voucher funding be extended to 
expatriate students?’ and ‘Should vouchers be tied to particular regions of a country 
to facilitate equal access?’ 
 
Figure 6 : Voucher Funding Scheme Actors and Primary Objectives and Themes 
 
 
        
Objectives:  Social Policy    Liberal Market 
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While equity and efficiency were seen as the two primary themes identified in the 
literature review (illustrated in Figure 6), the literature also revealed a number of 
additional themes. For each of these themes the same approach was applied in 
defining an overarching question which in turn led to the relevant interview 
questions. 
 
These additional themes, their overarching question, and sample interview 
questions, are summarized as follows: 
 
 Student decision making and awareness: Ability of students and institutions 
to acquire information and to understand the long-term economic, political 
and social value of a college education (Massy, 2004). Overarching 
question: ‘Does voucher funding provide students with more freedom to 
choose their higher education institution and does it make students more 
aware of, and more motivated to take control of, their higher education?’ 
Sample interview questions: ‘Are students (and their parents) able to make 
informed decisions about which institution to attend?’, ‘If you had been given 
a voucher to attend any institution in the UAE would you have enrolled in a 
different university than the one you are currently enrolled in?’, ‘Do you think 
voucher funding makes students more aware of the cost of higher 
education?’ ‘Do you think voucher funding makes students more aware of 
the government’s strategic priorities and labour market requirements?’ 
 
 Protecting subjects and government steering: Voucher values or funding 
adjustments a government would likely need to consider to protect subjects 
and address national strategic priorities (Jongbloed, Koelman, 2000). 
Overarching question: ‘How can voucher funding support a nation’s strategic 
and economic objectives while also protecting its history?’ Sample interview 
questions: ‘Should specific vouchers be tied to certain courses that support a 
nation’s strategic and economic objectives e.g. physics, engineering, 
medicine?’, ‘Should specific vouchers be tied to certain courses such as 




 Funding requirements: Financially, the challenge for governments to control 
expenditures based on the premise of a fixed value of a voucher and open 
access to students (Levin 1998; Bekhradnia and Massy, 2009) Are there 
market based alternatives to vouchers? (Barr 1998; Bekhradnia and Massy, 
2009). Overarching question: ‘How can governments control costs if 
vouchers are driven by student choice?’ Sample interview questions: ‘How 
can government limit the number of vouchers given that funding is not open 
ended and at the same time address widening access?’, ‘Should voucher 
funding be extended beyond federal universities?’, ‘Should top-up fees be 
allowed to supplement vouchers?’, ‘Are there funding alternatives to 
vouchers that promote competition and student choice?’ 
 
 Resource requirements: Implementation of a voucher system will require 
administrative systems and functions for the collection and tracking of 
programme and subject based information of individual students as they 
progress through their studies (Bekhradnia and Massy, 2009). Overarching 
question: ‘How would a voucher system impact resource requirements and 
administrative costs?’ Sample interview question: ‘What additional 
administrative requirements and costs might higher education institutions 
incur from the implementation of a voucher funding scheme?’ 
 
 Physical facilities and geographical location: Student choice being limited by 
geographical factors and constrained by the capacity of physical facilities 
and infrastructure (Hough, 1987). Overarching question: ‘How can the 
provision of physical facilities and limitations due to geographical area be 
addressed in a voucher funding scheme?’ Sample interview questions: 
‘Would popular institutions need to expand and contract more buildings and 
appoint more staff?’, ‘Would there be a mismatch and waste of physical 
spaces – even for popular institutions?’, ‘How would students from rural 
areas be provided with equal access to educational institutions as those 
from urban areas?’ 
 
Having established the themes and overarching questions an initial set of interview 
questions were drafted according to the structure shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2 : Interview Questions  Development - Original 
Theme Sub-Theme Question Actors 

















1.1.0 Efficiency  
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Government objectives, resource requirements and administrative issues, and 
alternative funding models were identified as the main themes. Efficiency, equity, 
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protecting subjects, and funding were listed as sub themes of the government 
objectives theme. Resource requirements, physical facilities and infrastructure, 
geographical access and organizational culture were listed as the sub themes for 
the resource requirements and administrative issues theme. The questions were 
then allocated to each respective actor, as shown in Table 2, based on how these 
questions were perceived to be most relevant to the actor’s areas of responsibility. 
 
From this exercise a total of 54 questions were developed, guided by the discussion 
in the literature review. These questions are listed in Appendix 1. In reviewing the 
questions with the thesis supervisor it became apparent that too many questions 
were proposed. Given that interviews with government officials and university 
administrators would likely need to be limited to one hour, or less, it was deemed 
not practical to cover all of the questions. As well there was some overlap between 
questions that could be resolved through a consolidation of these questions. The 
structuring of the themes and questions was also reviewed. It was concluded that 
structuring the themes based on the perspectives of the government, the higher 
education institutions and the students, and matching these themes with the related 
sub-themes and questions would provide a more logical and effective means of data 
collection and analysis. Under this approach interviews would be held with each of 
the actor groups based on the themes and questions that were seen as naturally 
associated with the respective actor, and in some cases, falling under the authority 
of the respective actor. The resulting structure that was established for developing 
the final interview questions is shown in Table 3 while the related interview 


















































4.4. Research Design 
In the previous discussion on the research approach, the general research design  
was described in Punch’s (2006, p. 142) terms as the overall plan for a piece of 
research which includes the strategy, the conceptual framework, the question of 
what will be studied and the tools to be used for collecting and analyzing data. 
Punch (2006, p. 142) further elaborates that whether research questions are 
prespecified or whether they are developed during the course of the research 
project “the design still needs to connect the question to the data, and to fit in with 
both”. The research design, as illustrated in Figure 7 (Punch 2006, p. 63), shifts the 
focus from what data is required to how will the data be collected and analysed 
through the use of the four questions listed: 
 
Figure 7 : Research Design Connecting Questions to Data 
     Research Design    
Research    Data collected and analysed:  Data 
questions    Following what strategy?    
     Within what framework?    
     From Whom? 
     How? 
Source: Punch (2006:63) 
 
A number of qualitative research designs have been identified to answer these four 
questions. Mertens (1998) points to twenty-six types of sub-strategies in qualitative 
research by Tesch (1990) and of these, emphasized seven: 
1. Ethnographic research – a method designed to describe and analyse 
practices and beliefs of cultures and communities (Tesch 1990). 
2. Case study – “a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a 
comprehensive understanding of that instance obtained by extensive 
descriptions and analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its 
context” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990, p.14). 
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3. Phenomenological research – the study of the way in which members of a 
group or community interpret the world and life around them (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1994). 
4. Grounded theory – “a general methodology for developing theory that is 
grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994 p. 273) 
5. Participative inquiry – required the participation of all the people in the 
research process either by not explicitly addressing power relations (co-
operative inquiry) or by the recognition of power issues and a goal of 
transforming society (participatory action research – PAR) 
6. Clinical research – “the investigation of physical, behavioural, cultural, 
historical, social, emotional, and spiritual ramification of what is going on with 
the body, what is happening with a person’s life and who has what power” 
(Miller and Crabtree, 1994, p. 342). 
7.  Focus groups – group interviews that rely, not on a question and answer 
format of interview, but on the interaction within the group (Morgan, 1988). 
 
Of Mertens’ (1998) seven types of qualitative research outlined above, all except 
grounded theory and case study were ruled out initially because they have to do 
with the study of culture or people therefore they did not fit the nature of this inquiry. 
Grounded theory, while identified by Mertens as a qualitative research design, the 
author sees as a model for creating a theory, while case study is seen as an 
approach to doing research. As such case study was further analysed as the 
research approach to utilize in this study. 
 
Punch (2006, p. 144) defines a case as a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a 
bounded context which could include a decision or a policy or a process.  He states 
the case study seeks to understand the case in depth, in its natural setting, 
recognizing its complexity and its context.  Punch therefore sees the case study as 
more a strategy than a method. Yin (1981, p. 59) also sees case study as a 
research strategy with “the distinguishing characteristic … that it attempts to 
examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when 
(b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
72 
 
Experiments, Yin states, differ from this approach in that they deliberatively 
separate a phenomenon from its context. Voucher funding of higher education could 
be considered a contemporary phenomenon in that this form of market-based 
funding has been considered by a number of countries but there are few examples 
of actual implementation. As such, the study of voucher funding of higher education 
within the context of the UAE, the conditions and circumstances unique to the UAE 
and how these would impact the implementation of voucher funding, was seen to fit 
the definition of a case study as outlined by both Punch and Yin. 
 
Punch (2006, p. 145) further elaborates on four characteristics of a case study. 
Applying these characteristics to this research project yields the following:   
1. It is a bounded system. 
The research project was limited to higher education institutions within the UAE. 
The total timeframe for the project covers the period from 1971 onward (the 
formation of the UAE) for discussion on the historical aspects of funding higher 
education within the UAE, to present day, for discussion on the implications of 
voucher funding for higher education within the UAE. 
2. It is a case of something – the unit of analysis must be determined. 
The unit of analysis was the federal government funded higher education system 
within the UAE, which funds the University of the UAE, The Higher Colleges of 
Technology, and Zayed University. In addition to these higher education institutions 
private institutions as well as those institutions funded by the local emirates were 
also considered as the intent of the voucher funding system is to enable student 
choice of all higher education institutions within the UAE. 
3. There is an explicit attempt to preserve the wholeness, unity and 
integrity of the case. 
Since not everything can be studied, even about one case, specific focus is 
required. This was guided by the main research question and the associated 
themes and sub-questions. 
4. Multiple sources of data and multiple data collection methods are likely 
to be used,  typically in a naturalistic setting. 
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Archival records, academic journals, policy documents and interviews were the 
primary sources of data for this project. Interviews were conducted in a naturalistic 
setting. 
 
Case studies have a more ambiguous standing in social science with a standard 
criticism that findings derived from a case study cannot be generalized (Punch 2006 
, Bryman 2004).  Punch (2006) however contends there are two main ways a case 
study can produce generalizable results, both of which depend on the purpose of 
the case study and in the way its data are analysed. One way is by conceptualizing, 
the other way is by developing propositions; the intended outcome being that the 
findings of each approach are potentially applicable to other cases. To 
conceptualize, as Punch (2006) explains, the researcher develops new concepts to 
explain some aspect of what has been studied, the focus being on “conceptualizing” 
rather than on describing. In developing propositions the researcher puts forward 
one or more propositions which link concepts within the case. An assessment is 
then made as to whether these are applicable or transferable to other situations. 
This is basically the opposite of traditional quantitative research where one begins 
with propositions which are the inputs into research. In this approach the 
propositions become the outputs of the research. 
 
Punch (2006, p. 147) further contends that properly conducted case studies, 
especially in situations where knowledge is shallow, can make valuable 
contributions in three main ways: 
1. From what one can learn from the study of a particular case, in its own 
right. 
The UAE is a relatively young country, having been established in 1971.  There has 
been limited research on the UAE and the financing of higher education. A case 
study would encompass an account of the history of funding higher education within 
the UAE and its rationale for considering the implementation of a voucher scheme. 
(Figure 1 illustrates the funding schemes implemented and considered during the 
course of the UAE’s relatively short history). Such an account would capture the 
uniqueness of the UAE in terms of its culture, resources and its significant economic 




2. An in-depth case study can provide understanding of the important 
aspects of a new research area. 
The implementation of vouchers for funding higher education is a relatively new 
research area. There has been very little empirical testing of ideas (Jongbloed, 
Koelman 2000) for voucher funding and these have related primarily  to the 
financing of primary and secondary education.  
 
3. A case study can make an important contribution in combination with 
other research approaches. 
Semi-structured interviews, for example, could be utilized for data collection with the 
case study “fleshing out” the results in a meaningful and understandable way. 
 
From the above analysis it was concluded a case study approach would provide for 
the examination of the relatively new research area of voucher funding of higher 
education within the real-life context of the UAE. The case study was also looked 
upon to develop generalizations that may be applicable to others considering 
implementing vouchers for funding higher education as well as to provide 
propositions that could form the inputs into further research. 
 
4.5. Data Collection 
Creswell (2003:185) states “The idea behind qualitative research is to purposely 
select participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will be best help 
the researcher understand the problem and research question”. Creswell goes on to 
state unlike quantitative research, qualitative research does not necessarily involve 
random sampling or a large number of participants and sites. The participants and 
sites chosen however might well be discussed according to the following four 
aspects identified by Miles and Huberman (1994, p.30): “the setting (where the 
research takes place, the actors (who will be observed or interviewed) the events 
(what the actors will be observed or interviewed doing), and the process (the 
evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the setting)”. The setting 





In terms of types of data to be collected Yin (2004) identifies six primary sources of 
evidence for case studies: documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observations, participant-observation and physical artefacts. He recommends that 
multiple sources of evidence be used as a single source raises questions of 
accuracy and trustworthiness. Moreover generally applicable results are hard to 
derive from a single source of data. For this research project documents, archival 
records and interviews were the primary sources of data. Policy documents from 
government authorities such as the Ministry of Higher Education, the Abu Dhabi 
Education Council and the Dubai Knowledge and Human Development Authority 
were reviewed for insights as to the role of government and that of the market in the 
provision of higher education against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, 
economy and accountability. Publications in journals of higher education (as 
identified in the Literature Review section) as well as regional and national 
newspapers were reviewed to present different perspectives on a voucher scheme 
of funding from various stakeholders. 
 
Appendix 3 lists the individuals interviewed for this research project. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with representatives from the higher 
education institutions and from the government departments. Focus group 
interviews were conducted for the students.  An account of the rationale for 
selection of the interview types chosen, along with the description of the interview 
processes, is provided later following a summary of the actors interviewed from the 
higher education institution and government sector categories. 
 
For the higher education institutions all three federally funded institutions, the Higher 
Colleges of Technology, United Arab Emirates University, and Zayed University 
were chosen as the implementation of a voucher funding scheme would directly 
apply to these institutions. The Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT), founded in 
1988 by federal decree, is the largest higher educational institution in the UAE. Over 
19,000 students attend 17 modern men’s and women’s campuses in Abu Dhabi, Al 
Ain, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah, Fujairah and Madinat Zayed/Ruwais. HCT 
offers English-taught programmes in Applied Communications, Business, 
Engineering, Information Technology (IT), Health Sciences and Education at various 
levels.  Programmes are designed in consultation with business and industry 
leaders to align students’ skills with job requirements (HCT 2013). 
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The United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) was established in 1976 as the first 
national university in the UAE. It has 12,000 students, primarily based in Al Ain, and 
offers bachelor degrees, postgraduate programmes, and doctorial programmes 
through the Colleges of Humanities and Social Sciences, Science, Education, 
Business and Economics, Law, Food and Agriculture, Engineering, Medicine and 
Health Sciences, and Information Technology (UAEU 2013). 
 
Zayed University was founded for UAE National women in 1998, with campuses in 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi. It currently has more than 7,121 male and female students 
and offers bachelor degrees and master programmes through the Colleges of Arts 
and Sciences, Business, Communication and Media Sciences, Education, and 
Technological Innovation (ZU 2013). 
 
For the private institutions three institutions were chosen based on programme 
offerings that were somewhat comparable to those offered by the three federally 
funded institutions; the three private institutions being Abu Dhabi University, 
American University of Sharjah, and British University in Dubai. 
 
Abu Dhabi University was founded in 2000 and is organized into three academic 
colleges: Arts and Sciences, Business Administration and Engineering and 
Computer Sciences. The University provides undergraduate and postgraduate 
degree programmes, as well as a Doctor of Business Administration programme, 
and currently enrols over 4300 students at its Abu Dhabi and Al Ain campuses 
(ADU 2013). 
The American University of Sharjah was established in 1997 and is based upon 
American institutions of higher education. The University, located in the emirate of 
Sharjah, next to Dubai, currently enrols over 5500 students. It offers 25 majors 
and 52 minors at the undergraduate level, and 14 master's degrees programmes 
through the academic colleges of Architecture, Art and Design, Arts and Sciences, 
Engineering and Business and Management (ADU 2013). 
 
The British University in Dubai (BUiD) was established in 2004 and is the Middle 
East region's first, research based, postgraduate university. It currently enrols over 
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470 students at its campus in Dubai. The University offers master’s degree 
programmes through the faculties of Education, Information Technology and 
Engineering, and Business and has established partnerships with the University of 
Edinburgh, the University of Manchester, the University of Birmingham,  Cardiff 
University and the King's College London (BUiD 2013). 
 
The choice of individuals to interview was guided primarily by their knowledge, 
namely process knowledge and context knowledge (Meuser and Nagel, 2009). 
Process knowledge in this case referring to the understanding of funding systems 
within higher education, their attributes and the mechanics of how input and output 
factors determine funding levels. Context knowledge here referring to the 
understanding of the roles of the various stakeholders involved in delivering higher 
education, from government agencies responsible for planning, funding, data 
collection and quality assurance, to the higher education institutions, both public and 
private, responsible for the delivery of higher education, and to the recipients of 
higher education, students directly and society in general indirectly. In choosing the 
individuals to interview an attempt was made to select those individuals that could 
be considered to possess both the process knowledge and context knowledge 
described, and who would be considered to be experts in their areas, utilizing the 
definition of expert and expert knowledge as summarized by Bogner and Menz 
(2005, p. 46):  “Experts have technical process oriented and interpretive knowledge 
referring to their specific professional sphere of activity. Thus expert knowledge 
does not only consist of systematized and reflexively accessible specialized 
knowledge, but it has the character of practical knowledge in big parts. Different and 
even disparate precepts for activities and individual rules of decision, collective 
orientations and social interpretive patterns are part of it. The experts’ knowledge 
and orientations for practices, relevancies, etc. have also – and this is decisive- a 
chance to become hegemonic in a specific organizational or functional context. This 
means, experts have the opportunity to assert their orientations at least partly. By 
becoming practically relevant, the experts’ knowledge structures the practical 
conditions of other actors in their professional field in a substantial way.” 
 
The individuals interviewed from the universities were the senior finance, budget or 
planning officers for their institutions. As such they were considered to be the most 
knowledgeable about the finances and administrative operations of their universities 
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and therefore the experts to interview regarding the implications voucher funding 
could have in those areas.  
 
The actors that were interviewed within the government sector were the Ministry of 
Finance, the funding authority for the three federal higher education institutions; The 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the ministry responsible for 
accrediting all higher education institutions within the UAE, and the body developing 
a central data collection system for all higher education institutions; The Ministry of 
Presidential Affairs, the ministry that commissioned the study on the funding 
schemes for higher education institutions within the UAE, including voucher funding; 
the Abu Dhabi Education Council, the body responsible for coordinating programme 
offerings and developing education and educational institutions within the Emirate of 
Abu Dhabi; and the Dubai Knowledge and Human Development Authority, the body 
responsible for the growth, direction and quality of private education and learning in 
Dubai. The other emirates within the UAE have not established education councils 
and rely on the federal ministries of Education and Higher Education and Scientific 
Research for their educational programme offerings.  Each of the actors within the 
government category will be described in turn in the following section. 
 
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the efficient and effective management of 
public resources at the federal level with a focus on sustainable economic growth 
(MOF 2013). The Ministry provides the funding for the three federal higher 
education institutions (Higher Colleges of Technology, United Arab Emirates 
University and Zayed University) and would be the funding source for all higher 
education institutions within the UAE should a federal voucher funding scheme be 
implemented. The individuals interviewed from the Ministry of Finance were the 
Head of the Budget Department and the Budget Officer as they were seen to have 
an in-depth understanding of the funding implications for the federal government of 
a voucher funding scheme for higher education. 
 
The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research was established in 1992 to 
oversee higher education and scientific research policies in the UAE, as stated on its 
website (MOHESR 2014): “The Ministry is responsible for the general planning of higher 
education and scientific research in the UAE; licensing private institutions of higher 
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education, accrediting their programmes and overseeing them to ensure their quality 
standards within the context of the master plan of higher education; preparing draft laws 
for the establishment of federal governmental institutions of higher education and 
scientific research and; achieving coordination and integration between federal 
institutions of higher education and scientific research in terms of budgets, fields of 
specialization and academic degrees awarded by each of them. The Ministry is also 
responsible for coordinating students’ admission policies and the criteria for their 
placement in the various fields of specialization in the UAE higher education institutions 
in response to the needs of the community; accrediting foreign bodies and institutions of 
higher education and equalizing their certificates; laying down the general policy of 
scholarships and academic aid, and following-up their affairs inside and outside the 
UAE, taking into account the needs of the community and the specializations provided 
by the higher education institutions in the UAE and; developing scientific research 
institutions, transferring technologies in the context of developmental requirements of 
the community, and coordinating between higher education and scientific research 
bodies and institutions on the one hand, and public education on the other”.  
 
The individuals interviewed from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research were the Commissioner for Development, Commission for Academic 
Accreditation and two representatives from the Higher Education Coordinating 
Council: the former managing director and the associate managing director. The 
Commissioner for Development, Commission for Academic Accreditation was 
interviewed for his insights into the quality assurance requirements of the Ministry 
and the possible implications these may have on a voucher funding scheme. The 
Commissioner was also interviewed regarding the data collection unit of the Ministry 
and the extent to which information was collected on the various higher education 
institutions within the UAE and how this data unit could support a voucher funding 
scheme. 
 
The former managing director of the Higher Education Coordinating Council was no 
longer in the UAE and had returned to his native USA. The interview questions were 
emailed to him and he responded back via email. The associate managing director 
was interviewed in person. These two individuals were interviewed as they were 
responsible for coordinating the proposed per student funding scheme between the 
federal Ministry of Finance and the three federally funded higher education 
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institutions and would most likely be involved in the implementation of a voucher 
funding scheme if adopted. 
 
The Ministry of Presidential Affairs was established in November 2004 and 
combined both the Office of His Royal Highness the President and the Presidential 
Court (MOPA 2013) with the stated “mission to provide support and consultation to 
the decision-maker through the development of excellent, high-quality and credible 
capability to enhance the central role of the Ministry in developing national policies 
and community services.”  The Ministry of Presidential Affairs commissioned a study 
in late 2006 to recommend how the federal universities in the UAE should be funded 
in the future. The two primary government officials from the Ministry that were 
coordinating the study were contacted for interview as their responses would have 
been highly relevant to this research project. Unfortunately these government 
officials declined to be interviewed. However, the consultants engaged to undertake 
this study of behalf of the Ministry were interviewed and provided an insight into 
potential funding schemes for higher education within the UAE including voucher 
funding. 
 
The Abu Dhabi Education Council (ADEC) was created in 2005 by the government 
of Abu Dhabi with the aim to improve education, and support educational institutions 
and staff to achieve the objectives of national development in accordance with the 
highest international standards and with the ultimate goal of transforming Abu Dhabi 
into a diversified, innovation-based, knowledge-producing society (ADEC 2013). 
The Division Manager, Global Partnerships, and the Section Manager for Planning 
and Performance Management, Higher Education, were identified by the Council as 
the appropriate individuals to interview as to the implications of a voucher funding 
scheme for higher education institutions within the emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
 
The Dubai Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) is the regulatory 
authority responsible for the growth, direction and quality of private education and 
learning delivered through the schools, universities, training institutes and other 
human resource sectors within the emirate of Dubai (KHDA 2013). The Executive 
Director, Higher Education was identified by the Authority as the appropriate 
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individual to interview as to the implications of a voucher funding scheme for higher 
education institutions within the emirate of Dubai. 
 
Punch (2006, p. 168) lists the interview as one of the main data collection tools in 
qualitative research. The interview can be conducted with various degrees of 
structure, ranging from structured interviews to semi-structured and focus group 
interviews to unstructured interviews. The structured interview (Bryman 2004, p. 
110) calls for all interviewees to be given exactly the same context of questioning so 
that all replies can be aggregated. Survey research would be an example where this 
type of interview would be used.   With semi-structured interviews “the interviewer 
usually has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as 
significant replies” (Bryman 2004, p. 113). Interviews here consist of open-ended 
questions and would be conducted in face to face mode and would most likely be 
recorded. Notes would be made during interviews to record non-verbal information 
and to provide contextual understanding. The focus group method emphasizes a 
fairly tightly defined topic and entails several participants who have been selected 
because they “are known to have been involved in a particular situation” (Bryman 
2004, p. 346 citing Merton et al. 1956, p. 3). With the unstructured interview the 
approach is usually informal with the interviewer having a list of topics or issues to 
cover and the phrasing and sequencing of questions varying from one interview to 
the next (Bryman 2004, p. 113).  
For this research project the semi-structured interview approach was first 
considered for the actors within the higher education institution category and within 
the government sector category. This method was considered as it would provide 
some structure on questions posed to the interviewees to ensure the voucher 
funding themes identified for these particular actor groups were covered, but to also 
allow sufficient leeway for the interviewees to provide a more detailed response that 
may not have been provided through a very structured interview approach. For 
example, the higher education institution administrators would all be asked 
questions on the theme of the additional administrative requirements and costs a 
voucher funding scheme may entail. The questions asked would ensure that this 
theme was covered by each higher education administrator and the flexibility of the 
semi-structured interview would allow for follow up questions and a change in the 
order of questions asked to provide for a greater in-depth discussion of the 
questions and arguably fuller and richer responses. 
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Upon further reflection however the question was raised as to whether interviewees 
could actually answer questions poised to them about a voucher funding scheme 
unless they first understood what it meant and how it compares to other funding 
schemes. Providing an overview of Figure 1, the progression of funding schemes in 
the UAE, could provide this background and understanding of voucher schemes to 
interviewees. The initial structure of the interview would then be more closely 
aligned with what Pawson and Tilley (1997) term as the ‘realist interview’. Under this 
approach the researcher teaches the conceptual structure which the respondent 
utilizes to understand the question and to formulate his answer. Figure 8 illustrates 
the adaption of the ‘realist interview’ structure. 
 
Figure 8 : Adaptation of Pawson and Tiley “Realist Interview” Structure 
 














(Adapted from Pawson and Tiley, 1997) 
 
  Start/Finish  





   Question 
     Answer 
(Respondent) Learns conceptual structure (Researcher) Teaches conceptual structure
      Tests / refines theory Applies / refines conceptual structure       
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The interview approach therefore utilized when interviewing the actors within the 
higher education institution and government categories was a combination of the 
semi-structured interview together the adaptation of Pawson and Tiley’s ‘realist 
interview’ structure, used at the start of the interview process. 
 
Once initial contact had been made with the actors from the higher education 
institution and government categories an email was sent a minimum of one week in 
advance confirming the interview date, time and location. Also included in the email 
were the interview questions and a two page background information summary on 
the research project including a definition of voucher funding and Figure 1, the 
progression of funding schemes in the UAE. The information summary also stated 
that the interview would be face to face, would last approximately forty-five minutes 
to one hour and that an audio recording of the interview along with note taking 
would take place. 
 
In each case the interview was conducted at the office of the interviewee. The 
meeting began with some informal rapport and an acknowledgement of gratitude to 
the interviewee for agreeing to be interviewed. During this time the set up and brief 
explanation of the Livescribe Recording Pen, which provides both an audio 
recording and a digital recording of notes, took place. Following this an overview of 
the higher education funding progression within the UAE leading to the possible 
implementation of a voucher scheme was provided, using Figure 1 as a reference. 
With this background and explanation of voucher funding as a funding scheme for 
higher education the semi-structured interview began based on the questions and 
themes identified for the particular actor group as listed in Appendix 2. 
 
For the students, focus group interviews were selected to enable a relatively 
unstructured way to question a group of participants with similar experience (being 
students) about a fairly tightly defined topic, that being voucher funding for higher 
education institutions. Three focus groups of six participants each were selected 
which consisted of a mixture of first and fourth year undergraduate students, with 
approximate equal representation of both male and female students. First year 
students were selected for their more recent decision making experience in 
attending their chosen university while fourth year students were selected as they 
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were now completing their undergraduate degree and could reflect back on their 
initial decision to enrol in their respective programme and compare this to the 
results they actually achieved. Having both first and fourth year students in the 
focus groups allowed these students to address the research questions poised to 
them within the context of their particular experience. The three student focus 
groups were conducted with students from Abu Dhabi University, Al Hosn 
University, and Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research. Khalifa 
University is funded by the Abu Dhabi government and its student admission criteria 
are seen as more selective than those of Abu Dhabi University and Al Hosn 
University, which are both private universities within Abu Dhabi emirate. Having the 
student focus groups from these three universities provided a broad spectrum of 
students from private and government funded universities. 
To arrange the student focus group interviews the Student Affairs Department of 
each university was contacted by email, with telephone follow up as required, to 
request a meeting of between forty-five minutes to an hour for a group of six 
students, with representation as described above. A list of 10 questions for the 
students (contained in Appendix 2) along with a definition of voucher funding was 
included in the email and was requested to be provided to the students ahead of the 
focus group interview. The students were also advised that an audio recording and 
note taking would be done to record the responses. Initially a video recording of the 
focus group interviews was considered to fully capture the participation of the group 
however this was changed to the audio recording (using the Livescribe Recording 
Pen) given the cultural sensitivities within the UAE amongst some women of having 
pictures or video taken of them. 
 
The focus group interviews were held in smaller meeting rooms within the 
respective universities to allow for a more informal and unstructured gathering and 
to facilitate greater participation amongst the students and to also ensure proper 
audio recording. The focus group interviews began with the following definition of 
voucher funding as applied to higher education institutions:  
A ‘promissory note’ given to students to ‘buy’ the educational services of the 
University    of their choice. The university upon receiving the voucher from 
the student would present it to  the government in exchange for its 
monetary value. Universities would therefore receive  their funding 
indirectly from the government via the vouchers rather than directly. 
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Following this the 10 questions as listed in Appendix 2 were poised to the students 
and the responses recorded. 
 
4.6. Data Analysis 
Punch (2006) states that while there is no single right way to do qualitative data 
analysis – no single methodological framework - the methods used need to be 
systematic, disciplined, transparent and described. The method of analysis needs to 
show how the conclusions to a research project are linked to the data. Creswell 
(2003, p. 190) describes data analysis and interpretation as making sense out of 
text and image data and involves the preparation of data for analysis, conducting 
different analyses to obtain a better understanding of the data and finally making an 
interpretation of the larger meaning of the data. Creswell (2003, p. 192) advocates 
blending generic steps with the specific research design steps; the generic steps 
having been summarized as follows: 
 Step 1. Organize and prepare the data for analysis. This involves 
transcribing interviews, optically scanning material, typing up field notes or 
sorting and arranging the data into different types depending on the sources 
of information. 
 Step 2. Read through all the data to obtain a general sense of the 
information and to reflect on its overall meaning. 
 Step 3. Begin detailed analysis with a coding process. Coding is the process 
of organizing the material into “chunks” before bringing meaning to those 
“chunks” (Rossman & Ralllis, 1998, p. 171) 
 Step 4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or 
people as well as categories or themes for analysis. 
 Step 5.  Advance how the description and themes will be represented in the 
qualitative narrative. 
 Step 6. Make an interpretation or meaning of the data. “What were the 
lessons learned?” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
 
Creswell’s generic steps were used as a guide for the data analysis for this project 
and were blended with the case study research design. The resulting approach to 




 Step 1.  Organizing and preparing the data for analysis. A total of 16 
interviews, comprised of 35 participants, were conducted and audio 
recorded amongst the three actor groups, along with email response from 
the government official that was no longer in the UAE.  The interviews were 
approximately 45 minutes to one hour in length and were recorded with the 
Livescribe Pen and saved as audio files on the computer. Rather than 
transcribing each recorded interview the interviews were played back and 
the salient responses, quotations and comments were typed on an Excel 
spread sheet against each of the questions asked. This exercise entailed 
replaying the audio recording as required to ensure the correct response or 
comment was noted against the respective theme and question. The time 
stamp for each response, taken from the minute and second recording of the 
audio files, was noted beside each response recorded on the Excel spread 
sheet for easy reference back to the audio recording as required.  In addition 
to the audio recordings the notes that were taken during the interview, and 
captured digitally via the Livescribe Pen, were reviewed and also noted 
against the respective theme and question. Approximately two to three hours 
were required to complete this exercise for each of the 16 interviews 
conducted. 
 
The responses and comments at times addressed questions outside of 
those posed to a particular actor group; in this case the response was 
recorded against the respective theme, sub-theme and question of the other 
actor groups. For example, university administrators, which had questions 
posed to them under the “Higher Education Institution” perspective, often 
made comments that related to the “Alternative Funding Models” sub-theme 
which was under the “Government Perspective” theme and as such their 
comments were noted under this theme.  
 
 Step 2. Beginning a detailed analysis with a coding process. As previously 
discussed in the research question section the initial themes and sub-
themes were established when the interview questions were being 
developed, these being: 





 Protecting subjects 
 Funding 
 Alternative funding models 
o Higher education institution perspective 
 Resource requirements 
 Physical facilities and infrastructure 
 Geographical access 
 Organizational culture 
o Student perspective 
 Student choice 
 Student awareness and motivation 
 Student life-long learning 
As such an initial coding process was established during Step 1, when the 
responses, comments and quotations from the interviews were noted on an Excel 
spread sheet against the respective questions and themes for each interviewee. 
This included the additional sub-themes that were established as a result of the 
responses that were provided and that did not fit well into the original sub-themes 
established. In Step 2 the responses recorded on the individual spread sheets for 
each interviewee were consolidated onto a master spread sheet, through a cut and 
paste exercise, which listed all noted responses for each interviewee and for all 
themes, sub-themes and questions, including the additional sub-themes that were 
established. The total data was captured on 18 pages of A3 paper. 
 
 Step 3. Using the coding process to generate categories or themes for 
analysis 
From the master spread sheet developed in Step 2 all the responses were 
organized by theme, sub-theme and actor group. These responses were 
reviewed a number of times to obtain a general sense of the data gathered, to 
reflect on the overall meaning of the data and to determine how best this data 
could be organized to address the main research question of “What are the 
consequences, intended and unintended, of implementing a voucher 




After considerable review it became apparent to take an approach similar to a gap 
analysis for establishing the categories for the data themes - these categories 
being: the proposed state of the voucher methodology of funding and the underlying 
principles this encompasses, the perceived enablers to facilitate this transition from 
the current methodology of funding to voucher funding, and the transition process. 
Applying this approach to the data collected, the corresponding themes were 
grouped to these categories as shown in Table 5. Through this data analysis 
process additional themes emerged from those originally identified when the 
research question and interview questions were established. For example, during 
the analysis of the responses to the “Efficiency” questions the theme of quality 
assurance was prominent and as such this theme was added. Numerous responses 
were made on the difference between a voucher system and a per student funding 
formula and the need for a governance body. Likewise with the culture of the UAE, 
its maturity and the transition to voucher process, issues for which a sub-theme had 
not been established. In each of these cases the additional sub-themes were added 
to the data analysis themes outlined in Table 5. 
 













Student choice, awareness, motivation Administrative Requirements  
  Governance body  







 Step 4. Advancing how the themes will be represented in the qualitative 
narrative. Having grouped the themes according to the categories listed in 
Table 5 provided a logical approach for the narrative account to convey the 
findings of the analysis. The three categories of Proposed Voucher State 
Attributes, Enablers (Constraints) and Transition were established as the 
main categories with the respective themes under each category to serve as 
the heading for the narrative for the data analysis. As the empirical data was 
collected through a series of interviews and focus groups (supplemented by 
a literature review) numerous quotations have been included in the analysis 
to provide for a richer and better understanding of the issues reviewed. This 
narrative is captured in Chapter 5, Assessing the Effects of a Voucher 
Scheme for the UAE. 
 
 Step 5.  Making an interpretation or meaning of the data and identifying the 
“lessons learned”. This is covered in Chapter 6, Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
 
4.7. Challenges Faced 
While securing interviews with the university administrators and most of the 
government officials was relatively straight forward, and in most cases the 
individuals were very accommodating, it was not possible to interview the 
government officials from the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. As previously stated 
this Ministry had spear-headed the review of the existing federal funding system for 
higher education and the implementation of the per student funding scheme. As part 
of that study the concept of voucher funding for higher education within the UAE 
was proposed so interviewing the officials that were coordinating the study for the 
Ministry would have been highly relevant to this research project. While it was not 
possible to interview these Ministry officials the consultants engaged to undertake 
this study of behalf of the Ministry agreed to be interviewed and provided valuable 





Arranging for the student focus group interviews provided some challenges as well. 
This required locating the correct staff person within the university that would 
coordinate the logistics of getting together a group of first year and fourth year 
students, with a mix of male and female students. Before this staff person could 
proceed they required permission from the senior leadership of the university, 
usually the Provost, to undertake this exercise. To support this request an outline of 
the research project and the interview questions were provided to the staff person to 
review with the senior leadership. For two of the universities a telephone call was 
made to the senior leadership to provide additional background on the research 
project and the involvement of the students. Once permission was granted it took 
some time for the focus group interviews to proceed as students had to be recruited 
and the interviews had to be scheduled around the students’ timetables and exams. 
 
The semi-formal interview style, while providing a richer response and gathering of 
information, made it more difficult to sort and code responses by question category. 
As earlier described approximately two to three hours were required for each of the 
16 interviews to replay the audio recordings and to transcribe the responses or 
comments against the respective theme and question. Transcribing the exact 
quotations within the Data Analysis chapter often required numerous replaying of 
the audio recordings, especially given the Arab and other dialects of the individuals 
interviewed. 
 
Finally, in some cases the interview data was insufficient and needed to be 
validated. Triangulation was utilized as a way of cross-checking the results achieved 
from the interviews against other sources of data, primarily government policy 
documents, journals on higher education and other writings as referenced in the 
literature review.  A case in point was the theme of protecting subjects and 
government steering. Here the findings of the UAE 2021 Vision and the Abu Dhabi 
Economic Vision 2030 were referenced against the responses from the interviewees 
to illustrate how the federal government and the Abu Dhabi emirate government 




4.8. Limitations Concerning Validity and Reliability 
4.8.1. Limitations of Validity 
Bryman (2004, p. 52) states that one of the standard criticisms of the case study is 
that findings deriving from it cannot be generalized. To counter this criticism Bryman 
(2004, p. 52) argues that the aim of case study researchers is to “generate an 
intensive examination of a single case, in relation which they then engage in a 
theoretical analysis”. The crucial question therefore centres not on whether the 
findings of a case study can be generalized to wider universe, but rather on how 
well the researcher generates theory out of the findings (Bryman, 2004, p. 52). In 
undertaking this “intensive examination of a single case” Silverman (2005, p. 211) 
points out qualitative researchers need to overcome the special temptation of 
anecdotalism, that is, ensuring that their findings are based on all their data and not 
on a few well-chosen examples. 
 
This study attempted to ensure that all data collected from the specified primary 
actors was analysed and considered when developing the findings to guard against 
anecdotalism. Some sixteen individual interviews were conducted with higher 
education institutions and government entities and three focus group sessions with 
students were completed, for a total participant list of 36, in an attempt to have the 
data collection representative of all actors impacted by the voucher funding scheme. 
Nonetheless there is still the risk that the exclusion of some actors may have 
resulted in data not being collected that could have altered the theory generated, 
the unavailability of government officials of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs for 
interview as earlier noted a case in point. As these officials were instrumental in 
having a review conducted of the funding schemes for higher education institutions 
within the U.A.E., including the implementation of a voucher funding scheme, their 
insights would have been valuable as to the objectives of the government and what 
they saw as possible implications of such funding schemes. While these 
government officials declined to be interviewed the consultants engaged to 
undertake this study of behalf of the Ministry were interviewed, and through this it is 
believed a fair interpretation of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs’ objectives and 




The implementation of vouchers as a scheme of funding higher education, as 
previously discussed, has few examples. While the findings derived from this case 
study may likely have applications to other countries, the findings in large part apply 
to the unique characteristics of the U.A.E. and cannot be generalized to a wider 
universe. 
 
Trustworthiness is another primary criterion for assessing a qualitative study.  
Bryman (2004, p. 273) identifies credibility, which parallels internal validity, and 
transferability, which parallels external validity as primary criteria categorized as 
trustworthiness. Credibility is stated as the feasibility of others reaching the same 
conclusion as that of the researcher. Bryman (2004, p. 275) lists respondent 
validation or member validation as well as triangulation as two techniques that can 
be used to substantiate credibility. Triangulation, as illustrated in Section 4.7, 
involves using more than one method or source of data in the research project as a 
way of cross-checking the results achieved. In this project the sources of data were 
interviews and publications, primarily policy documents, journals on higher 
education and other writings as referenced in the literature review. The interviews, 
and the corresponding findings, were categorized according to the themes 
established in the research sub-questions which in turn were derived from the 
literature review. This puts forward the argument that the research questions were 
credibly determined and as such others using the same questions could feasibly 
obtain the same conclusions. 
 
Respondent validation or member validation refers to the researcher submitting his 
findings to those studied (in this case those interviewed) for confirmation that the 
researcher has correctly understood their response (Bryman, 2004, p. 275). In this 
case it was deemed not feasible to review the findings with all those interviewed 
(although one could argue that the semi-structured interview facilitates confirmation 
as it allows for follow up and clarification of the responses provided). While the 
findings were not reviewed with all those interviewed they were reviewed with the 
consultants engaged by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. It was deemed that the 
consultants were acutely familiar with the objectives of the government and what 
they saw as possible implications of such funding schemes and hence confirmation 




It is further argued that utilizing an adaptation of the “realist interview” provided 
additional validation to this study. As earlier discussed this approach has the 
researcher teaching the conceptual structure which the respondent utilizes to 
understand the question and to formulate his answer. By applying this process to 
the progression of funding schemes in the U.A.E. as depicted in Figure 2 it is 
argued provided the foundation for the respondents to understand the concept of 
voucher funding for higher education in relation to other funding schemes and 
provided the context and background for the research sub questions.  
 
4.8.2. Limitations of Reliability 
LeCompte and Goetz (1982, p.31) write about reliability in relation to qualitative 
research and describe both external reliability and internal reliability. External 
reliability they define as the extent to which a study can be reproduced. As this 
project was based on a case study with data sourced primarily through literature 
and interviews with individuals representing the three actor groups of higher 
education institutions, government and students, the argument is made that a 
comparable study could be replicated. Internal reliability LeCompte and Goetz state 
occurs when there is more than one observer and all observers agree about what 
they see and hear. In this study only one observer was present so this measure is 
not applicable. 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) identify dependability as a parallel to reliability in 
quantitative research and argue that researchers should adopt an “auditing” 
approach to ensure the trustworthiness of their research. This would involve 
keeping complete records of all phases of the research process, from identifying the 
research question, to the interview notes and transcripts, to the data analysis and 
conclusions. Guba and Lincoln (1994) state these records would need to be 
accessible so that peers, acting as auditors, could ascertain how far proper 
procedures were followed and to the degree to which theoretical inferences could 
be justified. While this study did not engage this auditing approach (which Bryman 
2004 states has not become a popular approach to enhancing the dependability of 
qualitative research) care was taken to ensure complete records of research project 
were maintained. Through the use of the Livescribe Recording Pen and its 
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technological capabilities, audio interviews were recorded and backed up on an 
external hard drive as were the interview notes that were made and recorded 
digitally via the Livescribe Pen. Spread sheet schedules were maintained of the 
interviews conducted, listing the interviewees, their position titles and the dates, 
locations and timings of the interviews. It is argued that these records, along with a 
Gantt chart recording the various phases and timelines of the research project 
(serving as a diary) provides evidence that sufficient records were maintained to 
document the various phases of the project. 
 
As a final measure of the reliability of the project the concept of confirmability is 
identified. Bryman (2004, p. 276) defines the concept as showing that the 
researcher acted in good faith and has not overtly allowed personal values or 
theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct of the research or its associated 
findings. As the researcher was a former administrator of one of the publicly funded 
higher education institutions within the UAE, care needed to be exercised to guard 
against biases and pre-conceived notions as to the implications of a voucher 
funding scheme. Likewise it needs to be recognized that information provided 
through interviews is filtered through the views of the interviewees and many factors 
can influence responses, one way or another (Bell 1987, p. 73). From the literature 
review it is noted that the advantages and disadvantages of a voucher funding 
scheme are based on the different ideological approach to the role of higher 
education in society. University administrators, for example, operating in similar 
environments may very well have opposing views on the implications of a voucher 
funding scheme based on their ideological beliefs. As such it needs to be 
acknowledged that the findings gathered through the interviews are a reflection of 
the personal ideology of the interviewee. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
The implementation of vouchers in higher education is still a relatively new research 
area, and there has been limited research on funding higher education within the 
UAE. The case study approach to this research project was undertaken to develop 
generalizations that may be applicable to others considering implementing vouchers 
for funding higher education as well as to provide propositions that could form the 
inputs into further research. Creswell’s generic steps were used as a guide for the 
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data analysis for this project and were blended with the case study research design. 
Through this process the categories for the data themes were established - these 
three categories being the proposed voucher state attributes and the underlying 
principles they encompass; the perceived enablers to facilitate this transition from 
the current methodology of funding to voucher funding; and the transition process. 
These categories provided the framework for the data analysis covered in Chapter 























5. Chapter Five: Assessing the Implications of a 
Voucher Funding Scheme for the UAE 
The traditional view of higher education saw universities and colleges shielded from 
the pressures of market and political forces; higher education institutions were seen 
as public resources and education was viewed as a public good (Massy, 1996). 
According to Massy (1996) this view has been challenged over the years through a 
combination of reduced government resources and a corresponding questioning of 
government’s ability to assure quality and efficiency to the satisfaction of public 
officials and their constituents. The result has been an increasing “privatization” of 
higher education, with a greater reliance on market forces over public 
appropriations. As discussed in the literature review chapter proponents of a 
voucher funding scheme assert that a demand driven, voucher model of funding 
higher education will spur on greater competition for students amongst higher 
education institutions. Students would have stronger incentives to participate and 
with such a system, choice, underpinned by good information and strong quality 
assurance, should drive both a high quality student experience and institutional 
diversity. Major concerns raised in the literature review about a totally market and 
student demand-driven system for funding includes the capacity of the government 
to fund open ended enrolments and the ability to fund rapid enrolment increases; 
the impact on institutions and campuses of sudden enrolment shifts; the quality of 
student entrants if funding is demand-driven and the risk of mismatch between 
student programme choices and the workforce requirements of the nation. In 
assessing the implications of a voucher funding scheme for the UAE these issues 
along with others as identified in Chapter 4, and summarized in Table 5, have been 
analysed and are presented in the three categories of Proposed Voucher State 
Attributes, Enablers (Constraints) and Transition. These three main categories 
together with the respective themes under each category serve as the heading for 
the narrative for the data analysis and are discussed in detail in the following 
sections. Salient quotations from the individuals interviewed are included in the 
following sections and have been referenced according to the actor group category 
(Government Official, University Public Official, University Private Official, Student 
Focus Group). Random numbers have been assigned to each individual actor, with 




5.1. Proposed Voucher State Attributes 
5.1.1. Efficiency and Quality Assurance 
Proponents of vouchers, as discussed earlier, propose that greater competition 
amongst higher education institutions for students will act as incentive for the 
institutions to improve their quality. The UAE has a large number of higher 
education institutions. In addition to the three public higher education institutions 
(Higher Colleges of Technology, United Arab Emirates University, and Zayed 
University) there are 74 private institutions of higher education recognized by the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (CAA, 2014). As well there a 
number of “free zones” within each local emirate that have distinct geographical and 
administrative areas, which can allow up to 100 per cent foreign ownership, and 
which target specific commercial activities, in this case private higher education 
institutions.  Given the large number of higher education providers in the UAE, and 
following the logic of proponents of vouchers, one could argue that this has a 
positive effect on quality as the large number of higher education institutions would 
force competition to improve programmes and the employability of graduates. This 
argument had both supporters and detractors from the individuals interviewed. 
Suggestions were made that universities would need to compete to be on a list of 
“quality” universities from which students with vouchers could choose from. 
Government Official 1: “You have to have sort of like list of universities 
according to course, well done analysis for their performance that you can 
allow students with vouchers to join and in this case all universities will have 
a direct impact … all universities will compete to improve their education and 
to compete to appear on this list with a good performance so in this case yes 
I think it would be a good idea to introduce them (vouchers)”. 
 
Some respondents argued that with the increased number of foreign private 
institutions that have established campuses in the UAE an increased number of 
Emirati students are forgoing free tuition at the federal institutions and paying to 
attend these private higher education institutions, believing these offer a higher level 
of quality.  
Government Official 7:  “It seems to me that the reputation of the federals is 
slipping a little bit, that as people become more globally conscious and 
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thinking more about global competitiveness that the federal education 
institutions really aren’t … they don’t have the prestige”.  
 
Other respondents stated that the increased attendance by Emirati students at 
private institutions was for reasons other than quality; that without an accompanying 
quality assurance programme students may choose to attend institutions with the 
easiest entrance requirements. Likewise institutions may be incentivised to “dumb 
down” their standards simply to attract more students and the accompanying 
funding. 
Government Official 5:  “There is in general in the Emirates a movement of 
Emiratis leaving federal institutions where the quote unquote value of the 
voucher exists and moving to non-federal institutions and they are doing so 
with no voucher, so if you have a voucher would that accelerate that? I think 
it would. Would they all go to quality institutions? I think they would not. We 
see very large numbers of Emirati students going into low entrance 
institutions, maybe where you can still study in Arabic, where most of the 
faculty is Arabic speaking, even if it is an English language institution, where 
the entrance standards are low, 60 per cent for example rather than 70 or 80 
at other institutions, low CEPA scores and they are enrolling in large 
numbers in some of those institutions. So it’s just not quality.” 
 
Government Official 1: “Some universities, especially the private, they may 
sacrifice the quality because the culture that we have, for example, the 
people who have money don’t always seek good education, they may seek 
easy education. So if you are able to consider the quality of the institution as 
a condition … (of a voucher)… you can guarantee to an extent that 
universities will not sacrifice their quality to please the students.” 
 
University Public Official 2: “The country is at a stage where they have to 
scale up their standards, they have to challenge the students more and 
more, and we already see with the formula funding … a lot of pressure from 
budgeting, finance and administrative people … to raise the number of 
students and to try to dumb down standards. This would be an unfortunate 




Government Official 8: “There is no automatic reason for quality to be 
maintained. Government mandates will be necessary to ensure quality” 
 
From the above comments it would seem that market forces by themselves cannot 
assure the quality of higher education. Within the UAE the focus is primarily on 
licensure, compliance and accreditation, and not necessarily on quality assurance 
and improvement. At the federal level the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research (MOHESR) is responsible for the licensure and accreditation of the three 
federal institutions (MOHESR, 2013). In addition Zayed University has been 
accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, a US regional 
accrediting body, while the other two federal institutions are seeking international 
accreditation. 
 
For the private higher education institutions of the UAE, the Commission for 
Academic Accreditation (CAA) of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research conducts a programme of licensure of institutions of higher education and 
accreditation of each of their academic programmes. (MOHESR,CAA 2013). 
 
Foreign institutions operating within free zones are not subject to the licensing 
requirements of the CAA however they are subject to the quality assurance 
requirements of the individual emirates. The emirate of Dubai, for example, through 
its Knowledge and Development Authority (KHDA), encourages the provision of 
additional high quality foreign education providers to supplement local supply and 
speed up human resource development in the UAE; however these foreign 
institutions need to comply with the quality standards the KHDA has established 
through its University Quality Assurance International Board (UQAIB). This Board 
consists of international quality assurance experts who assist with the oversight of 
the quality of higher education offered by foreign higher education providers 
operating in the Dubai free zones (KHDA, 2013). Foreign private operators are also 
expected to comply with the same quality assurance requirements of their home 




Having these foreign institutions that are operating within free zones come under 
CAA accreditation is a likely goal of the federal government according to following 
government official: 
 
Government Official 4: “These institutions in the free zones are part of the 
higher education system in this country. Why wouldn’t the Minister of Higher 
Education want to know all the higher education institutions in his country 
regardless of what deal they are operating under? The Ministry is proud, and 
rightly so, of the CAA and believes it’s a good system and would like all 
institutions to go through it”. 
 
University Private Official 2: “Given that vouchers support a market driven 
approach to funding it is essential that a quality assurance regime be in 
place. If QA is implemented then this may be an advantage of a voucher 
system in that it would enforce QA to be in place for all institutions which is 
not the case with the institutions within the free zone areas.” 
 
In an effort to bridge this accreditation gap between the free zone higher education 
institutions and the public and private institutions accredited by the CAA, the federal 
government established in 2011 the Center for Information & Statistics of Higher 
Education (CHEDS) within the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
Referring to its decree  a primary role of CHEDS is the collection and analysis of all 
information and statistics of each higher education institution in the UAE through 
which the performance of each HEI is compared with performance indicators for 
quality and excellence, with such results produced and published to inform decision 
makers and the public of the performance level of each HEI, and to enable them to 
make comparisons among similar educational programmes offered by these 
institutions, and also general comparison among institutions (MOHESR, CHEDS, 
2013). At this time however participation by the free zone HEI’s with CHEDS is still 
voluntary.  These HEI’s may consider to have their programmes accredited by the 
CAA in order to attract more national students as graduates cannot work in federal 
government institutions with unaccredited degrees.  This would be attractive in 
recruiting national students as this is where a large number of nationals prefer to 
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work due to higher salaries and more favourable working conditions as compared to 
the private sector (Wilkins, 2010). 
 
So while the CAA provides this licensing and accreditation function, it is 
questionable whether this is the type of quality assurance function required in a 
voucher funding scheme. Given the need to improve quality and efficiency in 
response to the market forces of a voucher funding scheme it may be more 
appropriate to have a system more focused on institution-level quality assurance 
and improvement processes and outcomes measures than having an approach 
based on summative judgements about delivered quality and compliance. In effect 
the distinction is made between ““Quality Assessment”, the mechanism or 
procedures used to determine the extent to which quality exists, and “Quality 
Assurance”, the mechanism or procedures used to assure or measure the level or 
existence of quality.  Institutions choosing Quality Assurance evaluate the 
mechanisms and procedures used by the institutions to assure and measure, and 
also to improve, the level of quality – a process that has come to be called 
“academic audit.””(Massy, 2006, p. 1) 
 
“Academic audits” that have been implemented in a number of countries, including 
Australia, New Zealand, England, the U.S. states of Missouri and Tennessee and 
the Canadian province of Ontario. These academic audits focus on process and 
improvement rather than summative statements about quality standards achieved. 
A select manageable number of important issues are set out for audit as opposed to 
the larger number of issues and requirements called for in an accreditation process. 
The academic audits are also characterized by a high degree of transparency and a 
self-study approach that further supports the focus on improvement rather than 
compliance. Using the Canadian province of Ontario as an example it has 
established the Ontario College Quality Assurance Service (OCQAS) that has 
developed a set of six quality criteria/characteristics which are seen as quality 
exemplars for higher education institutions (OCQAS, 2014). Every public college in 
Ontario, on a five year cyclical basis, undertakes a self-study rating themselves 
against these six criteria. This is followed by an on-site audit by an external panel of 
trained auditors to ensure the findings of the colleges are valid and supported by 
reliable evidence. Final reports are released to the colleges and posted on the 
OCQAS website, available to the public. Colleges also provide a follow-up report to 
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the audit findings within 18 months and this report is also posted on the OCQAS 
website. 
 
Within the UAE a determination would need to be made as to whether the role of 
the CAA should be expanded to include academic audits, whether this could be 
incorporated under the mandate of CHEDS or whether a separate unit should be 
established for this function. 
 
Leaving aside the discussion about the relationship between quality and efficiency, 
one also needs to look at historical development of the UAE and how key decisions 
that were made in the 1970s shaped the character and structure of higher education 
in the country and how this impacted efficiency of programme delivery. Four original 
pillars of policy for the UAE from the 1970’s are identified: “the federal government 
would build and operate its own universities, separated by gender; a qualified, 
mostly international faculty would be employed; all instruction would be in English; 
and education was to be for all qualified Emiratis, and would include women” (Fox, 
2008).  These key decisions contribute to higher costs for the federal higher 
education institutions due to the cost of importing faculty and the associated cost of 
providing housing and transportation home each year, as well as the duplicate costs 
associated with separating campuses by gender, namely capital costs and the 
number of faculty and staff. The effect these policy decisions have on efficiencies, 
as compared with private higher education institutions not bound by these policies, 
needs to be considered when evaluating arguments that voucher funding provides 
incentives for efficiencies. 
 
Finally a number of respondents stated that voucher funding would likely require a 
more mature higher education system. Many of the universities within the UAE are 
new and starting up and economy of scale efficiencies have not yet been realized. 





5.1.2. Equity  
In the literature review the main emphasis of Jencks’ model was referenced as 
equal access to education, with the aim to support the prevention of social and 
economic segregation, and to ensure that children should not be denied access to 
education as a result of their parents’ inability to pay. Within the UAE, Article 17 of 
the federal constitution states that education shall be a fundamental factor for the 
progress of society and free of charge at all stages, within the Union 
(Worldstatesman, 2003). As such one could argue that equal access, or equity, is 
guaranteed for all Emiratis, at least at the public institutions. However, as discussed 
in the previous section, many Emiratis are looking to enrol at private institutions 
where they are required to pay tuition. Having a voucher system that could be 
utilized at both public and private institutions would provide the choice that it 
appears Emiratis want. 
 
Government Official 5: “…I think the trends I see in this country is that 
Emiratis want options… One thing vouchers should do is to increase choice, 
and choice should include all public and private. They can already go to the 
public for free but if they had a voucher they could still go to the public for 
free or they could go to the private”. 
 
While Emirati students are provided with free education to one of the three federal 
institutions, and while a voucher funding scheme could provide additional access to 
private institutions, the skill level of the student would still be a determining factor as 
to which institutions the student would be eligible to enrol in. Within the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) is the National Admissions 
and Placement Office (NAPO) which is responsible for assessing the skill level of 
Emirati high school leavers and processing their applications for admission to the 
three federal institutions (United Arab Emirates University, the Higher Colleges of 
Technology, Zayed University), as well as the Abu Dhabi Centre for Technical and 
Vocational Education and Training (ACTVET), described later, and for study abroad 
under the sponsorship of the MOHESR (MOHESR 2013). The admission process 
includes the administration of the Common Educational Proficiency Assessment 
(CEPA) which consists of two tests, an English test and a Mathematics test. The 
results of these tests and the eligibility requirements set out by the institutions 
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determine which institutions are available to the students and which students are 
eligible to get a scholarship to study abroad. Furthermore students with high CEPA 
scores are eligible to enter academic programmes directly while lower scoring 
students are required to enrol in foundation programmes at the institutions 
(MOHESR 2013). 
 
Each of the three federally funded higher education institutions within the UAE offer 
these foundation, or bridging programmes, in English, mathematics and related 
subjects to bring the skill level of school leaver students up to university entry 
standards. At the Higher Colleges of Technology for example, General Education 
(foundation and work readiness) programme enrolments for the 2011-12 academic 
year totalled 7,360 out of a total enrolment of 19,515, or approximately 38 per cent 
(HCT 2013). Within the emirate of Abu Dhabi the Abu Dhabi Education Council 
(ADEC) reported that at the start of the 2012-13 academic year only 12 per cent of 
school leavers were able to go straight on to university degree courses, with the rest 
needing remedial lessons in English and other subjects first (ADEC 2013). In 
response to this deficiency ADEC implemented a New School Model in 2010, 
introduced in stages – first to kindergarten classes, then to each successive year, 
with grades 10 to 12 to be fully migrated by the academic year 2015-16 (ADEC 
2013). The reforms target a shift from an emphasis on content (“rote learning”) to 
one of critical thinking and an encouragement to continue learning throughout life.  
More specifically the reforms called for in the New School Model are to align with 
the following 10 year targets set by ADEC (ADEC 2013): 
 Abu Dhabi public and private school students perform above international 
average 
 All students at school age, Nationals and Non-Nationals, have access to 
quality schools 
 Kindergarten attendance at best-practice levels 
 Enhance students’ knowledge and pride of own history and culture 
 Ensure that 100 per cent of parents have access to their children’s 
performance data 
 
In addition to establishing the New School Model the Abu Dhabi government 
recognized the need for vocational education and training to complement its higher 
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education institutions and to offer pragmatic opportunities for its students. In 2010 
the Abu Dhabi Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(ACTVET) was created by the Abu Dhabi Executive Council to preside over 
technical and vocational training in the emirate with the goal of increasing the 
number of skilled young Emiratis employed in rewarding positions, with 
opportunities for life-long learning and personal development (ACTVET 2013). 
 
University Public Official 2: “The real problem is that the vast majority of 
students are not prepared for higher education… I think we have to be very 
careful about what the voucher system will do for that group. It’s not the 
highly motivated students, highly accomplished students (to be concerned 
about). I think they pretty much have something like a voucher system, they 
can go overseas, depending on gender and those cultural issues and so on, 
or they can go to local schools, even so called private schools like American 
University of Sharjah, they provide significant scholarships to local students, 
and NYU and Sorbonne. That is there for the motivated students but I think 
we really have to worry at this stage for the next five to ten years, the K-12 is 
still struggling, what to do with the majority of students with a voucher 
system”.  
 
Equal access to higher education in the UAE may therefore be more of a matter of 
not all students being adequately prepared, or suited for, university as opposed to 
not having access to higher education institutions for financial reasons. For those 
high school leaver students that are high achievers open access is already available 
to them – they can attend any one of the three federal institutions or they can 
receive scholarships to go to overseas universities or scholarships to attend local 
universities like New York University Abu Dhabi or Paris Sorbonne Abu Dhabi. The 
2011 year statistics from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 
Scholarship Department show that a total of 312 scholarships were awarded to UAE 
National students to attend higher institutions in 20 different countries; the 
scholarships broken down by degree programmes as 18 for Doctorates, 43 for 




Access to private schools could also be seen as an overarching equity issue, 
illustrating the emirate of Dubai as an example. The Dubai Knowledge and Human 
Development Authority (KHDA) was established in 2006 with the responsibility for 
the growth, direction and quality of private education and learning in Dubai. KHDA’s 
role is to ensure that Dubai’s private schools are established and operate according 
to the highest quality standards. KHDA’s Dubai Schools Inspection Bureau (DSIB) 
carries out detailed inspections of every private school in Dubai and the Regulations 
and Compliance Commission (RCC) are responsible for the licensing of schools and 
their adherence to regulations and guidelines. For primary and secondary education 
Dubai schools cater to 87 per cent of Dubai’s population, with the government 
school system open only to Emirati students.   For Emirati students, 43 per cent 
attend government schools, with the remainder in the private system.  For higher 
education 42 per cent of Emirati students attend the three federal higher education 
institutions (Zayed University, and the Dubai Men’s and Women’s Colleges of the 
Higher Colleges of Technology system) with the remaining 58 per cent of Emirati 
students attending one of the 52 higher education institutions that are either branch 
campuses of international universities or other private universities. (KHDA 2013). 
Within the emirate of Dubai, given the high rate of Emiratis enrolled in private 
schools and private higher education institutions, voucher funding could been seen 
to facilitate the choice of access between private and public higher education 
institutions for Emirati students. 
 
The issue of whether equal access should apply to expatriate students brought to 
light the significant increase in the population of the UAE in recent years, primarily 
from expatriates. In 2006 the population of the UAE was 5,012,384, broken down to 
851,164 for Nationals and 4,161,220 for expatriates. The population rose to 
8,264,070 in 2010, with the Emirati population rising slightly to 947,997 (12 per cent 
of total population) and the expatriate population rising to 7,316,073 (88 per cent of 
total population) (UAE National Bureau of Statistics 2013).This significant increase 
in the expatriate population raises the issue of whether expatriate students should 
also be eligible for equal access to education.  
 
Government Official 5:  (the population of the UAE) “has doubled in less than 
eight years and all of that is expats. That’s social service, roads, 
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construction, immense planning, water (requirements) let alone education. 
So you’ve got a huge demand for expats that have unmet needs.” 
 
The development of the UAE depends not only on having a well-educated citizenry 
but also on the presence of well-educated expatriates, many who have made the 
UAE their home and whose commitment is to the UAE.  While governments could 
see this as an incentive to recruit and retain the required expatriate workers to 
support the ambitious development plans of the UAE, equal access for expatriate 
students could be viewed as more of a citizenship issue requiring some form of an 
income tax regime for expatriate workers to enable this eligibility requirement.   
 
5.1.3. Protecting Subjects and Government Steering 
A review of the literature from past years would indicate that the role of higher 
education institutions in the Arab states was widely viewed as an instrument of 
social and economic development (Kazem, 1992). Development policies in most 
Arab states were aimed to provide free access to higher education thereby enabling 
greater entry to members of previously excluded social groups. As such these 
policies largely transformed universities into teaching institutions with limited funds 
made available for research programs (Mazawi, 2005). In addition, guaranteed 
employment policies exacerbated the misalignment between university training 
deliverables and labour market needs (Zhiri, 1990). The cumulative effect of these 
policies as concluded by the authors of the 2003 Arab Human Development Report 
(UNDP, 2003) is that universities in the Arab states generally “lack a clear vision 
[…and…] well-designed policies regulating the educational process” (p. 56). The 
authors further stated that overcrowding, decline in expenditures and inadequate 
facilities hamper the quality of instruction and research. Against this backdrop were 
calls for the restructuring of higher education. In most Arab states the major concern 
in the restructuring of higher education were the links between higher education and 
labour market needs (Mazawi, 2005).  The “growing gap between quality of 
graduates and labour market needs” (Morgaby, 2005) raises concerns about the 
relevance of higher education in the Gulf States  where imported workers “build our 
homes, repair our cars, fix our televisions and run the production lines in our 
factories” (Sulayti, 2000). This lack of a locally trained workforce was seen to impact 
the perceived national identity and cultural heritage of Gulf societies and was seen 
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to exert pressure on institutions to address this gap between higher education and 
labour market needs.  
 
It now appears the UAE government has taken concrete steps towards addressing 
this gap. Excerpts from the UAE 2021 Vision and the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 
2030 illustrate how the federal government and the Abu Dhabi emirate government 
view the role of higher education in relationship to economic growth strategies: 
 
“A diversified and flexible knowledge-based economy will be powered by 
skilled Emiratis and strengthened by world-class talent to ensure long-term 
prosperity for the UAE. We want all Emiratis to make a valuable contribution 
to their nation’s growth by building their knowledge and applying their talent 
with innovation and drive. 
 
More Emiratis will enter higher education, where they will enrich their minds 
with the skills that their nation needs to fuel its knowledge economy. 
Universities will listen closely to the needs of Emiratis and of their future 
employers, and will balance their teaching to the demands of the workplace. 
 
We want the UAE to transform its economy into a model where growth is 
driven by knowledge and innovation. Productivity and competitiveness will 
come to rival the best in the world, as a result of investment in science, 
technology, research and development throughout the fabric of the UAE 
economy.” (UAE Vision 2021 cited from http://www.vision.2021.ae, Section 
3) 
 
“The drive for diversification as well as the challenge of a burgeoning 
population delivers a greater need for Abu Dhabi to upgrade the quality of its 
education system and to increase the education attainment rates of 
Nationals and the overall workforce to move the economy up the value 
chain. Moreover, a better educated workforce will be a key enabler to 
address the relatively low productivity rates found in much of the Emirate’s 
enterprise base”. (cited from Government of Abu Dhabi, Urban Planning 
Council (UPC) Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, 2008, p.7) 
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From these excerpts both the federal government and the Abu Dhabi emirate 
government are looking to a highly skilled work force, comprised of both Emiratis 
and expatriates, to drive economic growth within Abu Dhabi emirate and the UAE. 
While this reasoning may be in line with Western assumptions that developed 
economies with high skilled, high valued economic activity have a competitive 
advantage, this reasoning may need to be revised. Brown and Lauder (2010, p.253) 
contend that “we are in the early stages of a ‘gale of creative destruction’ that is 
transforming the relationship between education, jobs and rewards that has been 
dominated by a neo-liberal (human capital) model of market competition”. They 
argue that in today’s global economy competition is based on quality and cost. 
Developing countries such as China and India are able to rapidly incorporate new 
technologies and business practices while taking advantage of lower labor costs to 
deliver “quality” at a declining cost. As well, developing countries are no longer 
content with doing the “body” work (manufacturing) while developed countries do 
the “head” work (research and design).  
 
This poses a major issue for the UAE as it increases investment in human capital in 
the belief that it will not only address the issue of unemployment amongst Emiratis, 
estimated at 15 per cent when Emiratis as a whole make up 12 per cent of the total 
population (based on 2010 population figures previously listed) (Salama, 2012), but 
to also generate demand for high quality private sector jobs. The majority of 
Emiratis are employed in the public sector. For example 94 per cent of 
administrative jobs in ministries are held by Emiratis (Salama, 2012). Private 
businesses on the other hand employ some 3.9 million people of which 
approximately 20,000, or 0.5 per cent, are Emirati according to the 2011 Labor 
Report (Salama, 2012). This low level of Emirati employment in the private sector 
has caused Essa Al Mulla, the head of the Emirates National Development 
Programme (ENDP), a national programme established in 2005 to help UAE 
nationals find jobs in the private sector, to declare at the 8th Emiratisation Congress 
held in May, 2012 that the Government should “stop recruiting nationals for the 
public sector for at least three years”. He went on to state that a “serious debate 
with the Government is needed. I’m calling for a revolution to the education system, 
because the reality is we don’t have the right caliber yet” (Olsen, 2012).  Providing 
the right caliber of Emiratis will likely require what Brown and Lauder (2010, pp. 
254-255) refer to as the development of a “learning state” with the development of 
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“senior staff who have a deep understanding of complex, inter-related policy issues 
(relating to the supply, demand and utilization of skills) and who can craft policy 
interventions that are coordinated across a number of different areas of policy 
(including education and training, labor market regulation, employment relations, 
research and innovation, and social welfare).” Brown and Lauder suggest that 
developing such a “learning state” will likely take some time as the imbalance 
between the private and public sector employment needs to be addressed, sooner 
than later, given that training can take a long time while with the global competition 
for high skilled, low- cost labor, “offshoring takes no time at all”. 
 
A key element in establishing the “learning state” will be implementing the reforms 
to ensure that graduates have the skills and qualifications to drive economic growth. 
The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 has identified that specialized education will 
be required to meet the projected future growth sectors primarily in the fields of 
engineering, aerospace, information technology, medicine, applied sciences, and 
tourism and business (UPC, 2008). As shown in Figure 9 the current supply of 
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Vouchers or not there does not appear to be any entity in the federal government 
that exercises overall governance and oversight of the higher education system 
although this would fall under the remit of the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research (MOHESR). Federal Law number 4/1992, which established the 
Ministry, states that the MOHESR’s mandate includes (MOHESR, 1994): 
 Planning the higher education and research systems in the UAE and 
defining the required types, sizes, majors and geographic distribution of 
institutions in light of the overall development needs of the country 
 Coordinating and integrating all the budget needs for all Higher Education 
institutions and research 
 Coordinating and integrating academic majors and degrees and 
programmes offered by all higher education institutions and ensuring their 
alignment with the overall higher education plan 
 Coordinating the admissions policies of the three institutions and the criteria 
for distributing students between the different academic majors within the 
three federal institutions. 
To date it does not appear that the Ministry has undertaken these planning and 
coordination roles, leaving the individual universities to develop their policies and 
strategic plans separately from each other.  As stated by the following response the 
large number of branch campuses that have recently set up in the UAE, and in 
Dubai particularly, have been largely to support the economic development of the 
individual emirate rather than the result of a planned and coordinated federal 
government strategy. 
 
Government Official 5: “The example of Knowledge City being set up next to 
Media City and Internet City to provide the training and graduates to support 
these entities.  This is a free zone area so the higher education institutions 
can set up their institutions easily – the facilities are provided – they can 
have their own boards and governance, can repatriate their profits. Voucher 
funding would not provide the same type of economic stability to these 
institutions. You can also look at the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong 
– higher education institutions were set up primarily to support economic 




Government Official 5: “We (Dubai) have the largest number of branch 
campuses in the world here, 27 give or take, there are 150 in the world. The 
reason that happened is Dubai made a very conscious plan to develop 
economic free zones in Dubai. Not only did they make it a free zone the 
government through (a government owned company) built buildings for 
colleges, training and universities. Why is this important? It’s important 
because S P Jain, Wollongong, Murdoch, Manipal could come to Dubai and 
say “I want to open my university but I can’t put up the capital infrastructure 
to do it, and I can’t go downtown because the rents are too high but I can 
come to your park, into a free zone, I can have my own board, I can invest 
my own money, I can start this programme and I can keep my capital 
investment down, so I can get into this, without that, I can’t get in. That 
government policy, then, first to create the economic zone, then to build the 
capital infrastructure to allow them to come in, that’s what made this work. 
That brings economic returns to Dubai. For them to look at a voucher system 
they would say “I don’t see the return. I don’t see my capital investment 
growing. I don’t see my places rented out.” …this policy we (Dubai) have 
been developing brings returns in terms of diversification, capital and 
investment, we want to be a hub because of the economic benefit…” 
 
One would argue that for effective government oversight and steering of higher 
education system a governing body is essential. Further discussion of this issue 
takes place in Section 5.2.5. Governance Body. 
 
5.1.4. Student Choice, Awareness and Motivation 
As a voucher system is purported to put the purchasing decision into the hands of 
the student the question is raised as to whether students have sufficient information 
to make sound choices for higher education and whether they have the capacity to 
undertake these decisions. Nicholas Barr (1993) argues that students are “better 
regarded as well informed than ill informed” and such information is generally simple 
enough for students to understand and evaluate and that students make choices 
already. Others argue that choices cannot be effectively undertaken without a 
meaningful understanding of quality. Economist William Massy asserts that 
“markets cannot discipline price without meaningful information about quality” 
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(Kluwer, 2004). Roger Brown, in the Higher Education Policy Institute Report 
(Brown and Scott, 2009, P.4) states that for choices to be effective for students 
when comparing different subjects, programmes and institutions, all of the following 
conditions would need to be meet: 
 “it must be possible to produce valid and reliable information about the 
relative quality of different subjects, institutions and programmes; 
 this information should be available in a timely, accessible and equitable 
fashion; 
 it should be tailored to the wants, needs and circumstances of each 
individual user; 
 it should be interpreted, judged and acted upon by each individual user in a 
rational manner; 
 institutions should be able to react appropriately to those judgements and 
actions; 
 someone would have to pay for it.” 
 
Brown concedes however that it would be very difficult to achieve these conditions 
in higher education given the difficulty in making valid comparisons between 
programmes and institutions given the number of variables involved such as 
institution missions and character, programme content and delivery, resources, and 
assessment practices. He further contends that information needs to be tailored to 
the requirements of individual students which adds further difficulty and cost and 
that even by doing this there is no guarantee that students would necessarily act in 
a rationale manner, and even if they did, it is not clear as to how institutions would 
react to this. Brown further contends that not having meaningful information about 
quality can result in “prestige” acting as a substitute for effective information about 
educational quality for institutions and students alike, “encapsulated in, and 
reinforced by, institutional league tables and rankings” (Brown and Scott, 2009). 
 
From the interviews conducted with the university administrators, government 
officials and students a number of these themes were raised, from having 
meaningful information available and being capable of interpreting it to the reasons 




University Public Official 1: “I’m just trying to think of a young 18 or 19 year 
old kid … you give him a piece of paper that’s worth, I don’t know, fifteen 
thousand dollars and you say go buy yourself an education – how would he 
react? I think 18, 19 year old kids need to be more organized and brought to 
a certain level before they can make a real consumer enlightened decision. 
When you’re 18, 19 I guess you’re still quite influenced by friends, by 
parents, so you really haven’t, I guess, the maturity to make important, I 
would say, decisions.”  
 
University Public Official 2: “Students are not necessarily mature enough to 
make the right decisions. They make simply look for the easiest way to get a 
degree – it could be a race to the bottom.” 
 
Student responses on the other hand were quite consistent in that they felt they 
were able to make informed decisions about which institute they would attend under 
a voucher system. The choice of programme and the reputation of the institution 
were common reasons for choosing an institution. Students interviewed from the 
private institutions also listed employment prospects as a determining factor for 
choosing an institution given that these students were paying tuition compared with 
the free tuition offered at the federal and emirate funded institutions.  
 
Student Focus Group 3 Participant: “I would consider the programmes 
offered and the quality of the university – my parents would be more 
concerned about the reputation of the university and cost.” 
 
Student Focus Group 1 Participant: “If the voucher is available for all 
universities then it won’t be a problem, your choice is then on the university 
and not on the cost.” 
Student Focus Group 2 Participant: “Graduates from the private institutions 
are expecting employment in their given field of study, in either a 
government or private company, given that they have paid for their 
education. At (our institution) we have a 90 per cent employment success 
rate.”   
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UAE family culture was also an important criterion as many students did not want to 
leave home, or in the case of some women students were not allowed by their 
families to leave home, and would look to enrol in their local institutions.  The recent 
doctoral thesis of Sabha Al Shamisi (Al Shamisi 2010) entitled Factors affecting 
secondary school graduates’ choice regarding higher education: The case of United 
Arab Emirates highlighted that family influences, particularly patriarchal preferences, 
significantly influence the choices available to young Emiratis. She asserts that 
family beliefs, traditions and restrictions are different from Western societies and as 
a consequence many Western values do not apply to most UAE nationals and are 
not accepted by them. 
 
Student Focus Group 3 Participant: “I wanted to join (name of University) 
because it is one of the universities that has biomedical engineering, and 
biomedical engineering is not available in the region in general, in the Arab 
world, I don’t want to leave home and go abroad to do that so that’s one of 
the main reasons.” 
Student Focus Group 1 Participant: “Because of location, near my home. 
And my sister studied here so I know about the reputation of the university.” 
 
Student Focus Group 2 Participant: “I chose this university because it has a 
good reputation – that’s the main reason. And because it’s close to my 
house – I live in Abu Dhabi. I live with my family.” 
 
The question of whether voucher funding gives students more freedom of choice as 
to which institute to attend (the responses to the question: If you had been given a 
voucher to attend any institution in the UAE would you have enrolled in a different 
university than the one you are currently enrolled in?) received similar responses. 
While students still identified programme choice, reputation of the institution, 
employment prospects and family culture as primary selection criteria, students did 
acknowledge that a voucher could provide greater flexibility in choosing an 
institution. Students along with administrators and government officials responded 
to the need for some central depository that could provide information on all 
institutions such as course and programme offerings, enrolment capacities, student 
life amenities, graduate employment statistics, and the like to assist students with 
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their institution choice. The need to have a quality assurance mechanism in place 
was also identified as a key component of a voucher system so that students 
choosing institutions would know that quality standards are in place for any 
institution they are considering and should not be a determining factor in their 
choice. 
 
Student Focus Group 2 Participant: “There is no one comparison – there is 
no statistics or comparison for all universities in one site, so that might be 
helpful.” 
 
University Private Official 3: “Should have a central depository for 
institutional information available to students. Facts about the different 
institutions – what programme are offered, what are the employment 
prospects” 
 
A question on whether students would be willing to pay a “top-up” fee over the 
voucher value if institutions were allowed to charge additional fees received mixed 
responses. Some students felt that given the requirement within the UAE 
constitution of providing free education to all students no “to- up” fees should be 
allowed and that vouchers should cover the total cost of a programme. Other 
students conceded that a “top-up” fee could be considered if it directly benefited the 
student, but not if it simply was a way of generating more money for the institution, 
or generating additional profit in the case of private institutions. A common response 
was that students would look at other institutions before paying a top up fee. 
 
Student Focus Group 3 Participant: “No, what’s the point of having a 
voucher if it does not cover the cost of the programme.” 
 
Student Focus Group 3 Participant: “Agree, may consider a top-up fee if it 
directly benefits the student, but not if it simply a way of generating more 




Student Focus Group 2 Participant: “If I noticed that the university is getting 
improved I will not have any problem with additional fees. But for many 
universities, without mentioning names, they are increasing fees without 
increasing service so that would be unfair for students.” 
 
The students were generally in agreement that vouchers would make students more 
aware of the cost of higher education and of the funds available to them personally. 
In the case of students attending Khalifa University, funded by the Abu Dhabi 
government, students receive a stipend, in addition to free tuition, provided they 
maintain their grade point average at a stated threshold. If a voucher was provided 
to students with this criterion then students would need to be aware of the funds 
being provided to them given the possibility of students losing a portion of their 
funds should they not maintain stated criteria. If voucher funds were made available 
for private institutions then vouchers could also be seen as an incentive to students 
to utilize these funds rather than “leaving money on the table”.  
 
The general feedback from students was that vouchers could instil a greater sense 
of control over their higher education, provided the voucher entitlements and any 
associated criteria was clear and that a central depository previously discussed was 
available which would allow students to make informed decisions about what funds 
were available to them and where they could spend them. There was also a general 
consensus amongst the students that this information could make them more aware 
of the government’s strategic priorities and labour market requirements if voucher 
numbers and values for specified courses and programmes were aligned 
accordingly.  
Finally a question on whether vouchers should extend beyond traditional 
undergraduate and graduate programmes and include on the job training and life-
long learning provided responses from students that suggested that internships 
could be included in a voucher scheme as they provide applicable career guidance 




5.2. Enablers (Constraints) 
5.2.1. Funding 
In a study for the OECD, Jamal Salmi of the World Bank identified a number of key 
issues that policy makers need to resolve when considering the implementation of 
voucher funding for tertiary education (Salmi, 2006, p. 29): 
 “Do vouchers cover the full cost of education, or will tuition fees be used to 
pay some of the costs? 
 Do vouchers cover the full public cost of tertiary education, or is there a mix 
between supply side and demand side approaches? 
 Are vouchers available to all students, or only to specific groups of students? 
 Are the vouchers the same amount for all students, or do students from 
disadvantaged families receive more? 
 Are students at private institutions eligible to use the vouchers, or are they 
restricted to those at public institutions? 
 How are seats allocated to voucher holders at institutions that are 
oversubscribed?” 
 
These issues could be further categorized according to price and quantity factors 
that are primary components of funding formulas for higher education institutions. 
Within the voucher funding scheme price would refer to the value of the voucher, 
differentiated by factors such as programme costs (laboratory – based programmes 
vs. non laboratory based, for example), programme level (Bachelor vs. Diploma, for 
example) and institution types (public vs. private). The public institutions are the 
federally funded institutions previously identified and the non-private, non-federal 
universities funded by the local emirates; the private institutions are the private 
universities owned by UAE entities and all other private universities operating in the 
UAE and overseas universities.   Quantity would refer to the number of students 
eligible for funding, where eligibility would need to be defined. This could mean any 
UAE Emirati leaving school who has not previously enrolled in a higher education 
institution or it could also be extended to all UAE Nationals regardless of their age. 
While federal funding to date has been limited to Emirati citizens to attend federal 
institutions voucher funding could be extended to expatriates given that the 
development of the UAE depends significantly not only on having a well-educated 
citizenry but also a well-educated expatriate workforce as well. At present the UAE 
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does not assess any income tax for expatriates, however should that ever change 
then extending the benefit of free or subsidized education to expatriates could 
become a more compelling argument. 
 
Given these various pricing and quantity factors the overarching question of voucher 
funding is how can governments control costs if vouchers are student driven. By 
fixing a value to a voucher without limiting the total number of students a 
government is effectively committing itself to an open-ended expenditure which, 
even with the resources available to the UAE, is likely not sustainable. To put a 
control on expenditures a government would need to look at alternatives such as 
placing a limit on the number of vouchers it would issue. This goes against the 
principle of widening and increasing participation that voucher funding is purported 
to support and would require the government to make decisions as to who would be 
eligible for voucher funding. Alternatively the government could look at varying the 
value of the voucher based on the number of students enrolling to maintain 
expenditures within a given limit. This would result in varying levels of support for 
students from one year to the next, a different level of unfairness as students in one 
year might be required to contribute from their own funds, something not required 
from students from other years. While these adjustments could be made to budgets 
in the following year this would likely result in budget shortfalls to universities in a 
given year and affect a university’s cash flow. 
 
University Private Official 2: “If our revenue was entirely voucher based at 
the undergraduate level … then I think there would be a significant cash flow 
issue. If you didn’t know actually what the situation was until September or 
maybe by the time you sorted it all out, October, then there would be 
significant cash flow pressure there.” 
This uncertainty of the level of government funding and the likely volatility of funding 
requirements given student demand was reflected by other respondents as well. 
While different viewpoints were expressed the common theme was that certain 
limits or criteria would need to be imposed, through the setting of quality standards 
for students to be eligible for voucher funding and by identifying the subjects and 




Government Official 1: “The government would need to control the number 
of vouchers issued through a quality assurance mechanism, such as the 
CAA (Commission for Academic Accreditation) that establishes quality 
standards to which voucher funding would apply. Government could look to 
providing a certain percentage of funds via vouchers, for example, seventy 
per cent, leaving the higher education institutions responsible for the 
remaining thirty per cent.” 
 
Government Official 7: “You could look at CEPA (Common Educational 
Proficiency Assessment) to control the number of students eligible for 
vouchers and the programmes that students would be eligible to enrol in 
such as medicine, engineering, business, etc., based on their competencies 
and assessment .” 
 
Along with setting the number of students eligible for voucher funding (quantity), 
setting the value of vouchers (price) is the other control available to the government 
in capping its financial commitment.  Identifying the subjects and programmes that 
vouchers should support becomes a necessary requirement along with setting the 
value of the voucher. The Colorado voucher scheme calls for a single value to be 
assessed to vouchers for all students studying any Bachelors or Diploma 
programme in a public institution and vouchers half that amount for students 
studying the same programmes in eligible private institutions. For the UAE similar 
decisions would need to be made on voucher values along with the programme that 
should be funded, be they only for Diploma and Bachelor programme, or expanded 
beyond these, and whether this funding should limited to having students complete 
these programme within two and four years respectively. Additionally decisions 
would need to be made whether voucher funding be considered for postgraduate 
education and a further “lifelong learning” period. These decisions will need to be 
guided not only by financial considerations but also according to the role of higher 
education institutions within society and the objectives of the government. 
 
University Public Official 1: “Public institutions should be on-going for 
decades if not for centuries and should be a service to the community. They 
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should provide programmes for undergraduate teaching, research, 
community service and graduate programmes.” 
 
University Public Official 1: “There is a lot of uncertainty about funding of 
institutions in that sense (through vouchers) because there are core 
missions of the university that will always exist… outreach to the community 
(as a core mission) is quite important, we have been told that time and time 
over again by all the sheiks. Research is another big agenda, we want our 
faculty to do significant research, to invest their career, … one of the big 
challenges we have is that we have to interest our faculty and give them the 
possibility to develop their career in the Middle East, it is not easy to 
convince people to come here for a good portion of their life and to invest in 
this part of the world. So that’s why  I think funding public universities with a 
multi-level strategy (is necessary) where you have basic funding for 
infrastructure, for other missions of the university and a component that 
could be more or less significantly related to student numbers and 
programmes , programmes that you want to develop and the real cost of 
these programmes.” 
University Public Official 3: “The most difficult decision would be on deciding 
the value of the voucher. What is the objective of the government? Caps 
would need to be set for programmes i.e.  the number of students in 
programmes and funding limits per student per programme.” 
 
University Private Official 2: “Voucher key benefit would be to target key 
sectors of higher education.” 
 
Government Official 3: “Voucher values could be structured in two ways: 
first, with a given value differentiated by programme cost, and second, open 
voucher equivalent to the university set tuition fee schedule. This schedule 
would need to be approved by the Ministry of Higher Education.” 
University Public Official 3: “Funding should be based on credit hours with 




A further consideration discussed to controlling government expenditures was 
allowing top-up fees to supplement vouchers. Given that the federally funded 
universities do not charge tuition fees for Emirati students because of the 
constitutional requirement that Emirati citizens are to be provided with free 
education, assessing a top-up fee could be an additional source of revenue, and if 
this was paid for by the local emirate on behalf of its students, then students would 
not be required to contribute their own funds. Within the UAE the federal 
government does not have an income tax system as its main source of funds. 
Rather, apart from revenues raises through fees and associated administrative 
charges, the funds are provided in large part through contributions from the local 
emirates. By having the local emirates provide the funding for the top-up fees for 
their students could be viewed as a means of providing greater equity funding 
between the federal government and the local emirates and would provide the 
additional revenues required to fully support a voucher system. Differing views were 
expressed by the respondents on this issue of top-up fees. 
Government Official 5: “I question whether the incentive would be there for 
local emirates to top up vouchers because, one, the recession of 2008 has 
meant most local emirates don’t have the money, and two, vouchers would 
compete with economic hubs that are realized when local emirates set up 
their own higher education institutions, such as Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and 
Sharjah.  The tighter the resources the more local emirates would likely want 
to invest in their own higher education institutions than look at paying top-up 
fees. The return from a top-up is an educated student that should in the 
longer run have an economic benefit… whereas investing in your own higher 
education institution should provide immediate economic returns.” 
 
University Public Official 1: “Could be an issue with emirates making 
different levels of contribution.” 
 
University Public Official 2: “In effect with federally funded institutions this is 
happening to a certain degree. Funding for operations is provided by the 
federal government while facilities and infrastructures are to be provided by 
the local emirate. Poorer emirates would still not be able to top-up while the 
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richer emirates such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi would rather invest in their 
own education authorities.” 
 
University Private Official 1: “There are cash flow issues with the (Emirate) 
government, especially with the recent announcement of substantial wage 
increases for the Nationals, likely a reaction to the Arab Spring movement. If 
top-up concept is implemented (Private University) would want assurances 
that supplementary revenues from (Emirate) government would be provided 
on a timely basis – would not want to see additional receivables”. 
 
University Private Official 3: “Some of this is already happening with local 
emirates supplementing the federal institutions through the provision of 
facilities, for example the HCT campuses and the American University of 
Sharjah campus, or through the sponsoring of specific requested 
programmes by local emirates”. 
 
While the contributions the local emirates make in the provision of facilities and 
infrastructure go directly to the benefit of the students residing within that local 
emirate, the contributions that local emirates make to support the federal 
government operations cannot be directly tied back to the individual students from 
the emirate. Implementing a top-up fee could be argued as a means of tying the 
funds allocated by local emirates directly to their resident students. 
 
As earlier discussed the development of the UAE depends significantly on having a 
well-educated expatriate workforce. A number of private higher education 
institutions have been established to cater to the needs of expatriates. Should the 
UAE government consider assessing an income tax on expatriate workers then an 
argument could be made for free or subsidized education for expatriates. 
 
University Public Official 2: “True private schools have been set up to cater 
more to the expatriate students. If a tax system is introduced then these 




Until such time if and when income tax for expatriates is introduced, including 
private schools to participate in a voucher funding scheme raises the issue of public 
funds going into private institutions, and further expands the financial commitment of 
the federal government. This financial commitment by the federal government could 
be controlled through limiting the value of the voucher, with the gap between the 
voucher value and the cost of the tuition covered through a tuition fee assessed to 
the student. While funding limits could be controlled in this way the issue of quality 
control would also need to be addressed. 
 
University Public Official 3: “If the government’s intention is to open up all 
schools then a main criteria, outside of the additional funds required, is the 
quality of the schools. Certain guidelines would need to be established to 
ensure any private schools eligible for voucher funding met the quality 
standards set by the government.” 
 
The discussion so far on the funding mechanism for vouchers has focused on the 
price and quantity factors and how these would need to be subjected to certain 
limits and criteria to enable the federal government to exert a certain level of control 
over its financial commitments and steering oversight. It is questionable whether this 
government control could be achieved through these voucher limits and criteria 
alone. With the implementation of the recent per student funding scheme for federal 
higher education institutions within the UAE (as shown in Appendix 4), one 
component of this scheme is a fee-for-service funding factor. This factor was 
established to provide funds to universities for specific services or programme such 
as a medical school or other expensive programme, the provision of postgraduate 
education, and the undertaking of research. These services and programmes were 
seen to fall outside of what the per student funding formula could realistically 
provide and are funded based on a contract that states explicitly what the university 
will deliver for this funding and what performance indicators will be used to measure 
the deliverables. A similar type of fee-for-service contract may need to be 
considered as part of a voucher funding scheme. 
 
University Private Official 2: “Consideration of voucher funding may force a 
look at the business model of higher education, not just about recruiting the 
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best students for teaching and learning, but would force the policy 
discussion on funding for research, knowledge management, application of 
research in that the policy would need to define whether voucher funding 
was just for teaching and learning or for research as well.” 
 
University Public Official 3: “Policy decisions need to be made as to what 
services the nation should provide and what the market can deliver.” 
 
Finally, the issue of cash flow and how funding disbursements would be made 
through a voucher funding scheme were raised, primarily by the respondents of 
private institutions. As private institutions realize their revenues through the 
collection of tuition fees, sponsorships, endowments and other sources they are 
acutely aware of the need to properly plan for cash flows and the operational risks 
associated with delayed or un-collectable fees. How cash flow for higher education 
institutions would be impacted through a voucher system, and how funding volatility 
from one year to the next could result depending on student enrolment, would need 
to be assessed and contrasted against the current grant funding scheme. 
University Private Official 3: “Cash flow would be a greater issue – private 
universities rely on tight cash flow. The government is known for slow 
payment which would have a negative effect on private university 
operations. Other reporting requirements do not seem as overbearing or 
significantly different from what (our university) is currently doing.” 
 
University Private Official 1: “Under a voucher funding scheme you would 
likely need to establish individual fees for undergrad. programme to align 
with voucher values – this would also require the financial reporting system 
to track the costs and revenues. You would likely require more robust 
external reporting – there would be a cost with that. (Our university) is 
moving to a cohort model so this may need to be modified for a sub-cohort 
tracking for the voucher funding. (Our university) should be able to handle 




University Private Official 2: “Encashing the voucher would likely be an 
additional burden and administrative requirement. Currently students walk in 
and are assessed a tuition fee. Under the voucher system students would 
need to be provided with a voucher ahead of time relating to the programme 
they wish to pursue. If they change their mind at the last minute - there is a 
last minute culture in the UAE – then a new voucher would need to be 
issued which complicates the admissions and registration process. The 
university would then need to encash the voucher with the Ministry to obtain 
its funds – these are additional processes and possible cash flow issues. I 
think it is premature to introduce vouchers.”  
 
5.2.2. Physical Facilities and Infrastructure 
 Universities are required to have infrastructure for the core services of teaching, 
research and community service. Having the funding for this infrastructure based 
primarily on voucher funding raises the issue of unstable facility planning given the 
volatility of funding should a sudden shift in student enrolment occur. A separate 
funding mechanism may therefore be required for physical facilities and 
infrastructure. 
University Public Official 1: “There is a lot of uncertainty about funding of 
institutions in that sense (through vouchers) because there are core 
missions of the university that will always exist… so that’s why  I think 
funding public universities with a multi-level strategy (is necessary) where 
you have basic funding for infrastructure, for other missions of the university 
and a component that could be more or less significantly related to student 
numbers and programmes , programmes that you want to develop and the 
real cost of these programmes.” 
 
Other respondents echoed similar statements that while student enrolment could be 
a factor to determine funding for facilities and infrastructure, having facility and 
infrastructure funding based entirely on student enrolment would likely have adverse 




University Private Official 2: “If our revenues were almost entirely voucher 
based … then I think there would be a significant cash flow issue. With our 
model at the moment, the way the (Emirate) government works, a calendar 
of January to December, and in a way that is quite useful for us because we 
do have that (facilities) negotiated separately from the start date of our 
programmes. If you don’t know actually what the situation was until 
September or maybe by the time you sorted it all out in October then, yes, 
there would be significant cash flow pressure there.” 
 
The provision of physical facilities and infrastructure also varies amongst the federal 
government and the local emirates. The federally funded Higher Colleges of 
Technology system has separate campuses for male and female students supplied 
by the local emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. The emirate of Sharjah has 
provided the facilities for the American University of Sharjah, a private co-
educational university. In addition the Ruler of Sharjah also funded the campus 
development for the University of Sharjah, with separate facilities for men and 
women.  
 
Variances also exist in operating costs amongst government funded and private 
institutions, utility costs being one example. Utility costs for the Dubai Women’s 
College of the HCT system are covered by the Dubai emirate, while the utility costs 
for the Dubai Men’s College, and all other campuses of the HCT for that matter, are 
the responsibility of the HCT. At the private American University of Sharjah the 
Ruler of Sharjah covers the cost of utilities.  
 
University Private Official 1: “Sharjah provided the facilities and has paid for 
utilities for the past 15 years - although this may likely cease in the future”. 
 
Private institutions usually have the ability to set up operating reserves for future 
facility maintenance and to buffer facility requirements from sudden enrolment 
shifts.  Setting up such reserves is not available to government funded institutions 




These variances in funding arrangements, and in the requirement for the federal 
government to provide separate campuses for male and female students, add 
additional complexities that voucher funding would need to address as it relates to 
the provision of facilities and infrastructure and the related operating costs. For 
institutions to compete effectively, as proposed under a voucher funding scheme, it 
is important to ensure a level playing field exists and that all institutions are 
competing under the same conditions. This is not only a matter of fairness but one 
would argue required to ensure the full benefits of competition can be realized. 
 
5.2.3. Geographical Access 
The provision of equitable access to all students given geographical constraints is a 
further issue when considering a voucher funding system. How would students from 
sparsely populated rural areas be provided with access to educational institutions 
equal to their urban counterparts?  Urban areas have a greater diversity of 
institutions and have public transportation. The same diversity and accessibility is 
not available in rural areas within reasonable travel distances. The federal 
government, for example, directed the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) in 
2006 to establish separate campuses for male and female students in the sparsely 
populated western region of the UAE to ensure students there had access to local 
higher education facilities and to also spur on economic and social development. 
While such development was a federal priority the HCT may not have had sufficient 
funds to undertake this project if funding was provided solely on a voucher funding 
basis. These views were supported by a number of the respondents. 
 
University Public Official 1: “Voucher may not accommodate state priorities. 
Setting up a rural campus in the Western region may be a state priority but 
may not be feasible if to be funded solely by voucher.” 
 
On the other hand arguments were made that vouchers could actually be used to 
incentivize enrolment at remote institutions, making vouchers only available for 
these institutions, or perhaps by providing supplemental funding to those students 




Government Official 1: “Actually (vouchers) could be used as a way to 
reduce the discrepancy that you can find in regions like Al Rabaya (remote 
western region of the UAE). So you can make the voucher as an incentive 
for sending students to regions like Al Rabaya. We could give the vouchers, 
not maybe to all institutions but to institutions who will operate in these 
(remote) regions.” 
 
If providing higher educational facilities in remote areas is not feasible then 
transporting students from these remote areas to urban areas would be an option 
towards more equitable access to institutions of choice. A number of universities, 
such as the federally funded UAE University and the private American University of 
Sharjah have residence halls and the Dubai Academic City has residence halls for 
students attending the various universities located there. Both student 
accommodation and related transportation costs would therefore need to be 
considered as part of a voucher scheme to address inequities in access to 
universities due to geographical location. It would appear that accommodating this 
support through voucher funding would be relatively straight forward, through the 
provision of an additional funding amount to cover these costs.  
 
University Private Official 3: “The voucher system would be the mechanism 
for incentivizing that would be reasonably cost effective to implement 
because once you have that basic voucher in place adding the other 
possibilities (such as housing and transportation) would become straight 
forward.” 
Government Official 1: “Given the context of Abu Dhabi, I think, and the UAE 
we need to encourage the students to enrol in higher education… it would 
be important to include this (transportation and housing) within the voucher 
because what has been happening is that all universities are offering this 
service already to their students.” 
 
5.2.4. Administrative Requirements 
The introduction of a voucher funding system raises the question of what additional 
administrative requirements and costs higher education institutions would likely 
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incur from its implementation. Under a voucher funding scheme data would need to 
be collected and analysed according to the credits or semesters enrolled and 
completed by individual students along with the various voucher values assigned to 
different subjects and programmes.  
 
University Public Official 1: “Need to track students, track students as they 
move semester by semester, year by year and if they change programmes. 
Also students dropping a course – asking for refund or credit.” 
 
Individual student records would need to be maintained to be able to track student 
progress and associated funding, not only from semester to semester and 
programme year to programme year, but also for transfers between programme and 
institutions should students decide to change their choice of programme or 
institution. 
University Public Official 3: “How to detail the information logistics – the 
tracking of students as they progress or change programme or institutions. 
Challenge to the Ministry of Higher Education is the audit function – how to 
confirm the number of students enrolled, in which programme, etc.”  
 
Tracking and analysis of data were noted by a number of respondents as the main 
administrative requirements associated with a voucher funding scheme. While most 
respondents felt that given their financial and administrative information systems 
this should not be an overbearing burden, concern was expressed that there 
needed to be a positive trade-off between the resources committed for tracking and 
analysis of students against the funding received under a voucher funding scheme. 
 
University Private Official 1: “Voucher funding could become a deal breaker 
if the number of students that could be funded through vouchers is small and 
the reporting and administrative requirements are excessive.” 
 
University Public Official 2: “Universities rather than becoming susceptible to 
losing students from common programme or courses may look at trying to 
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make programme or courses more unique – this raises the question of 
comparability of programme or courses… credits would need to be easily 
transferable… lots of efforts would go into bean counting and performance 
indicators – who is doing a better job. There would need to be an 
autonomous central unit / infrastructure to evaluate and assess programme 
and accredit them.” 
 
To ensure accurate and consistent unit-based information for each student within 
the UAE, and potential student, is collected, analysed and maintained will likely 
require both an audit function and a central data collection unit.  Within the UAE this 
central data collection and analysis unit would logically appear to be the recently 
established Center for Higher Education Data and Statistics (CHEDS) within the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific. CHEDS has been established as the 
national body for the collection, analysis and reporting of data on higher education 
in the UAE and completed its first data collection and report in August, 2012. 
(CHEDS, 2013). In an interview with the CHEDS Project Leader the role of the unit 
was further elaborated: 
 
CHEDS Project Leader: “The federal data warehouse unit has been 
operating for about 3 years. It has now been taken over by CHEDS. It was 
originally part of the CAA (Commission of Academic Accreditation) to collect 
information for accreditation purposes however the Ministry of Higher 
Education wanted a more robust and comprehensive data collection system. 
CHEDS will replace the data collection schemes from public and private 
institutions and for the CAA it will replace its data collection system. 
Performance indicators have been developed – looked globally and have 
come up with 62 indicators.  
 
CHEDS will be the data collection for all public and private institutions in the 
nation – exception may be the free zones. The KHDA (Dubai Knowledge 
and Human Development Authority) is questioning whether they will 
participate or not. The data unit will also be a repository for students on 
programme offerings, satisfaction levels, job placement, etc. During the early 
years of establishing the data unit there will need to be collaboration 
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amongst the institutions – agreement on the measures to be used and 
reported upon.” 
 
Data audit is a key administrative element of a voucher funding scheme as funding 
would be based on the number of students, likely differentiated by programme and 
degree type, and as this various data would translate into money, hence the need 
for an audit function to ensure the data provided by the universities is accurate. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the federal government in implementing the current per 
student funding formula, has called upon the State Audit Institute (SAI) to audit the 
number of students who had enrolled in the three higher education institutions. 
Whether the audit function for a voucher funding scheme would best be handled by 
the SAI or whether this function should be incorporated under CHED’s remit or 
within another entity would need to be determined. 
 
University Private Official 3: “Need for an audit function to record students 
that have dropped out and for which voucher funding should cease”. 
 
University Public Official 3: “Challenge to the Ministry of Higher Education is 
the audit function – how to confirm the number of students enrolled, in which 
programme, etc.”  
 
 
While the administrative requirements for implementing voucher funding within the 
UAE are not insurmountable, and in fact given the recent establishment of CHEDS, 
may be quite feasible, sufficient time and attention needs to be given to determining 
these requirements before implementation, a view summarized by the respondent 
below: 
 
University Private Official 2: “Need to ensure  that all administrative 
requirements and the QA regime is thought out before it is implemented – 
there is a tendency in the UAE to implement things quickly once a decision 
has been made.” 
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Data collection and audit requirements could logically be argued to be governed 
centrally by the federal government to ensure consistency and compliance amongst 
the higher education institutions to be funded under a voucher funding scheme. The 
same argument could be made for other elements discussed such as quality 
assurance, determining voucher values, and determining student eligibility for 
voucher funding. Discussion on the various aspects of governance required for 
effective implementation of voucher funding follows in the next section. 
 
5.2.5. Governance Body 
As discussed in Section 5.1.3 Protecting Subjects and Government Steering, the 
governance and oversight of the higher education system falls under the remit of the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, whose mandate includes 
(MOHESR, 1994): 
 “Planning the higher education and research systems in the UAE and 
defining the required types, sizes, majors and geographic distribution of 
institutions in light of the overall development needs of the country 
 Coordinating and integrating all the budget needs for all Higher Education 
institutions and research 
 Coordinating and integrating academic majors and degrees and 
programmes offered by all higher education institutions and ensuring their 
alignment with the overall higher education plan 
 Coordinating the admissions policies of the three institutions and the criteria 
for distributing students between the different academic majors within the 
three federal institutions.” 
The Office of Higher Education Policy and Planning within the MOHESR was 
established in 2004 to provide this role however with the introduction of the new per 
student funding scheme in 2008, as described in Section 3.2, this unit’s role was 
effectively diminished. As such it appears there is currently no unit within the 
MOHESR that is providing this planning and coordination function to ensure that 
higher institutions are interacting to deliver the programmes needed by the UAE. In 
the absence of this centralized planning and coordination function individual higher 
education institutions are left to themselves to develop their programmes according 
to their strategic plans and priorities and not necessarily those of the nation. This is 
further illustrated by the establishment of the Higher Education Coordinating Council 
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that was established in 2008 to govern the new per student funding scheme (Swan, 
2011). The membership of this council is comprised of the senior leadership of the 
three federal universities so it is questionable whether this body is able to 
independently assess its performance or to represent the needs of its member’s 
respective universities along with the needs of the nation. The HCT for example 
raised its admission requirements in 2012 to match those of UAE University and 
Zayed University (Swan, 2011). This resulted in the HCT enrolling only 4,160 
students that year, down from 5,533 the previous year and 8,024 in 2010. While this 
decision may have been in the best interest of the HCT, given that it would no 
longer have to devote about 30 per cent of its budget to remedial courses in maths 
and English to prepare students for degree studies, and given that under the per 
student funding scheme, degree taking students generate more funding than 
diploma students, this decision was not assessed against the needs of the UAE nor 
did it take into account that there was no more national capacity to produce 
technical level graduates in any federal university. In the absence of any national 
oversight of the missions of the universities the situation has now arisen where 
there are no longer guaranteed university places for all Emirati school leavers 
(Swan, 2011). 
 
A further conflict, until recently, was that the Minister of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research was also the Chancellor of each of the three federal universities. 
As Chancellor he was responsible for the optimal development of each university 
while as Minister he would be responsible to make decisions that were in the best 
interest of the nation. This conflict was eliminated when the federal government 
swore in a new cabinet in March, 2013 and the existing Minister of Higher Education 
and Scientific Research was appointed to a new cabinet post (Salem, 2013). 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1 Funding, a voucher funding scheme, like all other 
funding schemes, cannot have open-ended funding. If the total funding is fixed then 
the variables for control available to the federal government are the value of the 
voucher and the number of students eligible for vouchers. It would appear essential 
therefore that some national planning and coordinating role is required to agree the 
distribution of students by institution and by programme and subject to meet the 
overall development needs to the nation. Seeing that it is questionable whether this 
role is being provided by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
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and given the inherent conflict with the current Higher Education Coordinating 
Council, one can look to other countries for examples for the planning, oversight 
and coordination of funding schemes amongst higher education institutions. In a 
number of countries these roles lie not within a ministry but rather to a semi-
autonomous body that is independent of a single ministry. In England for example, 
the Board members of the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
are appointed by the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 
usually for a period of three years. The appointments are made on the basis of the 
member’s expertise in education, or their experience in industry or the professions 
(HEFCE, 2013). Other countries that have similar bodies include India, Thailand, 
New Zealand, Ireland and Hong Kong. How best the UAE may address this 
governance issue will be discussed in Chapter 6, Recommendations and 
Conclusion.  
 
So far the discussion has focused on the mechanics and processes associated with 
voucher systems. It may be worthwhile to consider the potential impact that the local 
culture of the UAE may have on implementing a voucher system. 
 
5.2.6. Cultural and Organizational Considerations 
Lane et al (2000) in their book International Management Behavior state that 
organizational structures are not free from the influence of culture. They contend 
that based on cultural backgrounds, managers can hold different views regarding 
structure. By applying their concepts to the UAE context an example is provided in 
Table 5 in which Western managers are identified as holding an instrumental 
conception of organizational structure while Middle East managers are identified as 








Table 5: Organizational Structure as Influenced by Culture – Two Views 
Instrumental – Western Manager Social – Middle East Manager 
Positions are defined in terms of tasks 
 
Relationships between positions are defined as  
being ordered in any way instrumental to 
achieving organizational objectives 
 
Authority is impersonal, rational, and comes 
from role or function; it can be challenged for 
rational reasons 
 
Superior-subordinate relationships are defined 
as impersonal and implying equality of persons 
involved; subordination is the acceptance of the 
impersonal, rational, and legal order of the 
organization 
 
Goal attainment has primacy over power 
acquisitions 
Positions are defined in terms of 
social status and authority 
Relationships are defined as being 
ordered by a hierarchy 
 
 
Authority comes from status; it can 
extend beyond the function and 
cannot be challenged on rational 
grounds 
Superior-subordinate relationships 
are personal implying superiority  of 
one person over the other; 
subordination is loyalty and deference 
to the superior 
 
Achievement of objectives is 
secondary to the acquisition of power 
Source: Lane, DiStefano & Maznevski, (2000) as adopted by the author 
 
These cultural differences and their impact on how organizations function could 
have an impact on entrepreneurial activities that institutions may wish to pursue. 
This may become more of an issue under a voucher funding scheme if institutions 
believe they need to become more entrepreneurial in their efforts to attract students 
and to raise additional funds. The use of alumni, for example, to help recruit 
students and to raise funds is common amongst universities in the west. This 
approach however is still a relatively foreign concept with government funded 




University Private Official 1: “Alumni functions are different from the west. 
Institutions are basically saying that the local ruler cannot afford to pay for 
the cost of education so they are required to go out and beg for money” 
 
A further example is that of naming a building, which again is a relatively common 
practice with universities in the west and which can raise substantial revenue.  
University Private Official 1: “To name a building the ruler needs to approve 
any name associated with “His” buildings. A lot of filtering needs to be done” 
 
Care therefore has to be taken in alumni development and other entrepreneurial 
activities to guard against being insubordinate to the leadership and to respect the 
local customs. It may be more appropriate to have alumni development follow the 
concept of partnering, as in Islamic finance, whereby partners agree upon a profit 
rate for a venture, rather than the concept of charging interest for funds provided. 
Alumni could partner with institutions to help with student recruitment activities and 
in providing donations – this would appear to be no different from activities of alumni 
in the west however the manner in which these activities are structured and 
presented to be in harmony with local customs is the key differentiator. 
 
5.3. Transition 
5.3.1. Vouchers vs. Per Student Formula Funding 
A question on the difference between voucher funding and the current per student 
funding scheme adopted by the UAE federal government was raised by a few of the 
respondents during the interview sessions. Some authors contend that any funding 
system that is driven by student enrolment is in effect a voucher system. They 
assert that funds received by the institutions are ultimately determined by the 
number of students enrolled in an institution, regardless of whether these funds 
were driven in an indirect way through a per student formula, or directly funded via 
the student. Utilizing Jongbloed’ s (2004) funding model, this viewpoint could be 
illustrated by showing quadrant 3 (Q3) and quadrant 4 (Q4) as not distinct – rather 
the supply side is still student driven and therefore the two quadrants could be 
viewed as converging to the middle, as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 : Jongbloed’s (2004) funding model analysis – Modified:Fully Student 
Driven 
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Figure 11 : Jongbloed’s (2004) funding model analysis – Modified: Vouchers as a 
Continuum 
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Other authors, such as Nicholas Barr, argue that “vouchers should be thought of as 
a continuum, from 0 per cent constrained (“law of the jungle”) to 100 per cent 
constrained (“pure central planning”) or anywhere in between.” (Barr, 1998). He 
argues it would be a mistake to simply conclude that universities which attract a 
large number of students would flourish while those who fail to attract students 
would perish. This viewpoint could be illustrated by modifying Jongbloed’s (2004) 
funding model to show that quadrant 3 (Q3) and quadrant 4 (Q4) represent a 
continuum between demand driven funding and supply driven funding, as shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
While the resulting funds provided could be similar under a per student funding 
system and a voucher funding system proponents of voucher funding argue, as 
discussed in the Literature Review Chapter, that the philosophy and possibly the 
psychological effects of voucher systems influence students to be more aware of 
the funds provided for their education and to be more serious about their higher 
education, and for institutions to become incentivized to improve their efficiencies 
and quality.  
Government Official 3: “With per student funding the institution will without 
any effort get students enrolled. Under a voucher system the money is in the 
hands of the students and they can choose to go wherever they want so 
institutions have to become more efficient and effective in attracting students 
and in running their operations”. 
 
Government Official 1: “Both per student funding and voucher funding need 
to have an output measure included as part of the funding scheme. Per 
student funding without any output measure will not provide the incentive for 
improving quality – the more you enrol the more money you get. Voucher 
funding, which would only be available for students to use at listed 
universities would encourage universities to improve their quality and to 
attract more students. Without this output quality measure there would be no 




5.3.2. Transition to Vouchers 
If the federal government made the decision to implement voucher funding how best 
should this be implemented? What would be the most pragmatic method to 
transition from the current per student funding scheme to voucher funding. It is not 
uncommon for governments to consider running a pilot programme before 
implementing a full-fledged initiative. This provides the opportunity to evaluate the 
results from a smaller select group, to look at lessons learned and to incorporate 
any improvements prior to roll out of the initiative to the larger group. Given that the 
UAE is a young country and that a number of the universities are new and starting 
up, and given that the federal government has only recently introduced the per 
student funding scheme, it would be reasonable to start with a pilot programme for 
voucher funding to include all three federal universities and a selected number of 
other universities.  
 
Government Official 1: “Voucher implementation requires a more mature 
higher education system. A number of the universities are new and starting 
up and efficiencies have not yet been realized. In four or five years’ time 
perhaps voucher funding could be applied as a pilot in two or three 
universities.” 
 
The previous discussion on the proposed voucher state attributes and the enablers 
and constraints of implementing a voucher funding scheme highlighted the need to 
have an operational framework in place to support a voucher funding scheme. This 
would include a nationwide quality assurance programme, a central data unit 
responsible for the collection and audit of unit-based information for each student, 
and a central agency responsible for the coordination and governance of the 
voucher funding scheme, bringing together the interests of the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, the Ministry of Finance and Industry, the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the individual Emirates and their respective 
higher education institutions. The voucher funding model itself, the voucher values, 
how these would be determined by subject area and how these would be allocated 
by student or credit numbers, would need to be fully understood not only by the 




University Public Official 2: “Unless you have a formula funding that is really 
mature and understood fully from the Cabinet on down, that is, 
understanding outcome measures, FTE students, etcetera, it is premature to 
consider implementing a voucher system in the UAE.” 
 
Some interviewees were quite specific in how the federal government should phase 
in the voucher funding formula and how the voucher funding scheme should be 
coordinated with the local emirates. While these views could be debated, with the 
argument that a voucher funding scheme should be fully implemented once a pilot 
programme has been completed, and adjustments made to the voucher funding 
scheme based on the lessons learned, the assertion of phasing in voucher funding 
points to the realization that such a scheme needs to be fully understood by all 
parties and the operational framework to support this funding scheme needs to be in 
place for effective implementation. 
 
Government Official 3: “First year to have 80 per cent of funding provided to 
national students on a per student funding basis and to have 20 per cent 
funded on a voucher system for the excellent students – allow excellent 
students to go where they want. Each year thereafter the per student funding 
proportion to be reduced and the voucher funding proportion to be increased 
as an incentive for institutions to improve their efficiencies. As per the 
constitution the Federal Government is obliged to provide education to its 
students, so the voucher system would facilitate this. However there would 
need to be coordination amongst the local emirates so that there is not 
double funding to a student. Scholarships would also need to be coordinated 
if a voucher system is implemented. Scholarships are to be provided only if 
programmes cannot be offered in the UAE.” 
 
The standard of school leavers was brought up again as an issue that should be 
addressed before considering the implementation of voucher funding. As discussed 
in Section 5.1.2 Equity, the level of school leavers that are able to go straight on to 
university degree courses is very low. The discussion on the Abu Dhabi Education 
Council (ADEC) stated this number to be 12 per cent for the start of the 2012-13 
academic year. In response to this deficiency ADEC implemented a New School 
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Model in 2010 to target a shift from an emphasis on content (“rote learning”) to one 
of critical thinking and an encouragement to continue learning throughout life.  The 
timeline for full implementation of the New School Model is ten years. 
 
Government Official 5: “First, the federal government needs to invest in the 
K – 12 sector to ensure an acceptable number, to be determined, of school 
leavers are up to standard of college entry.  Next, diversify the federal 
institutions to allow expat students to enrol – two reasons: One: Provide 
national students with the classroom experience of interacting with different 
nationalities and Two: To prepare for global community they may eventually 
work in. Then go to vouchers for specific programmes as required by the 
nation such as education, engineering, tourism – programmes that are 
required but not necessarily popular with the students.  Then consider 
implementing full voucher scheme for the federal institutions. At this point 
with a combination of expat and national students the federal institutions 
may be more sheltered / tempered from swings in enrolments due to 
vouchers and students voting with their feet.” 
 
University Public Official 2:  “The main problem is that the majority of 
students are not prepared for higher education – so how would a voucher 
system address these students. The high achieving students basically have 
a voucher type of system available to them already – they can receive 
scholarships to go to overseas universities or scholarships to attend local 
universities like NYU, AUS, Sorbonne, etcetera.” 
 
Other respondents questioned whether the UAE was mature enough to introduce a 
voucher funding scheme at this time. Reference was made to “turbulence” in that 
the UAE is going through such an expansive change that more time is needed for 
policy discussion on the objectives of higher education and the resources required. 
Before voucher funding is introduced it may be more necessary to have further 
dialogue on funding not only for teaching and learning, but for research and 




Government Official 5: “To implement a voucher scheme you require a set of 
other policy issues – too complicated as standalone – too much turbulence. 
We neglect turbulence – the UAE is going through such an expansive stage. 
All universities are subject to certain amount of turnover however in the UAE 
this is much more apparent – a higher degree of turbulence.  How do you do 
social engineering given this level of turbulence? In the west we think linear 
– test, evaluate, decide. This does not necessarily translate to the Arab 
culture. In the UAE there are two societies: Emiratis and expats; male and 
female students – challenges are different here”. 
 
University Private Official 2:  “It may be worthwhile to have the discussion on 
vouchers, to begin the dialogue.  Consideration of voucher funding may 
force a look at the business model of higher education, not just about 
recruiting the best students for teaching and learning, (it) would force the 
policy discussion on funding for research, knowledge management, 
application of research in that the policy would need to define whether 
voucher funding was just for teaching and learning or for research as well.  I 
question though whether the higher education sector is mature enough to 
have these difficult policy discussions.” 
 
5.4. Summary of Findings 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter focused on three data theme categories, 
those being: the proposed voucher state attributes and the underlying principles 
they encompass; the perceived enablers to facilitate this transition from the current 
methodology of funding to voucher funding; and the transition process itself. The 
findings of each of the data themes will be summarized in turn, starting with the 
proposed voucher state attributes. 
 
5.4.1. Proposed Voucher State Attributes 
5.4.1.1. Efficiency and Quality Assurance 
The common argument of proponents of vouchers is that because the funding of an 
institution is linked directly to the number of students it recruits, the institution in 
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response to market competition becomes more efficient, more responsive to the 
programmes that students wish to study and more quality focused. The responses 
to the theme of efficiency brought to light that while voucher funding may provide 
students with a greater voice over their choice of programmes and institutions it 
would not necessarily equate to an increase in the quality of programme delivery 
nor in the delivery of programmes in the strategic interest of the nation. A number of 
comments were raised about the potential of students choosing programmes or 
institutions that had lower standards and were easier to access, which could result 
in a “race to the bottom”.  As such it was identified that a quality assurance and 
improvement programme would need to go hand in hand with the implementation of 
a voucher funding scheme.  
 
Currently the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, through the 
Commission of Academic Accreditation (CAA), provides a licensing and 
accreditation function for the three federal higher education institutions and for  
private institutions to permit them to function and thereafter to accredit and re-
accredit their programmes. (Foreign institutions operating within the free zones are 
not subject to the licensing requirements of the CAA; however they are subject to 
the quality assurance requirements of the individual emirates.)  Given the need to 
improve quality and efficiency in response to the market forces of a voucher funding 
scheme  an “academic audit”  approach is likely more appropriate, focusing on 
institution-level quality assurance and improvement processes and outcomes 
measures rather than having an approach based on summative judgements about 
delivered quality and compliance. 
 
A number of countries have implemented “academic audits” including Australia, 
New Zealand, England, and the U.S. states of Missouri and Tennessee. The 
Canadian province of Ontario, through the Ontario College Quality Assurance 
Service (OCQAS), has been illustrated as an example of the academic audit 
mechanisms and procedures used by an institution to assure and measure, and 
also to improve, the level of quality. 
 
A determination would need to be made as to whether the role of the CAA should 
be expanded to include academic audits, whether this could be incorporated under 
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While efficiency arguments for voucher funding are linked to supply side, on the 
demand side arguments for vouchers are proposed to increase equity amongst 
students and are proposed to offer greater choice and flexibility over institutions and 
programmes. Within the UAE the federal constitution provides for free enrolment for 
Emirati students at one of the three federal higher education institutions, subject to 
the student’s assessment and the eligibility criteria of the institution as administered 
by the National Admissions Placement Office (NAPO). The student assessment not 
only determines which of the three federal institutions the student is eligible to enrol 
in, it also determines whether the student can enrol directly or whether the student 
needs to take foundation programmes. Each of the three federally funded higher 
education institutions within the UAE offer foundation, or bridging programmes, in 
English, mathematics and related subjects to bring the skill level of school leaver 
students up to university entry standards. As noted, within the emirate of Abu Dhabi 
the Abu Dhabi Education Council (ADEC) reported that at the start of the 2012-13 
academic year only 12 per cent of school leavers were able to go straight on to 
university degree courses, with the rest needing remedial lessons in English and 
other subjects first (ADEC 2013). New School Models were introduced in 2010 to 
address this deficiency as well as to target a shift from an emphasis on content 
(“rote learning”) to one of critical thinking and an encouragement to continue 
learning throughout life.  For Emirati students therefore access to the federal 
institutions and programmes of their choice is not an issue of financial constraint (as 
enrolment is free) but rather an issue of the students being adequately prepared. 
For access to private institutions high achieving Emirati students are often able to 
obtain scholarships provided they meet the eligibility requirements. For those 
Emirati students not eligible for scholarships they may still be able to enrol in private 
institutions if they meet the admission criteria and are able to pay the tuition fees. In 
this case voucher funding could provide greater choice and accessibility for Emirati 
students. This does raise the issue of federal (public) funds going into private 
institutions and the capacity of the federal government to finance this level of 
access.   Extending voucher funding to expatriate students to allow them similar 
access to higher education institutions is a further consideration. As discussed the 
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development of the UAE depends not only on having a well-educated citizenry but 
also on the presence of well-educated expatriates, many who have made the UAE 
their home and whose commitment is to the UAE.  While the UAE could see this as 
an incentive to recruit and retain the required expatriate workers to support the 
ambitious development plans of the UAE, this would place additional financial 
constraints on the government.  Equal access for expatriate students may need to 
be viewed as more of a citizenship issue requiring some form of an income tax 
regime for expatriate workers to enable a voucher eligibility requirement.   
 
5.4.1.3. Protecting Subjects and Government Steering 
While equitable access to institutions and programmes may be more of an issue of 
national students being adequately prepared the issue of which institutions and 
programmes voucher funding should support could have opposing effects on 
government steering and protection of subjects. A review of the UAE 2021 Vision 
and the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 indicates that both the federal 
government and the Abu Dhabi emirate government see a highly skilled work force, 
comprised of both Emiratis and expatriates, as a key driver of economic growth. 
Recent initiatives such as the introduction of the New Model School and the 
introduction of vocational education and training to complement higher education 
institutions are seen to support the establishment of the “learning state” required to 
ensure that graduates have the skills and qualifications to drive economic growth. 
More specifically the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 has identified that 
specialized education will be required to meet the projected future growth sectors 
primarily in the fields of engineering, aerospace, information technology, medicine, 
applied sciences, and tourism and business. An entirely market-driven system 
where programme choice is left up entirely to students could result in enrolments in 
these subject fields falling below the strategic and economic targets set by the 
government. As well, programmes of high cultural value but low enrolments could 
be at risk if simply left to market forces. Universities, along with other cultural 
institutions, are often viewed and tasked with the responsibility of being a primary 
depository of a country’s history and culture. Proponents of vouchers suggest that 
altering voucher values, or limiting the number of vouchers available, could be used 
by a government to steer students to programmes and courses required to support 
is strategic and economic objectives and to protect high cultural value but low 
demand programmes. Whether this would be workable within the UAE is 
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questionable. Also questionable is whether there is a government entity that can 
carry out this steering and governance function. As discussed in Section 5.2.5, 
Governance Body, the governance and oversight of the higher education system 
falls under the remit of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
There appears however to be  little evidence of this government unit providing this 
governance and coordination function, by and large leaving the individual higher 
education institutions to themselves to develop their programmes according to their 
strategic plans and priorities and not necessarily those of the nation. 
 
5.4.1.4. Student Choice, Awareness and Motivation 
Student choice and awareness as it relates to voucher funding raises the issue of 
whether students have meaningful information to make sound decisions for their 
higher education. In pure economic theory, as Brown (2013, p. 24) points out, 
“Students’ choice of what, where, and how to study would be based on valid, 
reliable and accessible information about the price, quality and availability of 
relevant subjects, programme and institutions, and their suitability for them.”  
Achieving these conditions would be difficult, as Brown concedes,  given the 
challenge in making valid comparisons between programme and institutions given 
the number of variables involved such as institution missions and character, 
programme content and delivery, resources, and assessment practices, leaving 
students to perhaps base their choices on the perceived “prestige” of institutions 
and programmes. From the interviews conducted student responses were quite 
consistent in that the choice of programme and the reputation of the institution were 
common reasons for choosing an institution, with students interviewed from private 
institutions also listing employment prospects as a determining factor for choosing 
an institution, perhaps given that these students were paying tuition compared with 
the free tuition offered at the federal and emirate funded institutions. While these 
factors for choosing a programme and institution are likely similar for students from 
the West, within the UAE family beliefs, traditions and restrictions are different from 
Western societies and as a consequence many Western values do not apply to 
most UAE nationals and are not accepted by them. As a result many students do 
not want to leave home, or in the case of some women students are not allowed by 
their families to leave home, and would look to enrol in their local institutions. 
Finally, proponents of vouchers argue that providing vouchers to students can have 
a psychological effect of making them more aware of their programme and 
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institution choices, and the value of higher education in general, and that by not 
taking advantage of the vouchers made available to them, they are in effect wasting 
resources or “leaving money on the table.” While this study did not uncover any 
empirical evidence to support this claim the general feedback from students was 
that vouchers could instil a greater sense of control over their higher education, 
provided the voucher entitlements and any associated criteria was clear and that a 
central depository was available which would allow students to make informed 
decisions about what funds were available to them and where they could spend 
them. There was also a general consensus amongst the students that this 
information could make them more aware of the government’s strategic priorities 
and labour market requirements if voucher numbers and values for specified 
courses and programmes were aligned accordingly. 
 
5.4.2. Enablers (Constraints) 
5.4.2.1. Funding 
While indirect funding to higher education institutions and student choice are 
fundamental features of the mechanics of distributing public funds under a voucher 
system, other key elements need to be considered as well. These could be 
categorized as price and quantity factors. Price factors would address the value of 
vouchers and how these may be differentiated according to subject and programme 
costs, programme levels and durations, and institution types, public vs. private. 
Quantity factors would address which students would be eligible for vouchers. For 
UAE Emirati students this could mean students leaving school who have not 
previously enrolled in a higher education institution or it could also be extended to 
all UAE Nationals regardless of their age.  For expatriate students a decision would 
need to be made whether to extend voucher funding to these students. Given that 
the development of the UAE depends significantly not only on having a well-
educated citizenry but also a well-educated expatriate workforce, extending voucher 
funding to expatriate students may be a consideration, and may become more so if 
income tax for expatriates is introduced. At present the UAE does not assess any 
income tax, however should that ever change then extending the benefit of free or 
subsidized education to expatriates could become a more compelling argument. In 
considering these price and quantity factors one needs to examine how this would 
impact government control, not only on containing costs but also the government’s 
151 
 
role of steering education. Having no limit in place for the number of vouchers 
driven by student demand commits the government to an open-ended expenditure 
that would most likely not be sustainable. Having programme offerings determined 
largely by student choice could result in under enrolled programmes and subjects 
that are of strategic importance to the nation. For universities having revenues 
determined largely by student choice leaves them subject to the potential volatility of 
funding from one year to the next and impacts their level of certainty for institutional 
planning. Governments could address these issues by limiting the number of 
vouchers issued, or by varying levels of support from one year to the next, or by 
targeting vouchers for specific programmes and subjects, however this could go 
against the principle of student choice and widening and increasing participation 
that voucher funding is purported to support and would require the government to 
make decisions as to who would be eligible for voucher funding. The right balance 
would need to be struck between student choice (market forces) and government 
oversight.  
 
The issue of “top-up” fees was another theme that was addressed through the 
interviews. These fees could be paid by the local emirates on behalf of their 
students and could  serve as an additional source of revenue for the federal 
government to help offset federal funds that find their way to private and Emirate-
funded universities if voucher funding and student choice is opened up to all 
institutions. The responses were mixed whether this would be supported by the 
local emirates as those emirates with fewer resources were thought to be reluctant 
to make this additional contribution while the richer emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, with their recently established education authorities, were thought to use 
their resources to invest in their own institutions rather than to make additional 
contributions to the federal government.  
 
Finally a fee-for-service contract may need to supplement the price and quantity 
factors within a voucher funding scheme. As currently part of the per student 
funding scheme for federal higher education institutions within the UAE, this type of 
contract could also  be part of a voucher funding scheme to fund specific services or 
programmes such as a medical school or other expensive programmes, the 
provision of postgraduate education, and the undertaking of research.  Under such 
a contract funding would be based explicitly on what a university would deliver for 
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the funding received and what performance indicators would be used to measure 
the deliverables.  
 
5.4.2.2. Physical Facilities and Infrastructure 
Planning for physical facilities and infrastructure would most likely be unstable and 
impractical under voucher funding given the volatility of funding should a sudden 
shift in enrolment occur. Higher education institutions may be reluctant to invest in 
new facilities or undertake necessary upgrading given this level of funding 
uncertainty. A common theme expressed was that a separate strategy for funding 
facilities and infrastructure should be provided outside of voucher funding.  
 
Within the UAE there is a considerable variance amongst higher education 
institutions on how facilities are provided as well as who is responsible for utility 
costs. Within some emirates, primarily Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, facilities are 
provided by the local emirate, and in some cases the utilities are also covered by 
the local emirate. A further variance is that all federal institutions are required to 
have separate facilities for male and female students. For effective competition 
amongst institutions, as proposed under a voucher funding scheme, it is necessary 
that a level playing field exists and that all institutions are competing under the same 
conditions, not only to ensure fairness but necessary to ensure the full benefits of 
competition can be realized.  
 
5.4.2.3. Geographical Access 
The issue of equitable access of higher education for all students is also impacted 
by geographical location. Within the UAE there are sparsely populated areas, such 
as the Western Region, where students do not have access to education facilities 
comparable to their urban counterparts. To address these inequities students could 
be transported to urban settings and access the housing that a number of 
universities are providing. Funding providing by way of voucher would need to be 
supplemented for these additional services. Conversely, governments could 
establish universities in remote areas that could offer specialized programmes, in 
addition to core programmes, providing greater access to students in addition to 
spurring on economic and social development in these remote areas.  Students 
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from outside these remote areas interested in the specialized programmes would 
also need to be provided with additional funds for transportation and 
accommodation; this could mostly likely be provided through a supplementary fund 
in addition to the basic voucher.  
 
5.4.2.4. Administrative Requirements 
The collection and analysis of data were identified as primary administrative tasks 
associated with a voucher funding scheme. This would entail tracking the credits or 
semesters enrolled and completed by individual students along with the various 
voucher values assigned to different subjects and programmes. The tracking would 
not only be from semester to semester and programme year to programme year, 
but also for transfers between programmes and institutions should students decide 
to change their choice of programme or institution. While some higher education 
administrators were cautious about the possible additional administrative work this 
would require a common response was that this information should be readily 
collectable within the universities’ information systems. From the government 
officials viewpoint it was acknowledged that a central depository for the collection 
and analysis of this student funding data would be required given that students 
could be transferring from one institution to another and that there would need to be 
central oversight to ensure consistency in applying data standards and collection. 
The Center for Higher Education Data and Statistics (CHEDS) within the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific that was recently established as the national body 
for the collection, analysis and reporting of data on higher education in the UAE  
was seen as the logical body to support this data collection and analysis for voucher 
funding. 
 
Data audit was another primary administrative task identified to support a voucher 
funding scheme given that if funding would be based on the number of students, 
differentiated by programme and degree type, then this data would translate into 
money, hence the need for an audit function to ensure the data provided by the 
universities was accurate. For the current per student funding scheme the federal 
government utilizes the State Audit Institute (SAI) to audit student enrolments. 
Whether the SAI would be the appropriate body to provide this audit function, or 
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whether this function would better be incorporated under the remit of CHEDS or 
another agency would need to be determined. 
 
Finally there was a caution issued about implementing a voucher system too 
quickly, stressing that sufficient time and attention needs to be given to ensure that 
the administrative requirements are properly thought out. 
 
5.4.2.5. Governance Body 
Funding under a voucher scheme, like all other funding schemes, cannot be open-
ended. If the total funding is fixed then the variables available to the federal 
government for control are the value of the voucher and the number of students 
eligible for vouchers. To effectively balance the distribution of students by institution 
and by programme and subject to meet the overall development needs of the nation 
requires a national planning and coordinating role. This role appears to fall under 
the remit of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research however it is 
questionable whether this role is being fulfilled. For the current per student funding 
scheme a Higher Education Coordinating Council was established to provide 
oversight and governance. The membership of this council is comprised of the 
senior leadership of the three federal universities so it is questionable whether this 
body is able to independently assess its performance or to represent the needs of 
its member’s respective universities along with the needs of the nation. One may 
need to look to other countries for examples for the planning, oversight and 
coordination of funding schemes amongst higher education institutions. In a number 
of countries these roles lie not within a ministry but rather to a semi-autonomous 
body that is independent of a single ministry. 
 
5.4.2.6. Cultural and Organizational Considerations 
While much of the discussion of a voucher funding scheme has focused on the 
mechanics and processes associated with its implementation one should also 
consider the potential impact of the local culture of the UAE. This could especially 
relate to increased entrepreneurial activities that institutions may undertake in their 
quest to become more competitive and market orientated under voucher funding.  
The use of alumni, for example, to help recruit students and to raise funds, while a 
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common practice amongst universities in the west, is still a relatively foreign concept 
with government funded institutions in the UAE. Alumni development and other 
entrepreneurial activities need to guard against being insubordinate to the 
leadership and to respect the local customs and practices. Where appropriate the 
concept of partnering, as in Islamic finance, may need to be followed whereby 
partners agree upon a profit rate for a venture, rather than the concept of charging 
interest for funds provided.  
 
5.4.3. Transition 
When comparing the current per student funding scheme adopted by the UAE 
federal government to voucher funding one may question if there is any difference. 
Some authors contend that any funding system that is driven by student enrolment 
is in effect a voucher system. While the resulting funds provided could be similar 
under a per student funding system and a voucher funding system proponents of 
voucher funding argue that the philosophy and possibly the psychological effects of 
voucher systems influence students to be more aware of the funds provided for their 
education and to be more serious about their higher education, and for institutions 
to become incentivized to improve their efficiencies and quality. 
 
Given that the current per student funding scheme was recently introduced, and 
given the expansive change that has occurred in the UAE over such a short time, a 
number of respondents questioned if the UAE was mature enough to undertake this 
transition and whether more time was needed for policy discussion on the objectives 
of higher education and the resources required and how best funding schemes 
should be derived not only for teaching and learning but for research and knowledge 
transfer as well. Questions were raised on the need to have an operational 
framework in place to support a voucher funding scheme, including a nationwide 
quality assurance programme, a central data unit responsible for the collection and 
audit of unit-based information for each student, and a central agency responsible 
for the coordination and governance of the voucher funding scheme, bringing 
together the interests of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 
the Ministry of Finance and Industry, the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the 
individual Emirates and their respective higher education institutions. The need to 
devote sufficient time and discussion on a voucher plan implementation was 
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highlighted to ensure such a scheme was fully understood not only by the higher 
education institutions but by the government officials responsible for its 
implementation. The standard of school leavers was another issue highlighted and 
whether efforts to raise these standards should be undertaken first before 
considering the implementation of voucher funding. 
 
Given these complexities associated with the implementation of a voucher funding 
scheme a common response was to consider a pilot project for voucher funding with 
selected institutions as well as  phase in periods, with identified timelines and 






















6. Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1. Introduction 
Through the research conducted the arguments for vouchers have been found to be 
largely based on ideologies and theories rather than on evidence of realized 
benefits. Arguments for vouchers often align with the claim that such schemes 
would promote greater student access and would foster improvements in 
efficiencies and quality as institutions would be competing to be responsive to the 
needs of students. In arriving at a conclusion to this research project a first step was 
to return to the fundamental question of what the UAE is trying to do with its higher 
education system and how a voucher funding scheme would fit into this plan. As 
stated in the introduction the market forces that have driven the rapid development 
of the UAE economy could also be seen as the government’s attempt to drive 
competition and efficiencies within its higher education system. Putting funding in 
the hands of students would require the federal higher education institutions to be 
more responsive to student choices and thereby require the institutions to offer 
programmes and services of a higher quality than their competitors in order to 
attract more students. 
 
Increased awareness for both students and their parents of the cost of high 
education could also be seen as another potential consideration of the UAE 
government for implementing voucher funding. While the UAE constitution 
guarantees its citizens free access to primary, secondary and tertiary education, 
along with a host of other social benefits, there is also the realization that this type 
of ‘welfare state’ will not be sustainable in the long run and that citizens should 
become more aware of the costs of services made available to them and should 
hold some accountability for them. Voucher funding, proponents argue, has a 
psychological effect of showing the investment the government is making on behalf 
of the students, money that could be ‘left on the table’ if not utilized, thereby 
encouraging the aspect of student choice and advancing the government policy of 
increasing participation. 
 
The desire of the UAE government to transform its economy into a model where 
growth is driven by knowledge and innovation was identified as a further 
consideration for voucher funding of higher education. A dominant view today is that 
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a knowledge economy, characterized by a large degree of individualism, will result 
in higher education institutions facing increasing student demands for diversity in 
educational services, not just for the years after high school, but increasingly for 
lifelong learning.  Proponents see vouchers as the mechanism to facilitate student 
choice for education diversity; that vouchers could ultimately enable students to 
tailor their individual learning programmes through a combination of different 
faculties and institutions. As such vouchers could be seen as a mechanism for the 
UAE government to facilitate increased education diversity to support its pathway to 
a knowledge economy.  
 
This leads back to the research question of the consequences, intended and 
unintended, of implementing a voucher system for funding higher education within 
the United Arab Emirates. From the research findings one can construct what a 
likely voucher funding scheme for higher education within the UAE would entail, and 
whether such a funding scheme would be workable or not. However the findings 
also point out that there are a number of fundamentals that the UAE government 
needs to address before considering voucher funding or other market-based funding 
models.  As well, a common argument is that a certain degree of government 
regulation is necessary for markets to operate effectively. The conclusion therefore 
addresses both the implications of voucher funding of higher education within the 
UAE as well as the likely prerequisites the UAE government needs to consider for 
market-based funding models and the potential recommendations for a regulatory 
framework. 
 
6.2. Implications of Voucher Funding of Higher 
Education in the UAE and Conclusion 
To begin one can look at the existing systems and processes in place that could 
support a voucher funding scheme within the UAE. Under the current per student 
formula funding scheme (see Appendix 4) the UAE government has already 
established a mechanism for defining funding values differentiated through the use 
of ratios and weightings by programmes, by degree type (Bachelor or Diploma, for 
example) and whether they are laboratory or non-laboratory based programmes. In 
effect separate funding levels have been established between Bachelor and 
Diploma degrees for four subject groups: preparatory subjects, other subjects (non-
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laboratory), laboratory based science subjects and medical subjects. These 
differentiated funding levels could therefore be used to establish different voucher 
values for different programmes and subjects, providing higher funding values at the 
Bachelors level and lower at the Diploma level; higher funding values for medical 
and laboratory subjects and lower funding levels for non-laboratory and preparatory 
subjects. These differentiated voucher values could be established to not only 
recognize the different costs incurred with delivering the different types of 
programmes and subjects but could also be set as an incentive for students and 
universities, and as a means of government steering. Lower funding values for 
preparatory subjects could be seen to incentivise students and universities to spend 
less time in these subjects. Likewise higher funding values in laboratory subjects 
such as science and engineering could be seen as incentives to students and 
universities, and as a steering means for the UAE government, for upward 
progression into these programmes.  
 
It is apparent that voucher funding would not be practical for the provision of 
facilities or infrastructure given the substantial investment required and the risk of 
funding shortfalls given sudden enrolment shifts.  
This does not appear to be an issue within the UAE given the history of local 
emirates providing required facilities and related infrastructure. The funding of 
facility utility costs however would need to be addressed, whether to include in the 
base funding of voucher values or not, to ensure a level playing field for all 
institutions, given that some local emirates now cover these costs.  
 
Additional funding over the basic voucher values would be required where it was 
deemed more cost effective to extend transportation services and provide 
necessary week day accommodation over building new facilities. In such cases a 
supplementary voucher could be provided to students whose geographical location 
would require them to avail of these transportation and accommodation services to 
access the institutions offering their chosen programmes.  
 
While some government steering could be achieved through the provision of higher 
voucher values for strategic programmes it is unlikely that this alone can realistically 
allocate the resources needed to address the specific strategic priorities of the 
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government. The UAE government would likely need to consider fee-for-service 
contracts as the funding methodology for research and national strategic priorities. 
Under this approach funding would be based upon a contract between the federal 
government and the university that explicitly outlines the deliverables that the 
university would provide and the funding that would be received in return. Any 
performance indicators that a university would need to meet to receive the funding 
would be part of the contract along with any penalties that would be applied if the 
contract was not fully met. The term of the contracts should be sufficient to allow 
universities to plan with a reasonable level of stability, hence a term of three to five 
years is proposed; with a five year term for research funding deemed appropriate. 
 
Turning to the issue of voucher eligibility, given that the UAE provides free 
education at all three levels to its citizens, vouchers could be made available to 
national students leaving school who have not previously enrolled in a higher 
education institution, however vouchers could also be extended to all UAE Nationals 
regardless of their age.  For expatriate students a decision would need to be made 
whether to extend voucher funding to these students. Given that the development of 
the UAE depends significantly not only on having a well-educated citizenry but also 
a well-educated expatriate workforce, extending voucher funding to expatriate 
students may be a consideration, and may become more so if income tax for 
expatriates is introduced. At present the UAE does not assess any income tax, 
however should that change then extending the benefit of free or subsidized 
education to expatriates could become a more compelling argument. 
 
Voucher eligibility also raises the issue of balancing life-long learning within budget 
constraints. As the UAE’s current per student funding scheme could be adapted to 
establish voucher values, the initial programmes to be funded by vouchers would be 
for Bachelor and Diploma programmes. As an incentive for students to complete 
their studies within a reasonable time, only the minimum number of credits to 
complete these programmes would be funded through vouchers. If additional time 
was requested to complete a degree, or additional degrees were sought, then these 
would need to be paid for by the students themselves. Postgraduate education 
would fall outside of the voucher funding scheme and would need to be covered 
under the fee-for-service contracts previously discussed. 
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Voucher eligibility in regard to which institutions students could encash their 
vouchers gets at the heart of the proposed benefits of vouchers: student choice and 
competition amongst the higher education institutions. To maximize student choice 
vouchers should be eligible at all higher education institutions within the UAE. This 
would include public, private, emirate owned or foreign owned institutions. These 
institutions however would need to meet certain criteria to be eligible to participate, 
such as implementing common administrative systems to track and audit individual 
student record data; the most critical criteria however being adherence to a quality 
and improvement system, described later in Section 6.2. The inclusion of private 
universities as eligible choices under a voucher funding scheme again raises the 
issue of budget constraints given the additional institutions to be funded by the 
federal government, along with the issue of public funds going into private 
institutions. One option to alleviate this additional budget pressure on the federal 
government would be to limit the value of vouchers available for private institutions. 
Another option would be to look to the local emirates to provide additional “top-up” 
funding.  This additional top-up funding could cover the difference between fees 
assessed by private institutions, emirate owned institutions and foreign owned 
institutions and the reduced federal voucher value. Each individual emirate could 
provide these supplementary vouchers to the respective citizens of their emirate. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 the UAE federal government does not have its own source 
of revenues, given the absence of an income tax system, and is reliant on the 
contributions from the individual emirates for federal funds. Increasingly the 
individual emirates, especially Abu Dhabi and Dubai with their recently established 
education authorities, are looking to invest first in their own institutions rather than to 
make additional contributions to the federal government.  The individual emirates 
may therefore be more receptive to providing supplementary vouchers directly to 
their resident citizens rather than providing additional contributions to the federal 
government. 
 
Additional implications for voucher funding in the UAE include administrative 
systems, a data collection and data audit unit and a quality assurance and 
improvement regime. As voucher funding would require the tracking of individual 
student credits and their associated funding values based on programme and 
subject enrolment, institutions would need to have common administrative systems. 
The three federal higher education institutions, along with the Center for Higher 
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Education Data and Statistics (CHEDS) all utilize the same financial and student 
information systems (formerly known as ‘Banner’) so this should facilitate their 
student credit tracking and funding requirements. Other private, emirate owned or 
foreign owned institutions however would need to align their financial and student 
information systems accordingly. CHEDS, within the Ministry of Higher Education 
and Scientific Research, was recently established as the national body for the 
collection, analysis and reporting of data on higher education in the UAE  and would 
be the logical choice for a central depository for data to support a voucher funding 
scheme. Data audit of enrolments for the current per student funding scheme is 
undertaken by the State Audit Institute and it would appear reasonable that this 
entity would also provide the data audit services under a voucher funding scheme. 
The Commission for Academic Accreditation (CAA), a unit within the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research, is seen as the entity to deliver the quality 
assurance and improvement system called for in a voucher funding scheme to 
ensure the participating institutions, the institutions open to student choice, meet 
stated quality standards and are focused on institution-level quality assurance and 
improvement processes and outcomes measures. Further discussion on the roles 
and responsibilities that both CHEDS and the CAA would provide under a voucher 
funding scheme is contained in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
 
In summary a voucher funding scheme for higher education within the UAE could be 
constructed as follows: 
 Voucher funding levels would be differentiated between Bachelor and 
Diploma degrees for four subject groups: preparatory subjects, other 
subjects (non-laboratory), laboratory based science subjects and medical 
subjects. The mechanism for defining funding values differentiated through 
the use of ratios and weightings by programmes and degree type under the 
current UAE per student funding scheme could also serve to establish the 
voucher values. 
 Only the minimum number of credits to complete the Bachelor and Diploma 
programmes would be funded through vouchers. If additional time was 
requested to complete a degree, or additional degrees were sought, then 
these would need to be paid for by the students themselves.  
 Postgraduate education would fall outside of the voucher funding scheme 
and would need to be covered under fee-for-service contracts. 
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 Fee-for-service contracts would also be utilized for research and national 
strategic priorities. Funding would be based upon a contract between the 
federal government and the university that explicitly outlines the deliverables 
that the university would provide and the funding that would be received in 
return. Any performance indicators that a university would need to meet to 
receive the funding would be part of the contract along with any penalties 
that would be applied if the contract was not fully met.  
 Initially vouchers would be made available to national students leaving 
school who have not previously enrolled in a higher education institution, 
regardless of their age. Additional vouchers could be considered at a later 
time for continued life-long learning. Vouchers for expatriate students could 
also be considered at a later time given that the development of the UAE 
depends significantly not only on having a well-educated citizenry but also a 
well-educated expatriate workforce. The introduction of an income tax 
system for expatriates could also support extending voucher funding to 
expatriate students.  
 The provision of facilities or infrastructure would fall outside of voucher 
funding given the substantial investment required and the risk of funding 
shortfalls given sudden enrolment shifts.  
The continued practice of local emirates providing required facilities and 
related infrastructure would be maintained. 
 Supplementary vouchers would be provided to students whose geographical 
location would require them to avail of transportation and accommodation 
services to access the institutions offering their chosen programmes. 
 To maximize student choice vouchers would be eligible at all higher 
education institutions within the UAE. This would include public, private, 
emirate owned or foreign owned institutions, although voucher values at 
private institutions could be reduced given their ability to assess tuition fees. 
These institutions however would need to meet certain criteria to be eligible 
to participate, such as implementing common administrative systems to 
track and audit individual student record data; the most critical criteria 
however being adherence to a quality and improvement system. 
 To address the additional funds required to extend voucher funding to 
private, emirate owned or foreign owned institutions “top-up” funding 
arrangements would need to be negotiated between the federal government 
and the local emirates. This additional top-up funding could cover the 
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difference between fees assessed by private institutions, emirate owned 
institutions and foreign owned institutions and the reduced federal voucher 
value. Each individual emirate could provide these supplementary vouchers 
to the respective citizens of their emirate rather than increasing their 
contributions to the federal budget. 
 
Having constructed a probable voucher funding scheme for the UAE this brings us 
to the question of whether such a scheme would be workable and would deliver the 
results expected by the government. On the issue of student choice and access to 
the multiple higher education institutions within the UAE the constraining issue 
appears to be more a matter of students being adequately prepared for admission 
into the institutions. Each of the three federally funded higher education institutions 
within the UAE offer foundation, or bridging programmes, in English, mathematics 
and related subjects to bring the skill level of school leaver students up to university 
entry standards. As noted, within the emirate of Abu Dhabi the Abu Dhabi Education 
Council (ADEC) reported that at the start of the 2012-13 academic year only 12 per 
cent of school leavers were able to go straight on to university degree courses, with 
the rest needing remedial lessons in English and other subjects first (ADEC 2013). 
New School Models were introduced in 2010 to address this deficiency as well as to 
target a shift from an emphasis on content (“rote learning”) to one of critical thinking 
and an encouragement to continue learning throughout life. So while a voucher 
funding system could provide the funds for students to attend the programmes and 
institutions of their choice this could be a moot point if the students are not 
adequately prepared and do not meet the institution’s admission requirements. The 
need for the federal higher education institutions to offer these foundation, or 
bridging programmes, also has significant funding implications. The HCT, for 
example, allocates approximately one-third of its budget towards foundation 
programmes. Reducing the need for these programmes would free up additional 
funds for higher education. Arguments have also been made that these costs 
should not be funded by higher education in the first place, that they should be 
funded by the Ministry of Education as part of secondary schooling costs. 
 
The claim that vouchers promote improved quality and efficiency through 
competition was identified as one of the reasons why the UAE has considered 
applying market forces to fund higher education, in particular to the three federally 
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funded higher education institutions. From the research conducted in this project 
there was no evidence that a voucher funding system would deliver the quality and 
efficiency improvements sought by the federal government. On the contrary a 
number of issues were identified that could lead to a misallocation of resources. 
While the UAE government could provide higher voucher values for programmes 
supporting national priorities, along with specific fee-for-service contracts, this is no 
guarantee that students would enrol in the numbers required. Having institutions 
respond directly to student demand could result in an over enrolment in 
programmes popular with students based on current economic cycles but not 
necessarily enrolled in the specialized education to support the future growth 
sectors of the nation, as spelled out for example in the UAE Vision 2021 and the 
Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030. As well programmes of high cultural value but 
low enrolment could be at risk if simply left to student demand. The loss of cultural 
identify has been raised as a concern by UAE leaders and citizens given the rapid 
development of the country and the large proportion of the population comprised of 
expatriates. Universities within the UAE, along with other cultural institutions, are 
often viewed and tasked with the responsibility of being a primary depository of the 
country’s history and culture.  
 
A fundamental criterion for the operation of any effective market is consumer 
information. For voucher funding both students and parents require sufficient and 
reliable information about programmes and services to support their choice and 
decision making. Currently no central depository has been established although 
CHEDS is identified as an entity that could potentially provide information on all 
institutions such as course and programme offerings, enrolment capacities, student 
life amenities, graduate employment statistics, and the like to assist students and 
their parents with their institution choice. CHEDS would need to be fully functional 
as a central depository however before a voucher funding system in the UAE could 
be implemented. 
 
A further issue of implementing voucher funding within the UAE would be the risk of 
an open-ended financial commitment as the government would need to fund all 
eligible institutions based on the students they enrolled. As the Australian review of 
voucher funding for higher education concluded (referenced as the Bradley Review 
Report in the Literature Review Chapter) that while competition for students could 
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lead to improvements in institutional efficiency and responsiveness to students, a 
market based funding scheme also has the potential shortfalls of an open-ended 
financial commitment by the government and the potential misallocation of 
resources in response to student demand versus the requirements of the workforce. 
Similar concerns were expressed by Brown (2013, p. 171) in his writings on the 
marketization of UK higher education where he states “that some competition for 
students and research income leads to improvements in efficiency and 
responsiveness. But if this is carried too far it leads – ironically, given the 
justification for introducing competition in the first place – to waste and inefficiency.” 
The UAE government would therefore need to place a limit on either voucher values 
or the number of students it could fund, in either case limiting the degree of student 
choice available. 
 
While the UAE government, as any government, would need to guard against an 
open-ended financial commitment characteristic of voucher funding, it would also 
need to ensure that adequate levels of funding were available. In referencing Brown 
(2013) and his discussion on the UK experience, he states that “market competition 
is no substitute for adequate levels of funding” (Brown, 2013, p. 172). The argument 
is put forward that sufficient resources need to be available to support core research 
initiatives as well as sustaining quality student learning experiences, such as the 
relationship of staff to students, curriculum and assessment, infrastructure for 
teaching and learning and student support services (Brown, 2013, p. 151). The 
history of implementing the current per student funding scheme illustrates that 
adequate levels of funding were not available to fully implement that funding 
scheme. While the Cabinet approved the per student formula funding scheme not all 
of the elements have been implemented to date, namely the fee-for-service 
contracts and the performance contracts and incentives. As well there has been no 
regular and systematic updating of academic salaries and benefits to ensure current 
benchmarking as called for in establishing the per student funding values. According 
to officials within the federal Department of Finance the funding levels for 
universities, and all other public expenditure, will not be altered until the fall of 2014, 
at which time new funding levels are to be established for a set number of years. 
While the proposed ‘top-up’ funding could potentially provide the additional 
resources required this would need to be weighed against the additional funding 
requirements brought on by the inclusion of the non-federal institutions into the 
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voucher funding scheme as well as the risk of not being able to secure such funding 
arrangements between the federal government and the local emirates.  
 
Voucher funding, as a market model, strives to deliver efficiency in the economic 
sense. Left unchecked however this can lead to a drop in quality. Student choice is 
not always based on selecting quality, and in the absence of a quality assurance 
programme, students could be choosing programmes or institutions that had lower 
standards and were easier to access, which could result in a “race to the bottom”.  
Brown (2013) in addressing the requirement for effective monitoring and regulation 
of quality, highlights that under market based funding there may be greater 
resourcing differences amongst institutions leading to greater differences in quality 
assurance practices. A strong external regime, attending not only to adequacy or 
resourcing, but to how institutions use these resources, with such oversight applied 
to all providers of higher education, is proposed by Brown (2013, p. 176) to ensure 
at least minimum standards of student learning and achievement. The Commission 
for Academic Accreditation (CAA), a unit within the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, has been identified as the logical unit to lead the delivery of 
such a quality assurance and improvement regime. However the CAA’s current 
focus and expertise is on quality assessment, not quality assurance. The CAA 
would need to upgrade its functionality therefore before it could provide the required 
quality assurance and improvement regime required to support voucher funding in 
the UAE. 
 
The most significant impediment in implementing a voucher funding scheme in the 
UAE is seen as a governance gap. In the absence of a centralized planning and 
coordination function individual higher education institutions have been left to 
themselves to develop their programmes according to their strategic plans and 
priorities and not necessarily those of the nation. This is illustrated by the example 
of the formation of the Higher Education Coordinating Council that was established 
in 2008 to govern the new per student funding scheme. The membership of this 
council is comprised of the senior leadership of the three federal universities so it is 
questionable whether this body is able to independently assess its performance or 
to represent the needs of its member’s respective universities along with the needs 
of the nation. A further conflict, until recently, was that the Minister of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research was also the Chancellor of each of the three 
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federal universities. As Chancellor he was responsible for the optimal development 
of each university while as Minister he would be responsible to make decisions that 
were in the best interest of the nation. (This conflict was eliminated in March, 2013 
when the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research was appointed to a 
new cabinet post). 
 
The need for independence, as referenced by Brown (2013), calls for a regulator 
with a wide remit to advise and report on the value being obtained from all 
resources invested in universities, and how the value can be increased, with 
complete independence from government, reporting directly to Parliament (Brown, 
2013, p. 177). The intent here is to have a body that could provide a well-grounded 
and independent view of the higher education system’s performance and 
requirements that would not be unduly influenced by either the government or the 
higher education sector. The UAE would need to introduce such a body before 
considering the implementation of a voucher funding scheme. 
 
In conclusion, while a voucher funding scheme could realistically be constructed for 
the UAE, and while it would increase the awareness of both students and parents of 
the contribution the government is investing of behalf of them,  such a voucher 
system would not be workable given the impediments identified, namely the 
absence of a unit to provide both students and parents sufficient and reliable 
information about programmes and services to support their choice and decision 
making; the absence of a strong quality assurance and improvement regime; the 
lack of funding identified to implement a voucher funding scheme given the inclusion 
of non-federal institutions and the absence of agreements between the federal 
government and local emirates for top-up funding; and most importantly, the 
existence of a governance gap and the need for an independent body to oversee, 
coordinate and plan the development of the higher education system in the UAE. 
The UAE government therefore needs to consider a number of prerequisites before 
considering not only voucher funding specifically, but market-based funding models 
in general. These are discussed in the next section. While these prerequisites are 
tailored for the UAE context the content would also be relevant to other countries 
considering market-based funding models for higher education.  
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6.3. Recommendations for Prerequisites for Market-
based Funding Models for the UAE 
6.3.1. Governance Body 
As previously referenced the governance and oversight of the higher education 
system falls under the remit of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research, whose mandate includes (MOHESR, 1994): 
 Planning the higher education and research systems in the UAE and 
defining the required types, sizes, majors and geographic distribution of 
institutions in light of the overall development needs of the country 
 Coordinating and integrating all the budget needs for all Higher Education 
institutions and research 
 Coordinating and integrating academic majors and degrees and 
programmes offered by all higher education institutions and ensuring their 
alignment with the overall higher education plan 
 Coordinating the admissions policies of the three institutions and the criteria 
for distributing students between the different academic majors within the 
three federal institutions. 
While the Office of Higher Education Policy and Planning within the MOHESR was 
established in 2004 to provide this role, the introduction of the new per student 
funding scheme in 2008 saw this role effectively diminished and replaced with the 
Higher Education Coordinating Council. As the membership of this council is 
comprised of the senior leadership of the three federal universities it is questionable 
whether this body is able to independently assess its performance or to represent 
the needs of its member’s respective universities along with the needs of the nation. 
As such it appears there is currently no unit within the MOHESR that is providing 
this planning and coordination function to ensure that higher institutions are 
interacting to deliver the programmes needed by the UAE leaving the individual 
higher education institutions to themselves to develop their programmes according 
to their strategic plans and priorities and not necessarily those of the nation. To 







In keeping with best practices from other countries such as England, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Hong Kong, and within the Middle East region, Bahrain, establish a semi-
autonomous body such as a Higher Education Council outside of the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research to oversee, coordinate and plan the 
development of the higher education system in the UAE. More specifically the 
Council’s role could include, but not be limited to, approving and monitoring the 
strategic plans of each federal higher education institution to ensure these plans are 
aligned with the nation’s strategic priorities; establishing the admission requirements 
for each institution and the corresponding enrolment targets; overseeing the 
implementation of funding formulas and assessing and consolidating the funding 
needs of the individual universities for presentation to the Cabinet. The Cabinet as 
such would need to establish the membership of this Council which most likely 
would include representation from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research, the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Presidential 
Affairs. The proposed UAE higher education governance reporting structure is 




Figure 12: Proposed UAE Higher Education Governance Reporting Structure 
 
 
6.3.2. Central Depository Requirement 
Accurate and consistent unit-based information for each student, and potential 
student, within the UAE would need to be collected and maintained on a central 
system as a key administrative element to provide accurate information on 
programme costs. This would be required to support the determination of funding 
values as well as determining student eligibility. With funding  based on the number 
of students, likely differentiated by programme and degree type, this various data 
would translate into money; hence there would also be a need for an audit function 
to ensure the data provided by the universities is accurate. These data collection 
and audit requirements could logically be argued to be governed centrally by the 
federal government to ensure consistency and compliance amongst the higher 




In addition to having a central depository for managing funding information the need 
was also identified for a central depository on institutional data to support student 
and parent choice and decision making. Students along with administrators and 
government officials responded to the need for some central depository that could 
provide information on all institutions such as course and programme offerings, 
enrolment capacities, student life amenities, graduate employment statistics, and 
the like to assist students with their institution choice. 
 
Recommendations 
The Center for Higher Education Data and Statistics (CHEDS) within the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific recently established as the national body for the 
collection, analysis and reporting of data on higher education in the UAE would be 
the logical choice for a central depository for data to support a voucher funding 
scheme. Article 2 of Decree No. 347/Year 2011 that established CHEDS defines the 
roles and responsibilities of CHEDS as follows (CHEDS 2011): 
 
“1. Collection and analysis of all information and statistics of each institution 
of higher education (HEI) (University, College, Institution) in the UAE. 
2. Produce and publish annual report on each HEI, through which the 
performance of each HEI is compared with performance indicators for quality 
and excellence; to contribute in demonstrating areas of strength in each HEI 
and describing the required areas for development in its operation. 
3. Produce and publish periodic reports on higher education in the country. 
 
 The Annual Reports referred to an item No. (2) above aims to realize the 
 following:  
 a) Inform decision makers and public of the performance level of each HEI, 
 and enable them to make comparisons among similar educational  programs 
 offered by these institutions, and also general comparison among 
 institutions. 
 b) Demonstrate the relative position of each HEI in the HE array in the UAE. 
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 c) Demonstrate the degree of consistency of HEI’s operation with 
 international norms of quality and the degree to which there norms are 
 realized in the HEI. 
 d) Direct HEI to the areas which require attention for their improvement, as 
 contribution to the preparation of future development plans in all areas, 
 whether academic, student life, or university environment in general.” 
 
As discussed in an earlier section the National Admissions and Placement Office 
(NAPO) is responsible for assessing the skill level of Emirati high school leavers 
and processing their applications for admission to the three federal institutions as 
well as the Abu Dhabi Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(ACTVET) and for study abroad scholarships. Through the administration of the 
Common Educational Proficiency Assessment (CEPA) student eligibility is 
determined for either direct entry into academic programmes or into required 
foundation programmes. Given the complexities of student eligibility and admission 
processes, and ensuring these are aligned with the data collection and analysis 
processes required to support a student driven funding scheme, CHEDS would 
need to coordinate with NAPO to ensure student eligibility and admissions data 
would be collected centrally and would form part of the overall data set required to 
support a student funding scheme. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research would be responsible for this coordination as both units fall within the 
ministry. 
  
While the collection and analysis of all information and statistics of each higher 
education institution in the UAE is referenced as a responsibility of CHEDS, the 
actual audit of this data is not referenced. Under the current per student formula 
funding scheme the federal government has called upon the State Audit Institute 
(SAI) to audit the number of students who have enrolled in the three higher 
education institutions. It would be appropriate for the SAI to continue to perform this 
audit function. 
 
Finally CHEDS could also act as a clearing house for institutional data to support 
student and parent choice and decision making. Through its website, and in the 
producing and publishing of an annual report of each higher education institution as 
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outlined in the CHEDS decree (Article 2 , item 2) the previously mentioned 
information on programme offerings, enrolment capacities, student life amenities, 
graduate employment statistics and the like could be summarized in a consistent 
format for all institutions within the UAE, thereby assisting students and their 
parents in their decision as to which higher education institution to attend. 
 
6.3.3. Quality Assurance and Improvement System 
As discussed in the Summary of Findings section, the Commission for Academic 
Accreditation (CAA), a unit within the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research, is responsible for the licensing and accreditation of the three federal 
higher education institutions along with the private institutions (excluding those 
operating within the free zones). The need to improve quality and efficiency in 
response to market forces will likely require a quality assurance and improvement 
system more focused on institution-level quality assurance and improvement 
processes and outcomes measures than the current approach based on summative 
judgements about delivered quality and compliance. In effect a progression needs 
to be made from ““Quality Assessment”, the mechanism or procedures used to 
determine the extent to which quality exists, to one of “Quality Assurance”, the 
mechanism or procedures used to assure or measure the level or existence of 
quality.   
 
Recommendations 
Implement a system of “academic audits” where the mechanisms and procedures 
use by the institutions to assure and measure and to improve the level of quality are 
evaluated, similar to those in a number of countries, including Australia, New 
Zealand, England, the U.S. state of Tennessee and the Canadian province of 
Ontario. Under this system a select manageable number of important issues are set 
out for audit as opposed to the larger number of issues and requirements called for 
in an accreditation process. The academic audits abide by a high degree of 
transparency and a self-study approach that further supports the focus on 
improvement rather than compliance. The example provided of the Canadian 




It would appear rationale to expand the role of the CAA to include academic audits, 
supported by data collected and analysed by CHEDS. 
 
6.3.4. Funding Policies 
As described in Section 6.2 the funding mechanisms supporting any student driven 
funding model would need to incorporate both price and quantity factors. Price 
factors would address funding values and how these may be differentiated 
according to subject and programme costs, programme levels and durations, and 
institution types, public vs. private. Quantity factors would address the number of 
students eligible for funding, taking into consideration admission requirements and 
the extent to which funding would apply to Emiratis and expatriates. Limits would 
realistically need to be placed on these price and quantity factors to contain costs 
otherwise having no limit in would commit the government to an open-ended 
expenditure that would most likely not be sustainable. It is questionable whether a 
funding mechanism driven by price and quantity factors alone could realistically 
allocate the resources needed to address the specific strategic priorities of the 
government, such as the conduct of research, the provision of postgraduate 
education or capital intensive programmes such as medicine. In this case a fee-for-
service contract, as provided in the current federal per student formula funding 
scheme, would be the appropriate mechanism to allocate funds for such specific 
services. Likewise for the provision of facilities and transportation services where 
supplementary funding outside of the price and quantity factors would likely be 
required to address the funding requirements for these services. From the higher 
education institutions within the UAE researched it appears they have the financial 
and administrative information systems necessary to track and analyse the 
information necessary to support a student driven funding scheme. Nonetheless 
concern was expressed that these administrative efforts should not be an 
overbearing burden. A greater concern expressed was the requirement to have 
timely funding allocations, given a history of some institutions of a delay in 
payments placing cash flow constraints on the institutions.  
 
Recommendations 
Under the current per student formula funding scheme (see Appendix 4) the UAE 
government has already established a mechanism for defining funding values 
176 
 
differentiated through the use of ratios and weightings by programmes, by degree 
type (Bachelor or Diploma, for example) and whether they are laboratory or non-
laboratory based programmes. This mechanism appears appropriate to support a 
student driven funding scheme. The constraint, as previously discussed, is to have 
an adequate level of funding while at the same time to guard against potential 
government budget overruns given that funding values need to be set before 
demand is known. As such, certain limits will need to be implemented, such as the 
maximum number of students funded for specific programmes and degree types. 
The universities themselves could also face budget shortfalls if their projected 
enrolments, and corresponding funding, fall short. Both governments and 
universities will therefore need to undertake longer term planning to allow for budget 
adjustments in future years. The establishment of operating and capital reserves at 
the university level is a further recommendation to help smooth out any potential 
budget deficits or surpluses that may occur in any given year. 
 
As discussed it is unlikely that a student driven funding scheme alone can 
realistically allocate the resources needed to address the specific strategic priorities 
of the government. As such it is recommended that the funding requirements for 
research, post graduate education and national strategic priorities, along with the 
provision of facilities and transportation services, be established by the proposed 
Higher Education Council (HEC) as this would be the body that would be 
responsible for approving and monitoring the strategic plans of the federal higher 
education institutions to ensure they are aligned with the nation’s strategic priorities. 
The HEC would need to identify these research and national strategic priorities and 
determine how these could most effectively be provided through existing facilities 
and infrastructure, and if new facilities were required, along with the associated 
funding requirements. As facilities and infrastructure are currently provided by either 
the federal government or the local emirates it is essential that the HEC coordinate 
the planning and provision of these facilities between these governments to ensure 
the required facilities are developed to accommodate the strategic programmes and 
initiatives identified. The funding of facility utility costs would also need to be 
addressed to ensure a level playing field for all institutions, given that some local 




Transportation services would come into the picture when determining how best to 
coordinate student access from their homes to the institutions offering specific 
programmes and degrees. One would look to the HEC to undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis of extending transportation services and providing necessary week day 
accommodation over building new facilities to determine the most efficient use of 
facilities before building new facilities, taking into consideration reasonable travel 
times. Supplementary funding would need to be provided for students that would 
need to avail of these transportation services to access the institutions offering 
these programmes.  
 
Fee-for-service contracts are recommended as the funding methodology for 
research and national strategic priorities. Under this approach funding would be 
based upon a contract between the federal government and the university that 
explicitly outlines the deliverables that the university would provide and the funding 
that would be received in return. Any performance indicators that a university would 
need to meet to receive the funding would be part of the contract along with any 
penalties that would be applied if the contract was not fully met. The term of the 
contracts should be sufficient to allow universities to plan with a reasonable level of 
stability, hence a term of three to five years is proposed; with a five year term for 
research funding deemed appropriate. 
 
Finally funding disbursements under any student driven funding scheme would need 
to be made in a timely manner so as not to negatively impact the cash flow 
requirements of the universities. For basic funding it is proposed that actual student 
enrolment numbers from the previous semester be used to fund allocations for the 
upcoming semester and that any variances between the two counts be adjusted in 
the next semester funding allocation. This will enable funding levels to be known in 
advance and funded according to a set schedule and will allow the universities to 
plan their cash flow requirements accordingly. For fee-for-service contracts, as 
these are proposed to be negotiated for a three to five year term, the funding 
disbursements should also be spelled out in the contracts based on the specific 




6.3.5. Implementation Plan 
From the previous recommendations the need to have an operational framework in 
place to support a student driven funding scheme has been highlighted, including a 
nationwide quality assurance programme, a central depository unit responsible for 
the collection and audit of unit-based information for each student, and a 
governance structure to coordinate and plan the development of the higher 
education system in the UAE. A critical path will need to identify the sequencing of 
the steps to implement the operational framework and the timelines required. A 
further issue is the standard of school leavers and the government efforts and 
timelines to raise these standards to the level where school leavers could be direct 
entrants into the universities. 
 
Recommendations 
Addressing the governance gap should be the first priority. The establishment of a 
higher education council as discussed in the earlier recommendation would provide 
the mechanism for overseeing the implementation of operational framework to 
support a student funding scheme and would be the entity with the authority to steer 
the funding scheme and to make the necessary decisions. While it would be up to 
this higher education council to develop the specific implementation plan and 
timelines, the critical path should include the processes for implementing the 
operational framework, starting with the implementation of a central depository unit 
responsible for the collection and audit of unit-based information for each student. 
This would likely be the longest lead-time item however with the establishment of 
CHEDS and the State Audit Institute a number of processes and systems are 
currently in place that could be expanded upon to support the data collection and 
audit functions. The implementation of a Quality Assurance and Improvement 
system would follow, looking to expand the role of the CAA to include academic 
audits, supported by data collected and analysed by CHEDS. Establishing 
agreements on policies and funding would entail setting the various funding levels 
and establishing the agreements with each of the federal universities for fee-for-
service contracts and associated performance indicators. Lastly a communication 
plan would need to be developed notifying the higher education institutions and the 
prospective and continuing students of the proposed funding system. While some of 
these tasks would need to be done in a sequential order as listed, it is not to say 
that some could be done concurrently. Again, as the first step would be the 
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establishment of the higher education council as the governance body, this entity 
would have the charge of determining the most effective implementation plan and 
the time required for each of these tasks.  
 
Finally the coordination of admission criteria for the three federal universities should 
fall under the remit of the higher education council. This would ensure that the 
admission policies of the three institutions would complement, and not compete, 
with each other. The existing National Admissions and Placement Office (NAPO) 
would continue as the central entity for all admissions ensuring the distribution of 
students in the most effective manner and in alignment with the nation’s overall 
higher education strategic priorities. The higher education council, in establishing 
the admission policies of the federal institutions, should also examine the issue of 
the entry standards of high school leavers. Given that each of the federal 
universities invests heavily in foundation programmes to bring the level of school 
leavers up to university entrance standards (in the case of the HCT, this being 
approximately 30 per cent of its budget) it may be more efficient to have these 
foundation programmes consolidated into one of the universities (such as the HCT) 
or to have programme purpose institutions, such as community colleges, 
established to offer these programmes. The higher education council would also 
need to work in coordination with the local emirates that have implemented school 
standards upgrading programmes, such as Abu Dhabi’s New School Model, to 
ensure that these programmes are aligned with the entry requirements of the 
universities. 
 
6.4. Originality, Significance and Limitations of the 
Study 
As stated, the implementation of vouchers as a scheme of funding higher education 
has been very limited, with claimed benefits being for the most part theoretical 
rather than empirical. In the case of the UAE, limited research has been conducted 
into the study of implementing voucher funding for higher education. This case 
study was looked upon to develop generalizations and pathways that the UAE 
government could utilize when considering the degree of market competition to 
implement for funding higher education within the UAE. Further the generalizations 
could provide propositions that could form the inputs into further research. The 
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proposed framework that identifies the pre-requisites that the UAE government 
should have in place when considering the degree of market competition in its 
higher education funding scheme, while addressing the unique characteristics of the 
UAE, could also serve as a guiding framework for other countries considering 
greater degrees of market completion in their higher education funding schemes. 
The research approach utilized in this study, evaluating the implementation of 
voucher funding for higher education through the three categories of Proposed 
Voucher State Attributes, Enablers (Constraints) and Transition, could also serve as 
a guide to other researchers evaluating the implementation of voucher funding for 
higher education. 
 
In regard to limitations of the study, the market system pre-requisites identified are 
based on Brown’s 2013 study focusing primarily on the UK, which has a 
parliamentary democracy that could be said to ‘fit’ a market system, whereas such a 
democracy does not exist within the UAE. One could argue however that market 
systems due flourish in non-democratic countries, such as China. The rapid 
development of the UAE was facilitated in large part by a pragmatic approach, 
utilizing market-based strategies alongside state-owned entities. As such one could 
contend that the market system pre-requisites of adequate funding, quality 
assurance and effective governance would be seen as pragmatic and necessary 
within the UAE in terms of higher education funding schemes regardless of the level 
of democracy. 
 
Other limitations of the study include the unavailability to interview the government 
officials of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs may have resulted in missing some of 
the objectives of the government and what it saw as possible implications of 
voucher funding schemes. While these government officials declined to be 
interviewed the consultants engaged to undertake this study of behalf of the Ministry 
were interviewed, and through this it is believed a fair interpretation of the Ministry of 
Presidential Affairs’ objectives and insights were obtained. 
In some cases the interview data was insufficient and needed to be validated. 
Triangulation was utilized as a way of cross-checking the results achieved from the 
interviews against other sources of data, primarily government policy documents, 
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journals on higher education and other writings as referenced in the literature 
review.   
 
While the theory generated provided an operational framework for the UAE to follow 
to aid it in determining the appropriate market driven funding scheme for higher 
education, more detailed work is required to determine the intricacies of the funding 
models. As the DBA thesis has a limitation on words and needs to be concise and 
























7.1. Appendix 1: Interview questions – Original 
Main Research Question: 
What are the consequences, intended and unintended, of implementing a voucher 
system for financing higher education within the United Arab Emirates? 
Interview Questions: 
Interview Questions Audience 
Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions Explanatory Notes Gov’t 
Officials 
Univ. Admin  Students
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Officials 
Univ. Admin  Students
    Public  Private  Public Private































































7.2. Appendix 2: Interview questions - Final 
Main Research Question: 
What are the consequences, intended and unintended, of implementing a voucher 
system for financing higher education within the United Arab Emirates? 
Interview Questions:  
Interview Questions   











Liberal  market  approach  – to  improve 
quality  and  efficiency  through 
competition.    For  institutions  to  attract 
more  students  they  will  need  to  make 
provision  that  is  of  higher  quality  than 
their competitors. 
    1.1.1  How  will  voucher 
funding provide  incentives 
to  institutions  to  improve 
education  quality  and 
make  better  use  of  public 
funds? 




As  institutions  compete  for  more 
students  how  will  they  ensure  quality 
standards  are  maintained?  E.g.  regular 
monitoring and publishing results. 




effect  reforms  or  does 
marketplace  competition 






















quality  assurance  and  improvement 
processes  and  outcomes  measures  – 
Academic Audits 
   
  1.2. Equity Overarching  Question: 
Does  voucher  funding 
achieve  equal  access  to 
higher education? 
Social  policy  approach  ‐  to  increase  the 
equality of educational opportunity 
    1.2.1  Should  all  Emirati 
citizens,  regardless of age, 
be  eligible  for  vouchers? 
Or  should  vouchers  be 





Issue  of  lifelong  learning  versus 
undergraduate  and  perhaps  graduate 
education. 
 
The  development  of  the  UAE  depends 
not  only  on  having  a  well‐educated 
citizenry  but  also  on  the  presence  of 
well‐educated  expatriates,  many  who 
have made the UAE their home an whose 
commitment  is  to  the  UAE.  Budgetary 
constraints are an issue. 




Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions  Explanatory Notes 
   
tied  to  particular  regions 
















    1.3.1  Should  specific 
vouchers be tied to certain 
courses  such as classics or 





a  primary  depository  of  a  country’s 
history and culture. 
    1.3.2  Should  specific 
vouchers be tied to certain 









could  fall  below  levels  required  to 
support  a  nation’s  strategic  and 
economic objectives. 
    1.3.3.  Should  vouchers 
only  be  used  at  the 
undergraduate  level  or 
should  they  be  extended 
to  cover  postgraduate 
studies?  Should  vouchers 
A  balance  needs  to  be  struck  between 
encouraging people – young and old – to 
further  their  education  and  budgetary 
















control  costs  if  vouchers 
are  driven  by  student 
choice? 
    1.4.1  How  can  the 
government  limit  the 
number of  vouchers  given 
that  funding  is  not  open 




ended  financial  commitment  and 
therefore  need  to  limit  the  number  of 
students it could fund through vouchers. 
    Overarching  Question: 
Should  voucher  funding 
be  extended  to  private 
institutions  or  other  non‐
publicly  funded 
institutions? 
Issue  of  public  funds  being  used  for 
private education. 



















    Overarching  Question: 
Should  top  up  fees  be 
allowed  to  supplement 
vouchers? 
    1.4.3. Given  that  federally 
funded  institutions  do not 
charge  tuition  fees  for 
Emirati  students  should 
top up fees be assessed as 
a  source  of  additional 
funds? 
The  UAE  has  a  constitutional 
requirement  that Emirati  citizens  should 
be  provided  with  free  education  hence 
tuition fees are not assessed. 
    1.4.4.  If  federally  funded 
institutions  charge  top‐up 
fees  should  these  be  paid 
by the Emirate (local state) 
for  the  Emirati  students 
resident of the Emirate? 
As each student  is a resident of one and 
only  one  Emirate  he/she  would  only 
receive one supplementary voucher. 
    1.4.5.  Given  that  the 
Federal  Government  is 
reliant  upon  its  funding 
from  contributions  from 
the  local  Emirate  states 
and  given  that  historically 
not  all  Emirates  have 
contributed  their  required 
Having  the  Emirates  states  fund 
supplementary  vouchers used  to  top up 
Federally  funded  vouchers may  address 
the  issue of not all Emirates contributing 
their share of funds to the Federal Gov’t 
for  its  operations.  Local  emirates  may 
have  more  incentive  to  fund 




Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions  Explanatory Notes 
   
share  of  funding,    would 
having top‐up fees, funded 
as  supplementary 


















to  100%  (pure  central  planning)  or 
anywhere in between. 
    In  England  universities  receive  two 
streams  of money:  the  fee  paid  by  the 
student  (in  effect  paid  by  the  Gov’t  on 
their behalf  and  then  recouped  through 
the taxation system) and the Gov’t grant 
paid  by  HEFCE  (which  is  dependent  on 
the number of students recruited and the 




















might HEI’s  incur  from  the 
implementation  of  a 
voucher funding system? 
    2.1.2  Should  voucher 
funding  be  limited  to 
Diplomas  and  Bachelor’s 
degree?    Should  voucher 
funding also be considered 
for Graduate degrees? 
    2.1.3 How  should  voucher 
values  be  decided  and 
funded? 
Should  values  be  decided  based  on 
programme  costs?  Should  strategic 
programmes  as  identified  by  the  gov’t 
receive additional funds? Should funding 
be based on credits offered? 
    2.1.4.  How might  voucher 
funding undermine budget 
stability  for  a  higher 
education  institution  and 
how  might  this  affect 
educational  programmes 
and services? 
    2.1.5.  Would  voucher 
funding  provide  an 
incentive  for  the  local 
Emirates  to  “top‐up”  the 


















addressed  in  a  voucher 
funding scheme? 









    2.2.3  Would  there  be  a 
mismatch  and  waste  of 
physical  spaces – even  for 
popular institutions? 





of  funding  if  based  solely 
on  student  demand  – 
thereby  having  an 













from  rural  areas  be 
provided with equal access 
to  educational  institutions 
as  those  from  urban 
areas? 
Student choice is limited by geographical 
factors.  Urban  areas  have  a  greater 
diversity  of  institutions  and  have  public 
transportation.  The  same  diversity  and 
accessibility is not available in rural areas 
within  reasonable  travel  distances 
thereby  not  allowing  the  same  level  of 
access for rural students. 
















Historically  universities  have  tended  to 
exhibit collegial  /collaborative cultures – 
would  this  shift  to  a  more 
entrepreneurial,  market  orientated 
culture? 





Programmes  may  be  subject  to  more 
changes  (additions,  deletions, 
modifications)  under  a  market  driven 
environment  –  part  time  faculty  may 





Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions  Explanatory Notes 
   
    2.4.3  Does  voucher 












more  freedom  to  choose 
their  higher  education 
institution  and  does  it 
make  students  more 
aware  of,  and  more 























Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions  Explanatory Notes 
   
UAE?
    3.1.3.  If  you  had  been 
given  a  voucher  to  attend 
any  institution  in  the UAE 
would you have enrolled in 
a  different  university  than 
the  one  you  are  currently 
enrolled in? 





    3.1.5.  Would  students  be 








3.2.1.  Do  you  think 
voucher  funding  make 
students  more  aware  of 
the  cost  of  higher 
education? 
    3.2.2.  Do  you  think 
voucher  funding  provides 
an  incentive  for  students 
to use their voucher rather 
than  not  using  it  and 





Theme  Sub‐Theme  Questions  Explanatory Notes 
   
    3.2.3.  Do  you  think 
voucher  funding  instils  a 






    3.2.4.  Do  you  think 
voucher  funding  makes 























7.3. Appendix 3: Data Collection – Interviewees 
 
 
Actors Institution Position 
GOVERNMENT Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, Commission for 
Academic Accreditation 
Commissioner for Development 
 
 Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, Higher 
Education Coordinating Council 
Former Managing Director 
 
 Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, Higher 
Education Coordinating Council 
Associate Managing Director 
 
 Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Department 
Head, Budget Department 
 Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Department 
Budget Officer 
 Ministry of Presidential Affairs Consultancy Engagement 
 Ministry of Presidential Affairs Consultancy Engagement
 Abu Dhabi Education Council Division Manager, Global 
Partnerships 
 Abu Dhabi Education Council Section Manager for Planning and 
Performance Management - Higher 
Education 
 Dubai Knowledge and Human 
Development Authority 
Executive Director, Higher Education 
UNIVERSITIES - 
PUBLIC 
Higher Colleges of Technology Vice Provost, Planning and 
Administration 
 United Arab Emirates University Chief Financial Officer 
 Zayed University Chief Administrative and Finance 
Officer 
UNIVERSITIES –  
PRIVATE
Abu Dhabi University Executive Director, Institutional 
Research 
 American University of Sharjah Vice Chancellor for Finance and 
Administration 
 British University in Dubai Registrar 
STUDENTS  Abu Dhabi University 
 
Focus Group 
 Al Hosn University 
 
Focus Group 





7.4. Appendix 4: UAE Federal Government Per Student 
Funding Scheme 
 
Annex A: Per Student Funding Scheme for Higher Colleges of Technology 










Medical Subjects A 0 0 0 551,250 1 1 #DIV/0!
Lab Based Science B 4387 2077 2310 420,000 0.7 1 360,346
Other Subjects C 7095 4059 3036 367,500 0.8 1 325,451
Preparatory Subjects D 5182 5182 0 327,600 1 0 327,600





Medical Subjects A 6.25 5
Lab Based Science B 15 12
Other Subjects C 17.5 14













Ratio of Exp. To 
Faculty Comp.
Allocation
Medical Subjects A 0 0 0 0 2.426000000 0 0
Lab Based Science B 331 138 193 119,262,522 1.523039996 181,641,591 300,904,113
Other Subjects C 449 232 217 146,062,482 0.729600000 106,567,187 252,629,669
Preparatory Subjects D 324 324 106,101,450 0.455999998 48,382,261 154,483,711
Total 1,104 694 409 371,426,454 336,591,039 708,017,492
ADJUSTMENTS / STUDENT






Student FTE Academic 
Salary & Benefit 
Scale
Salary Wt. for 
Subject Group 
up to Diploma




Annex B: Per Student Funding Scheme Summary – Federal Universities (2006-07 Academic Year Data) 
ENROLLMENT  UAE University Zayed University HCT 













Medical Subjects  A   244 244         
Lab Based Science  B    3,074 3,074   478 478  2,077 2,310 4,387 
Other Subjects  C   183 6,080 6,263   1,625 1,625  4,059 3,036 7,095 
Preparatory  D   4,718  4,718  1,129  1,129  5,182  5,182 
Total    4,901 9,398 14,299  1,129 2,103 3,232  11,318 5,346 16,664 
               
FUNDING/STUDENT  1 Assumed Exp.    Assumed Exp.    Assumed Exp.    
               
Medical Subjects  A  87,744,655   359,609         
Lab Based Science  B  271,454,130   88,306  42,210,499   88,306 300,904,444   68,590
Other Subjects  C  281,039,455   44,873 73,778,366   45,402 252,630,117   35,607
Preparatory  D  140,651,424   29,812 33,657,367   29,812 154,484,035   29,812
Total  780,889,664   54,611 149,646,232   46,301 708,018,596   42,488
            
ADJUSTMENTS/STUDENT            
Medic’s Salaries      2,241,750   157           
Emiratization  2   36,359,395   2,543         
Size/Scale  3   15,617,793   1,092  47,886,794   14,816  127,443,347   7,648 
Total   54,218,938   3,792  47,886,794   14,816  127,443,347   7,648 
GRAND TOTAL  835,108,602 4  58,403 197,533,026   61,118 835,461,943   50,136 
Footnotes: 1  Funding model assumes it is cheaper to engage faculty to teach courses in humanities than in the sciences and that teaching diploma level courses is cheaper than teaching 
      Degree level courses. As such the salary and allowance levels for each subject group and for the level of qualifications aimed for are as follows:    
  Qualification  
  Above Diploma Diploma  
Medical Subjects  A 551,250   
Lab Based Science  B  420,000 360,346 Diploma weighted at 0.7 
Other Subjects  C  367,500 325,451 Diploma weighted at 0.8 
Preparatory  D  327,600 327,600  
 
  2  UAEU employs substantially more UAE Nationals than the other institution hence additional funding is provided as compensation for Nationals is higher than for expatriates 
  3  The funding model includes a variable factor for size and scale to reflect the extra funds necessary to cater for small classes as a result of geographically dispersed  
      campuses, for single gender education and to allow for Zayed University’s small size and multiple programs. The following factors have been applied: UAEU 1.02; Zayed  
      University 1.32; HCT 1.18 




ADU  Abu Dhabi University 
ADEC  Abu Dhabi Education Council 
AHU  Al Hosn University 
AUS  American University of Sharjah 
BUiD  British University in Dubai 
CAA  Commission for Academic Accreditation 
CEPA  Common Educational Proficiency Assessment 
CHEDS Center for Higher Education Data and Statistics 
EMIRATI UAE Citizen 
HCT  Higher Colleges of Technology 
KHDA  Knowledge and Human Development Authority (Dubai) 
KU  Khalifa Univeristy 
MOE  Ministry of Education 
MOFI  Ministry of Finance and Industry 
MOHESR Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
MOPA  Ministry of Presidential Affairs 
NAPO  National Admissions and Placement Office 
SAI  State Audit Institute   
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
UAEU  United Arab Emirates University 
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